

Thinking, Conception and Construction of Intelligenism

From Theory to Organization

By Minghai Zhuo

Preface to the English Edition

Hello, English-speaking readers!

I'm delighted to present the English edition of this book to you. Six months ago, translating this book into English and publishing it seemed a distant prospect. During the translation process, I was unable to find readers whose native language was English and who had a complete understanding of philosophy, intelligence, and organizational management to review the translation and provide suggestions for revisions. But six months later, it's finally here. Ultimately, I thank the rapid advancements in AI, which have enabled me to find a seemingly viable balance between artificial translation and AI review, making this translation effort possible. During the translation process, when I'm unsure whether certain expressions are appropriate, I can directly chat with GROK to ask and discuss. Additionally, after completing the translation, I can utilize AI to review grammar and word choice. When I'm still unsure about the details of an expression, I'll collect some word usage examples and compare them with the AI's opinions to determine the final word choice. However, as a native Chinese author, although I have tried my best to eliminate all errors, I may still not be able to eliminate all potential errors in word choice and expression that may appear in this book. So, I'm very sorry for this and have left my email address below. If you are still confused about the word choice, expression, or logic of this book while reading, please send me an email, and I will do my best to explain it.

(My email: zhuominghai88@gmail.com)

It has always been my plan to distribute this book free of charge. As I said in the preface, I don't want to use this book as a source of profit for my future career. However, considering the pricing rules of the publishing platform, I may have to charge a certain amount for purchasing the English version. However, considering my past vision, I will set the price of the English version of this book as low as possible, hoping to make up for my past vision and my poor English translation skills.

As a Chinese speaker, my career has remained primarily focused in China for over a decade since I graduated. While I know I must expand my horizons and even establish my own business globally, family and career constraints have necessitated more time for preparation and planning. Furthermore, I'm not exceptionally gifted with languages, which means I'll need to invest time in further English learning. Therefore, as outlined below in this book, the business development approach based on the Intelligenism framework will continue to focus primarily on the Chinese market for the next two to three years. This means that much of the supporting materials on Intelligenism theory will not be available in English in the near future, for which I sincerely apologize.

I previously registered a website (Intelligenism.org), but as of September 2025, its content remains primarily in Chinese. In the future, I plan to explore ways to incorporate more English content on the website, making it a communication platform accessible to both English and Chinese readers. However, this plan may require a year or more to develop and refine.

I must admit that when I attempted to publish this book in English, I discovered that the time and cost of publishing a book in Europe or the United States differed significantly from that in China. In China, publishing a book can cost \$5,000 or more and take anywhere from six months to a year. But in the English-speaking world, everything is much simpler. While writing this book, I often had the feeling that if its content were truly valuable, it might be more suited to American or European society. If this feeling were to come true, I'd find it a bit ironic. However, thank you again for your support of this book. Let us begin this thought experiment in "Intelligenism"!

Preface

Clarification on Content

When you come across the title Thinking, Conception and Construction of Intelligenism in this book, on a website, or through other content platforms, you may be drawn to the term "intelligence" mentioned in the text. However, it is essential to clarify from the outset that the content of this book does not primarily focus on how humans should navigate the era of artificial intelligence, nor does it explore new lifestyles or learning methods in the wake of AI's arrival. Many people, upon seeing the word "intelligenism," might assume the subsequent content is related to artificial intelligence. While it is true that my career has involved some engagement with AI, and the text includes a brief introduction to the network structure of specific AI models, I have no intention of delving deeply into the field of artificial intelligence. I have read books that introduce AI or envision the AI era, written by authors with far greater technical expertise than I, and I see no need to overstep my bounds in this domain. Moreover, writing a specialized book on artificial intelligence was never my intention for this work. So, it's necessary to clarify at the beginning what this book is not about.

Definition of Intelligenism

When you visit the homepage of the website (intelligenism.org), you will encounter the term intelligenism alongside the title Thinking, Conception and Construction of Intelligenism. The suffix "-ism" or the Chinese term "智能主义" (intelligenism) might evoke associations with terms like Darwinism, chauvinism, capitalism, or socialism. To clarify the purpose of this book, we must begin with the concept of intelligenism. Undeniably, intelligenism falls within the category of "-isms." According to Wikipedia's explanation of "-ism," it refers to "an ideology or a comprehensive system of thought and belief, or it can be seen as different methods to achieve various purposes." More precisely, an "-ism" typically represents a complete foundational thought or ideology underlying a particular trend or behavioral pattern within a human group.

To illustrate with two examples:

- **Capitalism** (English: *capitalism*), as described on Wikipedia, is an economic system characterized by private ownership as the mode of production and the pursuit of profit as its core. Its key features include capital accumulation,

competitive markets, pricing systems, private property, property rights, free trade, and wage labor.

- **Darwinism** (English: *Darwinism*) is a term that has come to represent the broader scope of evolution and change in both biology and sociology. A prominent phrase associated with it is "survival of the fittest," which later became a hallmark of Darwinism. Modern "social Darwinism" is often analogous to Darwinism, applying Darwin's principle of "struggle" to society, typically in support of anti-philanthropic political agendas. Another interpretation suggests that, as natural selection no longer operates on "civilized" humans, "inferior" races might outcompete "superior" ones, making voluntary corrective measures, such as eugenics, desirable.

Drawing from Wikipedia's definitions of capitalism and Darwinism, it is evident that "-ism" terms often represent sociological expressions, reflecting the behavioral tendencies and corresponding values of certain groups. Similarly, intelligenism exhibits these characteristics, carrying sociological significance. In defining intelligenism, I focus on how intelligence is manifested in structures ranging from individuals to organizations (from single entities to multi-entity organizations) and the specific features and rules governing this manifestation. From individual human cells to organ systems, from neurons in the brain to its various regions and the brain as a whole, and extending to artificial intelligence programs—from a single neuron in a neural network to the entire network structure—I have observed that simple entities can form more intelligent organizational structures through specific collaborative mechanisms. These higher-intelligence organizations can, in turn, serve as individual components in constructing even larger, more intelligent organizational structures, thereby achieving greater manifestations of intelligence.

Based on this perspective, I began to consider whether enterprises and other social organizations could adopt the construction methods of intelligent agents to create more intelligent organizational forms, thereby gaining greater competitive advantages. Grounded in this vision, I define the values, ideologies, and corresponding behaviors of participants in this construction process as intelligenism. In traditional enterprise and organizational management, leaders tend to focus on order, control, and predictability. But do these traits necessarily translate into organizational competitiveness? Under the framework of intelligenism, if we shift the core goal of organizational construction toward the manifestation of intelligence—enabling the organization to exhibit intelligence surpassing that of its individual members—could this lead to a uniquely competitive edge? This exploration of a distinctive, highly competitive organization is my vision for intelligenism, and constructing social and commercial organizational forms with intelligence as the goal is the central aim of this book.

Form of Content Presentation

Before delving into the complete text, I would like to explain the nature and form of the book's content. For some time before starting this project, I had considered writing a book. However, traditional publishing would require readers to purchase the book, which conflicts with my intention of not profiting from publication. As a result, the idea of solely writing a book was soon abandoned. I then considered publishing the content as a text-based blog on specific platforms, as this would enable free dissemination and a broader reach. After evaluating the customization capabilities of blog platforms, I found them to be limited, which led me to choose a website as the optimal solution. A website allows for flexible adjustments to layout and content structure, which may enhance readers' understanding and engagement. Additionally, in the future, if conditions permit, I could add videos to accompany each chapter on the website, and any questions or new insights could be addressed through comments or further edits. Considering these factors, a website is the optimal medium for this book.

Although the content was initially planned as a book, it differs from typical blog posts, which often focus on time-sensitive topics. As the title "Thinking, Conception, and Construction of Intelligenism" suggests, my goal is to thoroughly explain this concept, which is why I initially considered writing a book. As the first draft neared completion, I realized that since the text was largely complete, the cost of distributing it across multiple platforms was low. Therefore, I decided to make the content available on all cost-effective channels to maximize its exposure. This means readers can access the full content for free through blogs or the website without needing to purchase a book. Of course, if readers find value in purchasing a paid version (e.g., for an audiobook feature or other purposes), I would naturally welcome that as well.

Our Era and Social Environment

After decades of economic dividends from China's reform and opening-up, the country is now entering a phase where these dividends are dissipating. Simultaneously, the Chinese real estate sector has peaked and begun to decline, with nearly all private real estate companies facing survival challenges. Amid this economic backdrop, societal sentiments have shifted. In the past, leading private entrepreneurs were widely admired, even idolized by younger generations. However, many entrepreneurs are now labeled as "capitalists" in public discourse, a term that carries negative connotations in China. The agility and ambition once associated with private enterprises have lost some of their luster. In specific industries, state-owned enterprises are leveraging their status as a selling point, implying greater reliability compared to private firms.

However, upon closer examination of various enterprises, I believe that state-owned enterprises still struggle to achieve robust decision-making incentives and effective

mobilization. In state-owned enterprises, decision-makers are not owners, meaning the penalties for poor decisions and the rewards for good ones are insufficient. In private enterprises, particularly large ones, the ability to mobilize mid- and lower-level employees is waning. As the economic "pie" stops growing, the traditional top-down profit distribution model limits expected gains for lower-level employees, with widespread salary cuts and layoffs occurring during economic downturns. This has made the conflict of interest between enterprise owners and employees more explicit, exacerbated by shifting societal sentiments. The optimistic visions of enterprise growth once shared by entrepreneurs are increasingly perceived by employees as "painting a big picture" (implying exaggeration or empty promises). The relationship between employees and enterprises is gradually becoming a simple transactional relationship - labor for wages.

With the rising average educational level among China's younger generation, there is growing resistance to low-paying, poorly working conditions jobs. Many young people, unable to find satisfactory employment, choose not to work. In addition, slowing economic growth has hindered wealth accumulation among young people, exacerbated the wealth gap and class divisions, fueled populism, and reduced the potential for consumption. Growing distrust of private enterprises, with entrepreneurs being labeled "capitalists," and intensified class tensions have heightened business owners' insecurity, leading to industrial relocation and reduced investment.

In summary, both state-owned and private enterprises in China are hitting development ceilings due to mobilization limits and declining incentives. Globally, wealth inequality remains a challenge without effective solutions, and the rise of populism and value conflicts continues to dominate.

My Plan

At this point, it should be clear that the purpose of this book is to construct a comprehensive system of thought and theory, which I call intelligenism. What intelligence is, what constitutes an intelligent agent, and what intelligenism entails cannot be fully explained in this preface; these concepts will be explored in depth in subsequent chapters.

The goal of this book is to thoroughly elucidate the Thinking, Conception, and Construction of Intelligenism. The content will progress from reflections and logical deductions related to intelligenism (1) to introducing its visions and concepts (2) and ultimately presenting organizational construction methods for applying intelligenism in commercial contexts (3). This progression aims to clearly articulate the Thinking, Conception, and Construction of Intelligenism.

After completing the initial draft, I will continue to refine and expand the content, striving to make the theoretical system more robust over time and through practical application. Once the draft is finalized, I will gradually open discussions, organizing

questions, answers, and debates related to each chapter, which will serve as valuable sources for future revisions. If necessary, I may produce videos to lower the barrier to understanding the content.

As a pragmatist, I do not wish for intelligenism to remain a purely theoretical or utopian concept, nor do I want it to serve as a mere consolation for the disillusioned. My pursuit is the practical value of this theoretical system, with its realization in practice as the ultimate goal. This book is merely the beginning of that process, not its end. As the theoretical framework nears completion, I plan to use intelligenism to establish intelligent collective organizations and conduct commercial experiments. The content of this book will serve as the theoretical foundation for these organizations, while their operations will provide opportunities to observe the development and evolution of intelligenism and intelligent collectives in practice. The real-world value of any "-ism" should be tested and refined through social practice, which will also provide material and feedback for future expansions of intelligenism-related content.

The Philosophical Foundation of Intelligenism

Introduction

When I began planning to write this book, I felt it necessary to start with some of my personal philosophical reflections. As a professional investor, I have read many of George Soros's works and delved into the writings of his mentor, Karl Popper, which I believe have greatly benefited my investment decision-making. However, as I observed markets and society more closely and started engaging with knowledge about artificial intelligence and the works of Douglas Hofstadter, I began to think that some of Popper's ideas could potentially be refined by integrating insights related to intelligence. While I cannot claim the absolute truth of these ideas, they have achieved a certain logical coherence in my view.

In this book, I propose the concept of Intelligenism and a new organizational form under this concept—the Intelligent Consortium. I also hope to embark on new ventures based on this conceptual framework and organizational vision in the future. When tracing the origins of Intelligenism, I must acknowledge that it stems from my reading of philosophical texts and the subsequent reflections. Since the concept originates from philosophy, it is necessary to treat philosophy as the foundational logic of Intelligenism and discuss it in the earlier parts of this book. The latter half of the book focuses on the organizational framework under Intelligenism, the logic and structural vision of the Intelligent Consortium. It will repeatedly reference the philosophical concepts introduced in this chapter. Therefore, if readers can familiarize themselves with these philosophical ideas in advance and connect them with the theoretical perspectives on intelligence discussed later, they will find it easier to understand the theoretical logic, organizational principles, and framework of Intelligenism. Thus, I believe this chapter serves as a guiding framework for the entire book. I will strive to explain my philosophical reasoning in simple, accessible language, ensuring that even readers unfamiliar with philosophy can understand the content.

The Dilemma of Absolute Truth in Theories

Throughout my career in investment and business management, constructing decision-making systems and making decisions have been critical components of my work. I need to study decision-making more thoroughly and spend more time on it than people in other industries. Since decision-making is central, I naturally focus on the correctness of decisions and the origin of truth. Similarly, as a manager in

business, I need to make correct decisions or ensure the company as a whole can make proper decisions, even if they are not optimal or absolutely correct, at least within the best of its capabilities. In post-mortems, I often revisit past scenarios and consider how things might have unfolded if I had made different decisions.

In one thought experiment, I imagined myself in the era of the geocentric model, suddenly realizing that in that time, the geocentric model was considered the truth until the heliocentric model emerged. Even after the heliocentric model appeared and people realized the geocentric model was not the truth, they still mistakenly believed the heliocentric model was the truth until it was overturned as well. This means that over the thousand years from the geocentric to the heliocentric model, whether humanity believed in the geocentric or heliocentric model, some future theory would eventually overturn the theories they accepted, and humanity would never reach the final, absolute truth. Faced with this reality, how can I be certain that the theories in my mind today won't be overturned a century from now or at some point in the future? Even if I think endlessly, can I reach the ultimate truth? Even if I believe I've touched absolute truth, how can I be sure it is indeed absolute and not a fallacy that will be overturned by some future theory? If I am unable to answer these questions, how should I address this situation? Should I become hesitant, ignore the dilemma, or seek another perspective to alleviate it?

After some reflection, I arrived at a simple answer: I cannot claim to have grasped absolute truth. From another perspective, those who firmly believed in the geocentric model lived their entire lives without possessing absolute truth, yet they were not punished beyond their capacity for mistaking the geocentric model for absolute truth. During that period, society continued to progress, and various problems troubling humanity were still resolved. When the geocentric model was overturned, a stumbling block in human development was removed. However, whether or not that block is removed, as long as people continue to think, revise, and explore, society will progress, and people can live better lives. As long as we do not claim to have mastered absolute truth, avoid acting on the premise of possessing absolute truth, and approach new ideas with an open mind—embracing and even experimenting with them—we may receive more feedback and achieve better outcomes. Similarly, this process may not require an absolute truth, and truth itself may not be as important as many people imagine.

Theoretical Adaptability

From the previous section on The Dilemma of Absolute Truth in Theories, we can conclude that we cannot assert the existence of absolute truth. Moreover, history shows that theories that are not absolutely true have still guided human life and development. From the perspective of human progress, there is no need to confirm the absolute truth of a theory before acting. When observing the world today, we see that religion and tradition are still widely accepted, and various theoretical systems exist

across different regions, some of which are entirely contradictory in their claims and guidance. While we can reasonably assume that these theories contain certain fallacies, this does not prevent them from being accompanied by human societal development. Different theoretical systems continue to operate in various regions, with some fostering regional identity and cultural cohesion, guiding local lifestyles and work practices, and occasionally creating barriers to the dissemination of foreign theories.

Based on this situation, I propose the concept of theoretical adaptability:

Although we cannot assert absolute truth, theories that cannot be deemed true still produce various positive or negative effects in human development, life, and work. By observing real-world societal operations, we find that not only do absolutely true theories generate positive effects across various human endeavors. As long as a theory is applied appropriately, even non-true theories can promote societal development and create value for society.

Each individual possesses their own set of theories, based on which they make as rational a set of actions as possible. While this process may not be entirely sensible and involves emotional factors, an individual's theoretical framework significantly influences their behavior and thinking patterns. In a specific region, the theoretical sets in human minds form a larger regional theoretical set, and the intersection of these individual sets manifests as regional culture, traditions, and other unique expressions. For example, in coastal areas where people have long relied on fishing, locals may believe in specific maritime deities or follow traditional (experiential) methods mixed with superstition to guide fishing practices. These local lifestyles may inadvertently prevent the depletion of fish stocks or protect fishermen from deadly storms. Similarly, in forest-dwelling tribes that rely on hunting, rituals or divinations may guide hunting decisions, resulting in balanced randomization that supports the reproduction of local animal populations and thereby prevents overhunting and species extinction.

In both fishing and hunting scenarios, certain traditional practices, which modern perspectives might deem fallacious, have historically guided human production and labor, producing positive effects on regional societal development.

This perspective offers a new angle to articulate the significance of theories. While we cannot assert a theory's absolute truth, even theories deemed fallacious may have their uses, which I refer to as theoretical adaptability. The adaptability dimension enables observers to move beyond the binary of truth and fallacy, allowing them to reevaluate a theory's role. Returning to the geocentric and heliocentric models, both may have adaptability in different contexts. However, theoretical adaptability has contextual limitations. In some scenarios, a theory known to be fallacious can still guide actions, but in others, its fallacious nature may lead to severe negative consequences. For instance, using the geocentric or heliocentric model to plan

interstellar travel would undoubtedly fail, but using the geocentric model to guide ancient farmers to work at sunrise and rest at sunset was sufficient.

Theoretical Openness

As discussed, we may identify a theory's fallacies but cannot assert absolute truth, placing us in an intermediate state between truth and fallacy when evaluating theories. When we disagree with a specific theory or viewpoint and notice logical flaws or fallacies in others' conflicting views, the typical response is to criticize or attack those flaws. However, based on the above reasoning, we cannot assert the absolute truth of our own views either. From others' perspectives, our theories may also contain fallacies or logical gaps. Ultimately, people should not constantly oppose others due to differing theories or views. Here, I propose an alternative way to approach differences.

When we identify flaws in another's theory, we can only prove its fallaciousness or logical gaps (not absolute truth), but we cannot deny its adaptability to their context. As shown earlier, even fallacious, non-true theories can have positive value in certain scenarios.

We apply a theory or solution because we believe it has greater adaptability to the context we face. When evaluating different theories through the lens of adaptability, there is no need to negate others' theories. Instead, we should explore the meaning and value of their theories in their specific contexts from their perspective.

When people refrain from asserting the absolute truth of their theories and instead explore the adaptability of different theories, they enter a state of theoretical openness. In this state, individuals continually update their theoretical frameworks to achieve higher adaptability and apply them, thereby improving their circumstances.

(Later sections will discuss the relationship between theoretical openness and consensus-building mechanisms. In consensus-building, criticism is one method to achieve consensus, as new theories and differentiation require discussion and critique of existing ones. However, understanding and accommodating the adaptability of others' theories under a state of individual theoretical openness is equally important and can serve as another tool in consensus-building.)

Denying Absolute Fallacy

I believe "truth" and "fallacy" are conceptually opposed. Since we have rejected the possibility of asserting absolute truth, the question of what makes us consider a theory true or fallacious reemerges. As Karl Popper stated, a theory can be deemed fallacious

once it has been falsified. However, with my concept of adaptability, I argue that Popper's falsification only disproves a theory in specific scenarios (e.g., laboratory conditions), where adaptability fails—meaning it doesn't work or lacks probabilistic advantage. While adaptability failure in specific scenarios provides valuable judgment for other contexts, it does not necessarily mean the theory lacks adaptability in all scenarios. Thus, falsification only negates absolute truth, and under the adaptability framework, it negates the assumption that a theory is universally adaptable. However, a theory that cannot be deemed absolutely true cannot be deemed absolutely fallacious either, as it may still have adaptability in certain contexts.

If a theory's absolute fallacy means it lacks adaptability in all scenarios, we similarly cannot assert absolute fallacy, as we cannot test and falsify a theory in every possible scenario. This leads to the conclusion that a theory always exists in an intermediate state—neither absolutely true nor absolutely fallacious.

Respecting Others' Value Propositions

From the above reasoning, I propose that theories always exist in an intermediate state—neither absolutely true nor absolutely fallacious—and we cannot assert a theory's absolute truth or fallacy. Based on this, when facing different theories, we should shift from debating their absolute truth or fallacy to exploring their adaptability. When others present their views or theories, we should not only analyze them logically but also avoid rashly declaring their absolute fallacy or attacking them without due consideration. Instead, we should calmly explore the adaptability value of their views or theories in their specific contexts, addressing questions like “Why do they hold this view?”, “Why do they follow this theory?”, and “What factors do they consider?” This places us in a state of respecting others' value propositions, fostering a broader, more open mindset that embraces diverse views and theories while maintaining a friendly, harmonious atmosphere.

The Cost-Benefit of Theoretical Adaptability

Continuing with the geocentric and heliocentric examples, we cannot rule out that the geocentric model still has adaptability in certain contexts. However, in many scenarios, replacing the geocentric model with the heliocentric model would yield greater adaptability, and even more advanced astronomical theories might perform better. This raises the question: why do some individuals in certain contexts prefer to stick with the geocentric model rather than adopt the heliocentric model or more advanced, precise astronomical theories?

Here, I introduce the concept of the cost-benefit of theoretical adaptability. In many scenarios, when applying a view or theory, individuals consider not only its adaptability but also its ease of understanding, its suitability for communication within local contexts, and the associated learning costs. When assuming a theory has adaptability value in a given context, decisions about adopting or replacing it involve weighing the costs of replacement against the potential benefits.

Consider a practical scenario: a computer runs software that adequately meets daily work needs. When the software company releases a more powerful new version or another company offers similar but superior software, most decision-makers evaluate whether to upgrade or switch based on effort and returns. They may choose to continue using the less powerful old software due to habits, the effort required to switch, or communication barriers with colleagues.

This software scenario mirrors a theoretical application. Decision-makers often consider cost-benefit when choosing or replacing theories. Sometimes, opting for a less adaptable theory allows individuals to allocate more time and energy to other pressing issues, leading to better overall outcomes.

In traditional societal or academic discourse, adopting more adaptable theories is seen as progressive, while clinging to suboptimal theories is considered conservative. In reality, individuals or work scenarios rely on a set of theories, and changing one part may improve outcomes, have negligible effects, or introduce barriers to collaboration or disproportionate costs. Thus, pragmatic cost-benefit evaluations remain necessary. We must also examine the reasons for conservative stances in theory selection. I advocate for cost-benefit-driven decisions rather than conservatism stemming from the assumption that one's theories are absolutely true, which leads to intellectual rigidity. The former involves openly exploring new theories, weighing their costs and benefits, and making advantageous choices. The latter, assuming absolute truth, fosters extreme conservatism, intellectual confinement, and attempts to influence or restrict others from exploring new theories, leading to societal inefficiency and value conflicts. Thus, we should maintain theoretical openness and allow others to adopt different theories, whether we agree with them or not.

The Greatest Common Denominator of Theoretical Adaptability Benefits

In an ideal individual or organizational collective, each entity would choose the theory set that maximizes its benefits (rational choice), achieving a state where the adaptability benefits of each individual's theory set are maximized. However, in reality, constraints arise. Many individuals claim absolute truth for their theories,

attempting to influence or control others to act according to these “truths,” disregarding the adaptability of others’ theories to their contexts. This prevents individuals and organizations from reaching optimal adaptability states, hindering the collective’s ability to achieve the greatest common denominator of theoretical adaptability benefits. I hope the Intelligenism framework enables me and others to create an organizational form that embraces diverse, benefit-driven theories, gradually approaching a state where the collective’s theoretical adaptability benefits are maximized. Later sections will propose schemes and ideas for achieving this.

Competition and Theoretical Belief Disengagement

Referring to the previous section, I hope individual or organizational collectives can achieve a state of maximized theoretical adaptability benefits. In a static environment, individuals may forgo exploring new theories due to the short-term benefits of adaptability. Thus, balancing short- and long-term benefits when evaluating theories remains necessary.

I believe that introducing competition is a key mechanism for accelerating collectives toward the greatest common denominator of theoretical benefits. Competition makes individuals more cautious in evaluating benefits, as failure may harm their interests, increasing their motivation to explore and update their theory sets. In competitive settings, some theories may offer short-term benefits but lack long-term competitiveness. Sustained competition forces individuals to address declining long-term competitiveness, making it valuable to explore and experiment with new theories for future benefits. In fairer competition, this pressure affects more individuals, pushing the collective toward the greatest common denominator of theoretical adaptability benefits.

Preventing Theoretical Belief Disengagement is a significant issue in families and societies. Some individuals or organizations believe their theories are absolutely true, leading them to negate or alter the theoretical systems of others. This often occurs between parents and children, as parents, wanting the best for their children, impose their perceived absolute truths. Others, aware of the fallacies in their theories, restrict or eliminate competing theories to protect their interests, thereby maintaining their competitive edge under existing systems. Historically, when the heliocentric model challenged the geocentric model, some religious groups labeled heliocentrists as heretics, even going so far as to eliminate them to protect religious doctrines tied to the geocentric model. Such actions hinder the collective’s progress toward maximizing theoretical benefits.

Thus, whether driven by protective intentions or self-interest, asserting absolute truth or negating others’ theories obstructs theoretical benefit maximization. Introducing fair competition and allowing individuals to detach from certain theories at any time are essential for progress. I acknowledge the value of theories in specific contexts, but

I argue that this should not come at the cost of preventing others from detaching or competing fairly, as such actions destroy greater value.

Practice and Truth

There is a Chinese saying: “Practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.” Based on my reasoning, I believe this expression is inaccurate and logically flawed. Returning to the geocentric and heliocentric cases, both of which dominated as “truth” for over a millennium, yet centuries of practice failed to verify their validity. How, then, can we claim practice is the sole criterion for testing truth? Not only is it not the sole criterion, but the idea that practice can test truth is itself inaccurate.

Based on my framework, I propose a more precise expression:

I believe that practice can test a theory’s adaptability in specific scenarios, constrained by factors such as people, regions, or time. Practicing a theory in a specific context only confirms its adaptability value in that context, which may not generalize to other contexts. Widespread practice by many individuals can provide broader adaptability feedback, but still cannot assert absolute truth. In the white swan and black swan example, catching 100 white swans does not prove all swans are white.

If we treat “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth” as a theory, we cannot entirely deny its adaptability. In many scenarios, encouraging practice provides feedback and supports the execution of theory. This theory exemplifies my concept of adaptability: a flawed statement still brought unique value to China’s reform and opening-up. Whether this value is limited to specific periods or contexts is difficult to conclude.

Mysticism and Science

Regarding Popper’s definition of science, he argued that science requires falsifiability. Mystical claims, however, lack falsifiability. I will discuss my thoughts on Mysticism from several angles.

If a theory requires multiple parameters to compute a result, and the boundaries of these parameters are vague, the output’s boundaries will also be vague. For example, in $Y = X * Z$, where X and Z range from (1,10), Y ranges from (1,100). Here, X and Z ’s boundaries are clear, so Y ’s boundaries are clear as well. In $Y' = X' * Z'$, if X' and Z' are vaguely defined as “around 1 to 10,” Y' will also be vague. If Y' equals 121, observers might argue X' and Z' could be 11, close to 10, fitting the vague condition, making $Y' = 121$ unfalsifiable.

Consider a less precise example: mixing yellow and blue yields green. If yellow’s boundaries are vague, so are blue’s, and thus green’s. A controversial green, mixed

from colors subjectively deemed yellow and blue, may be questioned as “not green.” Due to vague boundaries, this green cannot falsify the claim that yellow and blue make green. I do not deny falsifiability’s value, but such cases suggest it depends not only on a theory’s correctness but also on experimental methods.

To analyze phenomena, we first categorize them, the starting point of logical reasoning. To study color mixing, we define the RGB ranges of yellow and blue. Vague category boundaries lead to uncertain or vague results. Deduction (splitting A into A1 and A2) or induction (combining A1 and A2 into A) introduces further boundary uncertainty. Extensive deductive and inductive operations exacerbate boundary vagueness, reducing a theory’s practical guidance if results cover all vague boundaries.

When analyzing reality using a theory with vague boundaries, users can adjust the boundaries to favor the outcome, making the theory seem reasonable due to its flexibility, rather than its explanatory power. Mystical theories, with vague logical boundaries, often provide seemingly reasonable explanations in reality, due to subjective boundary adjustments. Scientific theories, with clearer boundaries, offer precise conclusions, making them more reliable for practical guidance.

However, defining Mysticism and science reveals a blurry boundary. Even scientific boundaries are not entirely clear, existing somewhere between fully clear (1) and fully vague (0), excluding absolute clarity or vagueness.

From the Mystical Nature of Elliott Wave Theory to the Dilemma of Defining Phenomena

Many investors characterize Elliott Wave Theory as metaphysical. As the above description of metaphysics suggests, Elliott Wave Theory does suffer from the characteristic of “always offering seemingly plausible explanations for market conditions, but with limited predictive accuracy.” Furthermore, the theory remains elusive as a whole. I have also attempted to quantify the Wave Theory, but ultimately failed after spending hundreds of hours on the project. A thorough examination of Wave Theory begins with wave counting, but wave counting requires defining wave levels, which leads to the problem of blurred boundaries between these categories. Because analysts cannot precisely define wave levels, and the relationships between waves are difficult to clearly articulate, Elliott Wave Theory still suffers from the problem of overly broad outputs when deducing effects from cause to effect. To effectively apply the Elliott Wave Theory, we must classify waves into distinct levels. This process presents the following dilemma:

When considering waves, I believe the boundaries between levels are fuzzy. It's difficult to assume there are 10 or 20 levels and then assign a specific wave to a specific level. Assuming a scale of 0 to 10, why can't a wave be 1.5 or 3.1? Because all waves are different, when we assign two waves with different amplitudes and time spans to level 2 (a pre-defined category), we ignore the objective differences between the two waves. This, in itself, is a form of oversimplification. However, simplification inevitably involves a certain degree of information loss, and we risk filtering out crucial information through the simplification process.

Based on the above "metaphysical dilemma," I conclude that the hierarchy of things cannot be defined in a simplistic, one-size-fits-all manner. For example, in market fluctuations, we cannot simply declare that wave A in a price fluctuation is Level 3 and wave B is Level 4. This would inevitably lead to the discovery of waves C1, C2, ..., Cn, whose amplitudes and time spans fall between A and B, and it would be impossible to definitively classify some of these waves as Level 3 and others as Level 4. If we were to do so, some Level 3 and Level 4 waves would be virtually identical. Similarly, if we assume that human intelligence is level 5 and mice's intelligence is level 4, then cats, dogs, and monkeys fall somewhere between levels 4 and 5. Alternatively, we'll always find some creatures that fall somewhere between mice and rabbits, possessing characteristics of both mice and rabbits. The same dilemma applies to the color definitions mentioned in the section "Metaphysics and Science." If someone sees a color and defines it as yellow, can a darker shade of yellow still be defined as yellow or red? It's always difficult to find a clear boundary between yellow and red or green; this boundary is always fluid and ambiguous. It's precisely this ability to continuously subdivide and expand consistently that constitutes the world we see.

Intelligenism's Solution to the Dilemma of Defining Complex Things

In many complex human social scenarios, defining boundaries is extremely difficult. For example, it's difficult to define certain individuals as good and others as bad. The complexity of society gives rise to complex and ambiguous boundaries across various dimensions. The pursuit of clear boundaries is inherently mechanistic, and the mechanistic approach to defining and understanding human society has significant limitations. In human society, the boundaries of affairs are often complex and ambiguous. It's even difficult to firmly believe that managing human society is a purely scientific endeavor; it involves both art and Mysticism. Within the Intelligenism framework, human society as a whole is even viewed as a larger intelligent agent, with the individual human being merely a humble neuron within this vast entity.

In this human society rife with uncertainty and ambiguity, rather than relying on a mechanistic obsession to define complex issues with clear boundaries, it's better to embrace the Intelligenism framework of theoretical adaptability, encouraging individuals to adapt theories to different scenarios based on their own perceptions and goals. At this point, the duty for defining the complexity and ambiguity of human society is decentralized to billions of individuals. These individuals, through their own perceptions within limited contexts, autonomously adapt theories and foster collaboration and influence among themselves. In this complex and information-rich human society, intelligenism should advocate for responding to the complexities of the group environment by allowing for greater complexity, rather than ignoring the inherent complexity of the system through wishful, simplistic definitions.

On Intelligence

Introduction

Since I began studying artificial intelligence in 2019, I have developed a strong interest in the mechanisms of AI and the meaning and implications of intelligence. This interest encompasses not only the engineering development of computer AI and the knowledge related to program execution, but also an understanding of the relationship between individuals and collectives in the construction mechanisms of AI networks, human cognition, social structures, and organizational evolution.

In the process of constructing a complex organization from a single neuron, we can observe intelligence gradually becoming richer and deeper, with the logic and form of this process being remarkably intricate. While learning, developing, and building a knowledge map related to AI, I began to rethink the origins of human perception and cognition and to explore the relationship between the evolution of our society and organizations and intelligence.


Reflecting on some phenomena and subsequent insights from investment decision-making and business operations, I vaguely sensed a critical relationship between organizational development and intelligence. When I decided to include this chapter in the book, I was firmly convinced that understanding intelligence would play a pivotal role in the fields of enterprise development and organizational restructuring, which I am deeply invested in.

Considering that the framework of Intelligenism I propose is built by referencing the architecture of deep learning networks and drawing on the characteristics of the relationship between individuals and collectives in deep learning networks to restructure or transform organizational frameworks, it is necessary to briefly introduce the history of machine intelligence and the operating mechanisms of deep learning in this chapter. This will help readers unfamiliar with the mechanisms of machine learning and deep learning better comprehend and understand the book's content.

In introducing the mechanisms of deep learning, I will avoid all formulaic derivations and computational processes as much as possible, as the application of deep learning in computer engineering is not the focus of this book, and such computations are not directly applicable to constructing human social organizations. For readers interested in the application of deep learning in computer engineering, I recommend consulting professional texts on machine learning and deep learning for further study.

The Historical Evolution of Machine Intelligence

The history of machine intelligence and how it has evolved over different eras:




Reference: Image from the introduction to the book 《深度学习》, ISBN: 9787115461476.

In the history of machine decision-making, the earliest approach was rule-based systems. The decision outputs of such systems were entirely based on the developer's inputs and the designed data processing formulas (algorithms) or procedural schemes. In modern software development, rule-based systems are frequently used and can be considered the foundational framework for building traditional computer software. However, this framework struggles to make decisions for datasets with diverse data types and large volumes, as developers cannot provide a complete and unified algorithm or formula to map the relationship between these data and the output goals during development. Thus, such systems are typically only applicable to programs with simple input data and straightforward input-output relationships.

In the 1990s, a simple machine learning algorithm based on logistic regression emerged, which could determine whether a pregnant woman should undergo a cesarean section based on a series of input parameters or real-world conditions (Mor-Yosef et al., 1990). During the 1980s and 1990s, various machine learning approaches emerged, which can all be classified as classical machine learning, as shown in the diagram above. Similar machine learning algorithms can be used to distinguish between spam emails and legitimate ones, or to predict reasonable house price ranges for a specific area based on regional housing data. However, these machine learning approaches relied on formalized, abstracted datasets derived from quantified features of real-world scenarios, represented as numbers or binary (true/false, 1/0) values. Returning to the example of the pregnant woman, such machine learning solutions could analyze quantified feature data to reach diagnostic conclusions, but could not make a final decision on whether a cesarean section was necessary based on a CT scan or ultrasound image. In contrast, human doctors rely on interviews, physical examinations, and analysis of CT or ultrasound images for diagnosis. Interviews, physical examinations, and image analysis are non-formalized, unlike the structured, quantifiable information in data tables. The difference in the types of information used highlights the fundamental distinction between simple machine learning decisions and human decision-making. Compared to rule-based systems, these machine learning approaches could handle decision-making tasks with diverse data types, large data volumes, and non-intuitive input-output relationships.

Entering the 1990s, deep learning began to emerge, demonstrating greater versatility and application value compared to classical machine learning. In classical machine learning, non-formalized scenarios, such as image or speech recognition, remained insurmountable challenges. However, deep learning decision-making systems gradually overcame these barriers in areas such as image recognition and text recognition. For tasks like image recognition, deep learning strategies no longer require manual definition and configuration of features or the construction of datasets, as was necessary in classical machine learning. Over time, the structure of deep learning began to resemble the form of the human brain—not because early deep learning strategies were modeled on the brain's mechanisms, but because this structural similarity enabled deep learning to perform better in non-formalized decision-making scenarios and exhibit characteristics akin to human decision-making (e.g., processing language, images, and other non-formalized information). Today, models under the deep learning framework have not only achieved breakthroughs in image and text recognition but have also excelled in higher-level applications such as autonomous driving, complex video game competitions, text generation, and speech translation.



Based on the frequency of phrases like “cybernetics,” “connectionism,” or “neural networks” in Google Books, the history of artificial neural network research can be divided into three waves (the diagram shows the first two waves, with the third wave emerging more recently). The first wave, from the 1940s to the 1960s, was driven by cybernetics, fueled by the development of biological learning theories (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943; Hebb, 1949) and the implementation of the first models, such as the perceptron (Rosenblatt, 1958), which enabled the training of a single neuron. The second wave, from 1980 to 1995, involved connectionist approaches, which could train neural networks with one or two hidden layers using backpropagation (Rumelhart et al., 1986a). The current third wave, deep learning, began around 2006 (Hinton et al., 2006a; Bengio et al., 2007a; Ranzato et al., 2007a) and appeared in book form by 2016. Notably, the first two waves similarly appeared in books much later than their corresponding scientific activities.

Reference of figure and description: introduction to the book 《深度学习》, ISBN : 9787115461476.

From rule-based systems to classical machine learning to deep learning, the evolution of technological approaches generally followed a progression from cybernetics to connectionism. Under the cybernetics framework, system rules, algorithms, and processes were fully constructed, and the entire process from input to output was entirely knowable, monitorable, and controllable, with outputs exhibiting more linear characteristics. In contrast, connectionism, as described by Wikipedia, holds that mental and psychological phenomena can be described by networks of simple, often uniform units, where the units and their connections can be represented as neurons and synapses (<https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/联结主义>). As systems evolved toward connectionism, the intermediate processes from input to output became more complex, and the randomness of the processing increased significantly, making most connectionist processes unknowable, uncontrollable, and difficult to monitor.

In classical machine learning systems, I believe they still retain some elements of cybernetics, as their processing procedures, algorithm selections, and feature choices are still planned, though they begin to exhibit some randomness in their path selection. In deep learning systems, the process of feature extraction is eliminated, further reducing the proportion of human-defined and subjective settings.

As deep learning developed, its application potential and versatility far surpassed rule-based systems grounded in cybernetic logic. Unlike traditional machine learning and rule-based systems, deep learning performs better as data volume increases. In contrast, traditional machine learning reaches a performance peak, after which additional data does not yield further improvements. This does not mean that cybernetics is useless; while it struggles in non-formalized, highly complex, and non-linear scenarios, it remains critical in areas such as industrial automation, software management, and enterprise management. For instance, standardized assembly lines and software data flow management are ideal applications for cybernetics. However, in scenarios like marketing, design, creative development, language communication, or on-site translation, a cybernetic framework would require engineers and managers to standardize these scenarios (e.g., by setting quantifiable KPIs), extract feature data, and manage them within a standardized cybernetic system. Yet, these scenarios are inherently non-formalized and non-standardized, and forcibly applying formalized methods to them can lead to significant distortions and biases in subsequent management.

In summary, for abstract, formalized tasks, traditional computer programs can easily outperform the human brain. Conversely, humans have an advantage in non-formalized tasks. The ability to handle non-formalized problems is a key indicator of a system's intelligence level and its manifestation of intelligence. The stronger a computer's ability to process non-formalized problems, the more intelligent it is. With the introduction of connectionism, more non-formalized, variable, and non-standardized scenarios gained new potential solutions, further expanding humanity's toolkit for addressing real-world challenges.

A Brief Introduction to Deep Learning

Considering that the organizational structure under the Intelligenism framework, as discussed in later sections, will draw on the network structure of deep learning and incorporate some logic from reinforcement learning to enable organizations to exhibit intelligent features similar to those of intelligent programs, this section provides a brief introduction to deep learning. By understanding the network structure and working principles of deep learning through this section, readers can more easily grasp the subsequent content related to the settings and logic of the Intelligent Consortium.




Figure 1

X1, X2, X3: Input variables X , also known as feature values.

W1, W2, W3: Weight values. In the figure, each neuron corresponds to three weight values, connected to the three feature values $X1$, $X2$, and $X3$.

Neuron: $Y = X1W1 + X2W2 + X3W3 + B$, where Y is the neuron's output value. In this case, Neuron 1 and Neuron 2 have different $W1$, $W2$, and $W3$ values, resulting in different outputs. B is the bias term, which can also be adjusted as a parameter.


Output: After calculating the Y value (neuron output), the Y value is transformed through an activation function to obtain the final output value.

Activation Function: Since the neuron's output value $Y = X1W1 + X2W2 + X3W3 + B$ is linear, the activation function introduces non-linear characteristics.

After computation, the final output value is compared with the true value from the external environment, and the difference is calculated. Through backpropagation, the parameters $W1$, $W2$, $W3$, and B are adjusted. By continuously iterating this process, as $W1$, $W2$, $W3$, and B gradually change, the final output value approaches the true value. The changes in parameters W and B can be understood as the continuous learning process of a deep learning program, ultimately enabling the program's output to align with reality.

The activation function computation and backpropagation involve significant mathematical operations, but as the goal of this book is not to serve as a deep learning textbook, these are simplified here. The aim of this chapter is to provide readers with a basic understanding of the deep learning process, facilitating comprehension of the subsequent construction of the Intelligent Consortium.

	rent cost	house's age	area	can find a tenant within one month or not?
training sample 1				
training sample 2				
training sample 3				
training sample 4				
training sample 5				
training sample 6				
training sample 7				
training sample 8				



Simulation Case Study:

Suppose we need to build a rental analysis model for a specific region. X_1 , X_2 , and X_3 represent the house's age, area, and rent, respectively. The goal is to analyze whether a property can find a tenant within one month.

Here, the true value is set as follows: if a tenant is found, the true value is 1; if no tenant is found, the true value is 0.

First, we need to prepare training samples and use historical rental data to train the model based on the architecture in Figure 1. The output value is compared with the true value to calculate the deviation. Backpropagation is then used to adjust the parameters, ultimately obtaining a final parameter set (where the deviation between the output and true value is minimized or near the minimum). Subsequently, the data to be analyzed is computed with the final parameter set to obtain the result (analysis outcome). In theory, the closer the output is to 1, the higher the likelihood of finding a tenant within one month; the closer it is to 0, the lower the likelihood.

The above example illustrates a very simple case in deep learning, where features are still manually defined, organized, and quantified, which seems to contradict the earlier statement that "deep learning does not require manual feature setting." However, in tasks like image recognition, autonomous driving, or video generation, explicit feature quantities cannot be obtained.




Figure 3: a simplified biological image observation transmission mechanism

(Reference: 《人人可懂的深度学习》，ISBN: 9787111680109)




Figure 4: Convolutional neural networks

(Reference: 《人人可懂的深度学习》，ISBN: 9787111680109)

Figure 3 presents a simplified biological image observation transmission mechanism, which is similar to the convolutional neural network scheme in Figure 4. Convolutional neural networks are typically used for image recognition, face recognition, and similar tasks. Their structure differs from Figures 1 and 2 but generally involves obtaining feature quantities at the input layer, assigning weights (setting W and B values) in each neuron to compute output values, introducing an activation function to make the neuron outputs non-linear, and iterating this process multiple times to obtain a specific form of output. After obtaining the output, it is

compared with reality to derive a comparison result, and backpropagation is used to adjust the W and B values of each layer, ultimately obtaining a satisfactory parameter set (a collection of W and B values).

In the application scenarios of Figure 4 (likely image-related), unlike the rental data example, there is no logically clear feature quantity data. Each pixel in an image (represented by three values for red, yellow, and blue) is processed through convolutional layers to generate a feature map (feature quantities). Convolutional neural networks apply a process akin to sliding window scanning of image data (three-color data) in the convolutional layer, typically without requiring manual intervention to define image feature variables.

Of course, the above is an extremely simplified overview. Deep learning schemes are diverse and ever-changing, and this book does not intend to cover them exhaustively or analyze their principles in detail. Through the examples in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4, the diversity and basic structure of AI schemes are illustrated. Given the book's writing goals, to make the subsequent content more accessible, deep learning is introduced only briefly, and this simplification may involve some inaccuracies. Readers seeking a precise understanding of this technology should refer to professional books.

Bottom-Up Transmission

Based on reflections from past development work and the brief introduction above, I believe bottom-up transmission is one of the fundamental manifestations of intelligence. Extending this concept, when we discuss intelligence beyond computer engineering and apply it to the human brain, we find it still follows a general pattern: starting from simple reactions of basic neurons and ultimately forming various ideas and feelings that humans can perceive (from simple to complex).

It is well known that the human brain is an extremely complex organ, comprising billions of neurons interconnected with other tissues, organs, and cells throughout the human body via various mechanisms. Compared to the complexity of the human brain, thoughts, and feelings, a single neuron is a very simple entity. Similarly, other cells in the human body are relatively simple entities compared to the body as a whole, also demonstrating a process of construction from simple to complex. This structural form (from simple entities to complex wholes) indicates that constructing complex wholes from simple entities to achieve higher intelligence is feasible. Moreover, the behavioral capabilities of complex wholes, which align with higher intelligence levels, are naturally far superior to those of simple entities. In AI network structures, simple neurons are connected through numerous similar information processing steps (input, processing, output) to form complex networks. After continuous training (adjusting weight parameters), these networks can produce surprising results. The characteristics of this computational process—1) its meaning cannot be fully understood, 2) its

process cannot be controlled, and 3) its seemingly random and elusive working form—are features I had never encountered or imagined in my past work developing quantitative investment strategies. These characteristics have inspired me to think more deeply about the construction process from simple to complex.

Definition of an Intelligence Degree

Before discussing intelligence, whether it is an artificial intelligence program or a human individual exhibiting high intelligence, it is necessary to clearly define what constitutes high and low intelligence based on evaluation criteria for the subject's intelligence. This definition will address why we consider some artificial intelligence programs to have higher or lower degrees of intelligence compared to others, and what basis we use to deem humans more intelligent than mice or other animals. Referencing some books on artificial intelligence, it is defined as "the study and design of intelligent agents," where an intelligent agent is a system that can observe its surrounding environment and take actions to achieve its goals. Based on the description of an intelligent agent, intelligence should be defined as the specific ability to observe the surrounding environment and act to achieve goals. High intelligence should manifest as the ability of the target intelligent agent to achieve better outcomes through actions taken after observing the environment, with better outcomes naturally receiving more favorable feedback rewards from the environment (such as obtaining more or higher-quality material rewards, a better living environment, or longer survival time). Based on this inference, higher intelligence should be defined as the ability to provide an intelligent agent with better adaptability to the external environment. The term "external environment adaptability" used here primarily refers to the ability to make more accurate judgments, responses, and decisions regarding the external environment. (Subsequent inferences will primarily use "external environment adaptability" to describe intelligence.)

Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence

The "Introduction to Deep Learning" section above mainly discusses the basic construction methods of artificial intelligence programs (deep learning). It indicates that after decades of development, the mainstream network structures of artificial intelligence are gradually approaching the operational mechanisms of the human brain. This does not mean that artificial intelligence development has directly adopted the unique network structures of biological intelligence. However, both biological intelligence and the mainstream artificial intelligence network structures (especially

deep learning) exhibit a developmental path from simple, numerous individual units (neurons) to a complex whole with increasing intelligence degree.

Definition and Structural Characteristics of Intelligent Agents

To facilitate the development of subsequent arguments, a distinction is made here: neurons or individual units within a relatively complex intelligent system are defined as intelligent agents, and the more complex intelligent system constructed from these intelligent agents is also defined as an intelligent agent. However, the former (neurons or individual units) are intelligent agents with a lower intelligence degree, while the latter (intelligent systems) are intelligent agents with a higher intelligence degree.

A human, as a biological entity, is an intelligent agent capable of exhibiting intelligent traits. Similarly, a single cell is also an intelligent agent, but with a much lower intelligence degree. An ant colony can be regarded as an intelligent agent as a whole, while a single ant or even an ant cell can also be considered an intelligent agent, but there are differences in complexity and intelligence degree among them. Intelligent agents with a high intelligence degree are constructed from intelligent agents with a lower intelligence degree and typically lower structural complexity. The term "exhibiting intelligence degree" is used here because an intelligent agent with a high intelligence degree may intentionally or unintentionally exhibit a lower intelligence degree. For example, a group of scientists studying the behavior of an ant colony might simulate being ants to observe or experience their behavioral characteristics. It is well known that the intelligence degree of individual scientists far exceeds that of an ant colony or individual ants, yet scientists can actively or passively exhibit a lower intelligence degree. Therefore, the term "exhibiting intelligence degree" is necessary to describe this general rule to avoid exceptions, such as the scientist example, from breaking the rule.

Based on the example of scientists simulating ant behavior, the following definition can be derived:

Intelligent agents exhibiting a high intelligence degree are composed of intelligent agents exhibiting lower intelligence degree. However, intelligent agents with a lower intelligence degree may not necessarily construct intelligent agents with a higher intelligence degree. Only under appropriate mechanisms can the goal of constructing intelligent agents with a higher intelligence degree from those with a lower intelligence degree be achieved.

Based on the above reasoning and real-world cases of humans constructing artificial intelligence networks, we can believe that it is feasible for humans to construct

intelligent agents with a higher intelligence degree from those with a lower intelligence degree.

Additional remarks: Active or passive limitations can cause an intelligent agent to exhibit a lower intelligence degree (e.g., the scientist simulating ants example).

The Meaning of Individual Survival and Intelligence Construction

Figure 1





Figure 4: Convolutional neural networks

(Reference: 《人人可懂的深度学习》, ISBN: 9787111680109)

The previous section introduced how artificial intelligence and biological intelligence achieve intelligent construction through a bottom-up mechanism. In this bottom-up construction process, individuals transmit their outputs to higher levels through mechanisms similar to those depicted in Figures 1 and 4 in the "Fundamentals of Machine Intelligence" chapter, followed by top-down feedback from higher levels to adjust and iterate the entire network. Subsequently, intelligence degree was defined as external environment adaptability: the higher the intelligence degree, the stronger the external environment adaptability, which leads to a better living environment, enhanced competitive ability, and greater material rewards.

In the bottom-up construction process of intelligent agents, intelligent agents with a lower intelligence degree form network structures within the system. Through mutual collaboration and continuous adjustment of their parameter settings, weights, and other factors, the newly constructed intelligent agent exhibits a higher intelligence degree.

In artificial intelligence programs, engineers set goals and reward functions for the program to achieve. The closer the program gets to the goal, the greater the rewards it receives. Feedback mechanisms (feedback functions, backpropagation) adjust the parameters and weights of neurons in the program's network, gradually improving its coherence with the engineer's set goals.

In nature, cells that form various organisms adapt to their external environment through genetic variation, the survival of the fittest, self-learning, environmental perception, and memory, striving to achieve a better living environment or evolve new survival strategies to thrive in their environment.

Whether in artificial intelligence programs, human society, or nature, individuals seek better ways to align with the external environment to exist better and longer. The construction of intelligent agents is a bottom-up collaborative mechanism formed by individuals to achieve their goals (attaining a higher intelligence degree and thus stronger external environment adaptability). This can involve cells in relation to the biological entity, neurons in relation to artificial intelligence programs, or individuals in relation to societal organizations. From the above, a low intelligence degree implies poorer adaptability to external environments, which means weaker survival competitiveness. Intelligence construction allows individuals to become part of a whole, benefiting from the higher intelligence degree of the whole to enjoy the dividends of greater external environment adaptability.

When revisiting the significance of intelligence construction, the answer becomes crystal clear: through intelligence construction, individuals, as part of a whole, can enjoy stronger external environment adaptability to achieve specific goals (typically survival) of individuals with a relatively low intelligence degree.

The Value of Externality to Intelligence

As mentioned earlier, intelligence is the ability to adapt to the external environment. During the training of an intelligent agent, the input values are derived from the external environment, and the output results interact with the environment to receive feedback. This feedback from the external environment drives parameter adjustments of neurons (individuals) within the intelligent agent (the whole). In other words, the external environment is the source of feedback for the intelligent agent and the context in which its intelligence is manifested. If an intelligent agent loses feedback and input from the external environment, the significance of intelligence ceases to exist.

In the construction of artificial intelligence programs, external information is crucial for training. Internal information is merely a manifestation of the program's operation, and the operation itself does not provide comparative results. Without comparative results, there is no feedback, and thus, the artificial intelligence cannot be trained. Before constructing an intelligent agent, it is necessary to define the boundary between the intelligent agent and its external environment to determine what constitutes the external environment and external information.

Different external environments not only manifest as different input values for the intelligent agent but also as specific feedback states for its output values. Therefore, different external environments and their corresponding feedback affect the internal feedback adjustment mechanisms of the intelligent agent (different parameter sets, different weighting schemes). If the environment faced by an intelligent agent during training is highly limited, exhibiting significant non-randomness or specificity, the network structure of the intelligent agent will also be highly limited. This means the intelligent agent will struggle to produce effective outputs (low adaptability) when facing external conditions significantly different from those it has adapted to. Therefore, the more realistic and open the external information input (i.e., the higher the similarity between training information and the real external environment), the more versatile and applicable the output schemes of the trained intelligent agent will be, resulting in greater and more effective adaptability to the environment.

The similarity between the external environment used for training and the characteristics of the broader real external environment is referred to as the intelligent agent's externality manifestation. The higher the externality, the more realistic, abundant, and open the external information the intelligent agent can obtain (with lower limitations or biases). Thus, higher externality makes the intelligence process more effective, with the adaptability manifested by the intelligent agent being more versatile and effective in real-world environments.

However, different intelligent network organizations have different goals. Some intelligent agents only need to operate in specific environments. For example, a particular animal species living on an isolated Pacific island only needs external information input from that specific environment. In this scenario, although the

external information is relatively closed, it is indeed generated by the species' real living environment. Additionally, more open data input is unnecessary for the species' current survival and may even reduce its adaptability to this specific, closed environment. While it cannot be ruled out that the species might die out quickly if invasive species arrive or if it is removed from this specific environment, in a static environment, localized environmental adaptability is the optimal solution. Therefore, the characteristics of external information for an intelligent agent need to be tailored to the organization's goals.

Assessment of Intelligence Potential

When developers of machine intelligence face simple decision-making tasks, such as recognizing digits in images or predicting regional housing rents, as mentioned earlier, the applied intelligent programs typically do not require many neurons or network layers. However, for more challenging tasks, such as autonomous driving, game competition, facial recognition, or simultaneous translation, intelligent programs require more neurons and network layers. Thus, it can be inferred that more neurons and network layers enable machine intelligence programs to have greater potential for intelligence. Admittedly, some more rationally designed intelligent program architectures can achieve better results with relatively fewer neurons and network layers. However, overall, there is a positive correlation between the number of neurons, network layers, and the effectiveness and intelligence potential of intelligent programs. As technology advances, it is possible that at some point in the future, humans may discover a threshold beyond which increasing the number of neurons and network layers no longer improves performance. However, this trend will persist until such a threshold is reached.

Complex tasks often require machine intelligence to have greater intelligence potential, which typically demands larger datasets and greater computational power to support the training of intelligent agents. On the other hand, larger datasets and more scientific data collection methods may result in trained intelligent agents with stronger versatility and applicability to real-world scenarios. Therefore, larger data reserves, more scientific data collection methods, and superior network structures can also contribute to greater intelligence potential for intelligent programs and intelligent agents.

Redundancy and Species Intelligence Potential

Approximately 70% of the human genome sequence does not encode any traits, and it appears that the absence of these 70% of amino acid sequences would not impact biological survival or trait expression. However, 70% of amino acid structures still

hold mutation potential. While a species could persist in an unchanging external environment without these 70% of genes, in the long term, the species' mutation possibilities and diversity would be significantly reduced. With decreased mutation and competitive survival potential, the species would be more prone to extinction in the face of significant environmental changes due to diminished long-term adaptability and evolutionary potential.

In the continuous evolutionary process of species, redundant sequences may play a critical role. If the evolution of a biological population is viewed as a manifestation of biological intelligence, redundancy can be considered a form of potential intelligence. When extending the concept of redundancy in species' genetic sequences to other contexts, such as intelligent network structures, the redundancy of an intelligent agent can include redundant information inputs, neuron counts exceeding minimum requirements, and network layers beyond minimum needs. If human organizations, such as societies, cities, villages, or commercial entities, are also defined as intelligent agents, redundant manifestations—such as excess information provided by individuals, idle time of individuals, surplus consumption capacity, or knowledge acquisition beyond organizational needs—can also be seen as expressions of their intelligence potential. Therefore, in evaluating intelligent agents, redundancy should not be viewed as waste; rather, its positive significance to intelligence potential must be considered.

Perception of Intelligence

When perceiving the intelligence of an intelligent agent, a key assumption I consider critical is that intelligent agents with a low intelligence degree cannot fully perceive the intelligence of intelligent agents with a high intelligence degree. For instance, a cell (a low intelligence degree intelligent agent) cannot fully perceive the behavior of a human (a high intelligence degree intelligent agent), meaning it cannot understand the logic of their behavior, grasp the patterns of their actions or reactions, or accurately predict their responses or behaviors. Similarly, assuming an ant colony has a higher intelligence degree than an individual ant, the individual ant cannot fully perceive (cognize) the intelligence of the ant colony (assuming the ant colony is a higher intelligence degree intelligent agent). This means the individual ant cannot fully understand, grasp the patterns of, or accurately predict the colony's operations.

Extending this to society, a phenomenon emerges: individuals with a low intelligence degree struggle to fully comprehend those with a high intelligence degree because the former lack the volume of information, logical depth, and information processing capabilities of the latter. Thus, the former cannot fully grasp the behaviors, abilities, preferences, or conclusions of the latter. In this dilemma, human observers (those with a low intelligence degree) cannot assess the intelligence of the observed (those with a

high intelligence degree) through actual intelligence manifestations, such as opinions or logic. Instead, they resort to alternative evaluation methods, such as observing the target's clothing, vehicle, resume, social influence, or wealth, which are non-intelligence-related traits used to indirectly recognize and partially perceive the observed individual's intelligence (ability or strength). Conversely, individuals with a high intelligence degree can more easily cognize and better understand and predict the behavioral logic of those with a lower intelligence degree.

In capital markets, there is a saying: the stock market is an excellent indicator of economic environment predictions. The stock market typically forecasts economic changes 3–6 months in advance, often outperforming the predictions of most economists. This can be analyzed using the above perspective: stock market changes are driven by billions of individual trading behaviors, forming a higher intelligence degree intelligent agent through market transaction mechanisms. While economists or professional investors exhibit a higher intelligence degree than most ordinary investors in economic forecasting, they still fall short compared to the stock market, constructed from billions of intelligent agents. Thus, individual humans struggle to outperform the stock market in economic forecasting. Similarly, predicting the stock market's operations is challenging for investors and analysts, with few consistent winners. This is both a real-world example of low intelligence degree individuals constructing a high intelligence degree intelligent agent and of low intelligence degree individuals being unable to fully cognize or predict high intelligence degree intelligent agents.

Enhancing Individual Intelligence Degree

Enhancing an individual's intelligence degree is a challenging process because an intelligent agent cannot fully perceive the intelligence of an agent with a higher intelligence degree. I define the process of an intelligent agent optimizing its behavior under fixed external information, network structure, and algorithmic forms, without changing its intelligence degree, as the manifestation of intelligence degree. Based on the analysis of intelligence degree in the "Definition of Intelligence Degree" section—"the adaptability of an intelligent agent to the external environment"—this optimization is merely the process of achieving environmental coherence without changing intelligence degree (i.e., adaptability remains constant). Only when an intelligent agent optimizes its external information structure, information sources, network structure, or algorithmic forms can its intelligence degree be considered substantively improved, which can be termed an enhancement of adaptability.

Douglas Hofstadter has repeatedly mentioned in his book that a robot cannot produce or upgrade itself without external forces, nor can a computer program fix its own bugs. In these cases, an intelligent agent requires external forces to complete its iterative

upgrades, including optimized external information input, more advanced operational logic, and more optimized network structures or algorithmic solutions.

Some might counter this with the example of AlphaGo's improvement in Go, suggesting it can continually progress. While AlphaGo can indeed improve its Go-playing skills, it does not enhance its intelligence degree; it merely follows a predetermined path to achieve its goals more effectively, which aligns with the aforementioned "coherence process." In my view, playing Go better does not reflect an increase in AlphaGo's intelligence degree; it is simply the intelligent program manifesting its expected intelligence under existing algorithmic forms, network structures, and input information. If a bricklayer is placed in an environment A, completely isolated from external information, and tasked with laying bricks according to rules that reward higher efficiency, the bricklayer will indeed become more skilled at bricklaying. However, if the bricklayer has been isolated from all external information since birth and environment A cannot provide feedback on skills like programming or embroidery, the bricklayer cannot develop those skills. They cannot reflect on bricklaying from a higher dimension or understand the world from a broader perspective, making this a typical case where intelligence degree cannot improve without external intervention.

Thus, external factors are a prerequisite for enhancing an individual's intelligence degree. Reading more books, engaging with diverse social phenomena, and visiting new places expose individuals to external factors beyond their original environment. Through continuous thinking, comparison, trial and error, and summarization, the intelligence degree can gradually improve.

Limitations in Perceiving Intelligence

This section further explores the limitations in perceiving intelligence. As intelligent agents, human individuals inevitably interact with, perceive, and engage with themselves and other intelligent agents, consuming a significant portion of their time and energy. This process includes, but is not limited to, observing and analyzing one's own thoughts and opinions, interacting with others to integrate into society, living in a city, understanding national development, joining or managing a business, etc. In the Intelligenism theoretical framework, entities such as the human body, brain, other individuals, society, nations, businesses, forest ecosystems, or marine systems are also defined as intelligent agents.

Interactions, perceptions, and engagements between human individuals or other intelligent agents with themselves or other intelligent agents can be categorized into three types:

1. *Intelligent agents observing, interacting with, or engaging with their own sub-level intelligent agents.*

2. *Intelligent agents, as sub-level components of a larger intelligent agent, observe, interact with, or engage with the larger intelligent agent.*
3. *Intelligent agents observing, interacting with, or engaging with other intelligent agents without a hierarchical relationship.*

1) Intelligent agents observing, interacting with, or engaging with their own sub-level intelligent agents:

Human individuals cannot perceive the inner workings of their brains or the complete functioning of their bodily organs. For example, humans cannot perceive their digestive system's absorption of food. This can be attributed to the evolutionary process, where humans did not develop sufficient neurons to transmit detailed status information from sub-level modules (bodily tissues). When perceiving their own operations, humans often rely on vague sensations, such as pain or itching, to receive feedback about the conditions of their sub-level systems. In many seemingly normal scenarios (where issues may not trigger pain), individuals typically cannot access detailed operational information or signals from other sub-level intelligent agents. This may stem from an evolutionary adaptation in biological organisms (humans) that prioritizes overall survival, as excessive information transmission to the brain could overload it. If humans cannot allocate sufficient decision-making resources to other external environments, they may lose competitive advantages in nature. During the process of generating thoughts or feelings, we cannot sense the detailed operational states of neurons (sub-level intelligent agents). We can only grasp some thought patterns that are close to the final answer.

In the scenario of riding a bicycle, it isn't easy to articulate how balance is maintained; yet, as intelligent agents, we achieve it. During cycling, the human intelligent agent typically focuses on the process itself. Concentrating on how hands and feet exert force or move often disrupts balance. In this process, the muscles of the hands and feet may form habitual responses, and the perception of cycling remains incomplete; yet, this state enables effective cycling.

This phenomenon is not limited to cycling. In swimming, running, or esports, the mind often focuses on the overall state, and concentrating on specific details while maintaining good overall performance is challenging. Michael Polanyi, in his book *Personal Knowledge*, refers to this state as the internalization of knowledge.

In these examples, human thought is still part of the intelligent agent's construction. Perception itself can be an output of a specific task for an intelligent agent. When we use our perception to sense overall operations, we influence the system's functioning, altering the intelligent agent's output and potentially affecting task execution. Similar to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics, observation affects the quantum state, making it unobservable in its pre-observation state. Thus, when an intelligent agent is part of a higher intelligence degree intelligent agent or uses its own intelligence to perceive itself or its sub-level intelligent agents, it influences the observed intelligent agent, resulting in a state different from its pre-observation state.

This may be one reason why an intelligent agent cannot modify itself without external influence, as it cannot observe itself statically while maintaining its intelligent structure. Similarly, a person cannot perform brain surgery on themselves, as their thoughts and behaviors change during the process, which can affect the surgery.

2) Intelligent agents, as sub-level components of a larger intelligent agent, observing, interacting with, or engaging with the larger intelligent agent:

The second type of observation and interaction can be exemplified by stock investors predicting and trading in capital markets. As sub-level intelligent agents in the stock market, investors both participate in the market's operations and observe, analyze, and predict it. While some participants can gain probabilistic advantages through analysis, the market's fluctuations cannot be fully predicted, demonstrating the limitations of intelligent agents observing and interacting with a larger intelligent agent.

3) Intelligent agents observing, interacting with, or engaging with other intelligent agents without a hierarchical relationship:

In another scenario, if an intelligent agent observes another as an independent third party, it can do so without influencing the observed intelligent agent, provided the observed intelligent agent is unaware of the observation. For example, a human observing a computer-generated artificial intelligence program's operations can study, modify, upgrade, or evaluate it without the program being aware of the observer's presence. However, even in this case, the observer cannot fully grasp the entire process of intelligence, as the program undergoes extensive parameter adjustments and interactions among neurons and networks before producing results. While we may partially understand the significance of these interactions, the parameter settings of intelligent program networks are more a result of coherence than a specific substantive meaning.

The Presentation of the World: Coherence and Balance

I believe the world's presentation is based on a continuous process of coherence and balance among various entities. In this ongoing presentation, since atoms, stones, trees, or humans can be broken down into smaller components, this construction—from smaller components aggregating into larger entities—can be seen as a form of organization. The coherence of these organizations with their external environment is a necessary condition for their stable existence. When most observed organizations exist stably, the world's presentation can be considered to have reached a local balance. When this balance is disrupted, environmental changes may lead to the dissolution, reconstruction, or internal reshaping of organizations, achieving a new balance. This cycle of coherence, shaping, balance, imbalance, reconstruction, and rebalancing, over sufficient time, manifests as the "eternal" world before humanity.

Within this framework, any human theory or formula is an interpretation or expression of the world, but cannot represent the world itself. This aligns with the views presented in the "Philosophical Foundations of Intelligenism" chapter (referred to as the "Philosophy Chapter"), which argues that no theory can be asserted as absolute truth, but rather that every theory has theoretical adaptability based on specific individuals or organizations within particular external environments. Some theories have broader adaptability, while others are limited to specific scenarios. Before the emergence of geometry and physics, humans had been building houses for many years, indicating that these fields were not necessary conditions for house construction. While these disciplines later provided significant guidance for building more robust structures efficiently, trial-and-error and inductive methods had already enabled humans to build houses without a thorough understanding of geometry or physics. Modern studies of ancient houses built without such knowledge reveal they still adhered to geometric and physical principles.

In the context of artificial intelligence programs, consider a set of 50 points on an XY coordinate system, all lying on the line $Y = AX + B$. Humans can derive the formula $Y = AX + B$ using two or more points to determine the exact positions of all 50 points. An artificial intelligence program, constructed with neurons and network layers, can use a subset of these points as a training set to adjust the parameters of its neurons. When given an X value from a non-training-set point, the program can output the correct Y value without deriving the formula $Y = AX + B$, instead relying on a set of neuron parameters. Similarly, ancient humans, without knowledge of physics or geometry, used a trial-and-error process akin to neural feedback and parameter adjustment to acquire house-building skills.

Billions of years ago, the world's matter likely underwent a similar process of "trial, feedback, and adjustment" to achieve coherence and form the broader balanced state we now recognize as the universe.

As mentioned earlier, intelligence degree is an indicator of an intelligent agent's ability to align with its environment. Ancient humans mastering house-building through trial and error was a process of environmental coherence (exploring and utilizing external material and environmental laws). A scientist exploring a theory is also a process of environmental coherence, which can be generalized as a manifestation of an intelligent agent's intelligence. Extending this further, intelligence may have existed before humans or most organisms, as it is the habitual way in which the world's entities achieve coherence and balance. When humans discovered and defined this process through subjective initiative, it became known as intelligence.

Balance, Coherence, and Structural Characteristics of Intelligence

As proposed earlier, the world's construction is a process of entities seeking external coherence and internal-external balance. In this process, similar structures appear across different scales of entities (aligning with the views in the "From the Mysticism of Wave Theory to the Definitional Dilemma of Things" section of the "Philosophical Foundations of Intelligenism"). As frequently observed in my career, market fluctuations reveal similar structural characteristics across different time windows—20-day, 5-day, 1-day, 4-hour, or 1-hour lines. Even when using non-standard time windows, such as 2-day, 99-minute, or 35-minute lines, market fluctuations exhibit similar patterns. This phenomenon is not limited to market price fluctuations, but also appears in scenarios such as water flow or biological structures. In these similar structures, the golden ratio is often evident, which I speculate is an inevitable result of entities stacking and accumulating from small to large scales to achieve internal and external balance. When entities can be infinitely subdivided and exhibit similar structures, they may only achieve balance through specific proportional stacking or expansion. Otherwise, entities might exhibit distortion or deformation at particular scales, which could be unpredictable and incompatible with external entities, making such deformations unsustainable in the environment. In studying the subdivision, stacking, and expansion characteristics of market fluctuations, these structural features appear not only in fluctuation amplitudes but also in time cycles, which may be the origin of market cycle theory. When studying Chinese dynastic changes, I vaguely sensed similar temporal rhythms, but limited by incomplete historical data and time constraints, I could not conduct detailed research to draw definitive conclusions.

When observing human social organizational structures, ranging from smaller-scale family units to larger-scale national organizations, and intermediate forms such as clans, villages, towns, or cities, similar stacking and accumulative structures, progressing from simple to complex, are evident. While the organizational subdivisions of different nations vary significantly, they all follow a layered, bottom-up pattern. The construction of intelligent program networks seems to, and perhaps should, follow this pattern—from individual simple neurons to relatively simple network structures, which then participate as intelligent agents in more complex network constructions to form higher-order intelligent agents. Through this layered stacking, intelligence leaps and organizational complexity increase. In this process, intelligent agents (serving as neurons in larger networks) continuously seek coherence with the external environment to sustain their existence. Just as humans, constructed from molecules to DNA to cells to organs, embody intelligence, this pursuit of external coherence drives the construction of higher-order intelligent agents with enhanced intelligence and behavioral capabilities.

Organization Setting of Intelligenism

Introduction

The previous sections have discussed the philosophical foundation of Intelligenism and the definition of intelligence, arriving at the following definition through logical deduction: "An intelligent agent, by stacking from the bottom up to form a larger intelligent agent, may achieve a higher intelligence degree, and a higher intelligence degree enables the intelligent agent to better adapt to the external environment and acquire more resources for survival." In traditional commercial organizations, the organizational structure enables individuals to engage in more specialized and segmented work, achieving greater economies of scale. This, in turn, allows the average output per individual within the organization to surpass that of individuals acting independently outside the organization. By combining the concept of a higher intelligence degree under Intelligenism with the economies of scale in traditional commercial organizations, the concept of the Intelligent Consortium is proposed here. I refer to the organizational form based on the concept of Intelligenism as the Intelligent Consortium, aiming to create a new type of commercial organization that not only achieves the economies of scale found in traditional commercial organizations but also possesses a higher degree of organizational intelligence compared to traditional top-down commercial organizations. From this chapter onward, a detailed discussion of the Intelligent Consortium organization will be provided, covering its foundational settings and construction process.

The chapter "*Organization Setting of Intelligenism*" primarily introduces the organizational settings of the Intelligent Consortium under the concept of Intelligenism, in coherence with the theories presented in the chapters "Philosophical Foundation of Intelligenism" and "On Intelligence." As the foundational setting for constructing the Intelligent Consortium, this chapter enables readers to more easily understand the principles and logic behind the settings when reading about the Intelligent Consortium. It also provides the most fundamental theoretical basis for future practitioners of organizational construction.

As indicated by the chapter title "*Organization Setting of Intelligenism*," the following settings (definitions) of the organization refer solely to the foundational settings of the Intelligent Consortium under the concept of Intelligenism. Different theories and organizational forms inevitably have different foundational settings and theoretical bases. The definitions and discussions in this chapter do not negate the value of other perspectives outside the scope of this book's theory, nor do they claim that other perspectives or theories will necessarily be replaced by this theory. The content of this chapter and subsequent chapters adheres to the concept of Theoretical Adaptability

proposed in "Philosophical Foundation of Intelligenism," focusing only on specific scenarios to which this book's theory and the Intelligent Consortium are applicable.

The Origin of Intelligenism Organizations

The statement "an organization is composed of individuals" seems indisputable, but a further question arises from this statement: Why do individuals form organizations? The Intelligenism framework provides the following answer: Individuals choose to unite with others to form organizations in order to accomplish tasks that they cannot achieve independently, thereby gaining the economies of scale found in traditional commercial organizations and a higher intelligence degree under the concept of Intelligenism to achieve goals that individuals alone cannot accomplish. Based on this answer, the setting is established: The origin of an organization lies in the goals of its individual members.

Summarizing the above, an organization is a collection of individuals formed to achieve their individual goals. From this, it can be inferred that an organization is a means and a process, but not a result; it is a tool for realizing individual goals. After an organization is formed, some individual goals may be ongoing, which may lead to specific individuals remaining in the organization for an extended period. However, whether an organization persists in the long term depends on the characteristics of the goals of all its individual members. When all individuals leave the organization because their goals have been achieved, the organization ceases to exist. Therefore, the duration of an organization's existence is determined by all its individual members.

In both traditional commercial organizations and Intelligent Consortium organizations, employees earn income by working for the organization (company). When a candidate, after carefully assessing their own situation and goals, decides to join a company and work for it, it means that working for that organization is the relatively optimal choice after evaluating their own limitations and other information. Their goal might be to earn financial compensation, accumulate professional skills, or achieve other objectives. Regardless, becoming a member of the organization and working for it is the candidate's best option at the time. This implies that by joining the organization, the employee can achieve goals that would not be possible without being part of it. The candidate cannot be certain that their ultimate goal will definitely be achieved, but this option represents the best path available to them at the current stage for achieving their goals.

Similarly, shareholders of traditional commercial companies establish or invest in companies to achieve their goals, which may include realizing certain commercial visions or achieving capital appreciation, among other objectives. In the context of traditional commercial organizations, most decision-making authority is likely held by

major shareholders or the management team they appoint. However, regardless of the organizational structure, all commercial organizations should adhere to the basic logic: Individuals achieve their goals through the organization.

Definition of Organizational Forms

The previous section outlined the significance of organizations and the basic logic of individuals forming organizations. Returning to the observation of organizations, we find various forms of organizations around us, from human organs and ant colonies to companies, cities, and nations. Although they are all organizations, they exhibit different forms and characteristics. Before delving deeper into organizational logic, it is necessary to introduce attributes that systematically distinguish among organizations across various dimensions.

Connate and Dis-connate Organizations

Here, I propose a concept: the connate and dis-connate nature of organizations. The attributes of connate and dis-connate nature can be understood as describing two extreme states of organizational forms, with all organizations positioned somewhere between these two extremes.

Extreme connate nature implies that individual members of an organization exist within the organization from the moment of their emergence. This default state of being part of the organization makes it impossible for individuals to exist independently outside the organization, reflecting a strong dependency between the individual and the organization. dis-connate nature implies that individual members do not belong to the organization at their inception and can choose to join or leave the organization based on their own interests.

The closer an organization's relationship with its individuals leans toward connate nature, the higher the dependency between the individual and the organization, and the greater the cost and risk of leaving the organization. In organizations near the connate extreme, individuals are typically part of the organization from their inception. A typical example is biological organ tissues, where individual cells can hardly leave the organization through their own will or intent, and it is extremely difficult for cells to survive independently after leaving. Such organizations typically evolve and optimize through internal individual mutations, competition between different organizations, and non-directional elimination due to environmental changes. Moreover, the consciousness of individual members in such organizations is typically weak or nonexistent, and compared to the lifespan of individual members, the evolutionary and decline cycles of these organizations are extremely long, often many times longer than the lifespan of their individuals.

If an organization's relationship with its individuals leans toward dis-connate nature, the dependency between the individual and the organization is lower, and thus the cost and risk of leaving the organization are also lower. In such organizational scenarios, individuals typically do not belong to the organization at their inception, or even if they do, they can relatively easily leave it. A typical example is a company, where individuals do not belong to the organization at birth and can choose to join different companies based on their needs after reaching adulthood. They can even join multiple organizations simultaneously, and individuals can survive relatively easily after leaving the organization. The evolution of such organizations is typically more efficient, with significant internal structural changes achievable through external competition. Moreover, compared to the lifespan of individuals, the evolutionary cycle of such organizations is shorter, often only a fraction or even a small fraction of an individual's lifespan.

Different organizations exist somewhere between these two extreme states, with those closer to the connate extreme exhibiting connate characteristics and those closer to the dis-connate extreme displaying dis-connate characteristics.

Entry Point for Organizational Theory Setting and Construction

The purpose of "Organization Setting of Intelligenism" and subsequent chapters is to introduce the principles and ideas for constructing organizations under the Intelligenism framework. Considering the classification of connate and dis-connate nature in organizational forms, studying and practicing organizational forms closer to the dis-connate extreme is more practical for Intelligenism organizations. This is because individuals can choose to join or establish organizations based on their own will, the organizational form iterates and optimizes more efficiently, and the cost and risk of individuals leaving the organization are lower. Therefore, the application of the Intelligent Consortium in commercial or quasi-commercial scenarios will be the main direction explored in this book.

Definition and Description of Organizational Individuals

Organizational individuals are the basic building blocks of an organization. It is necessary to define organizational individuals because no individual is absolutely isolated or indivisible; every individual is a larger entity composed of smaller individuals. Therefore, it is essential to provide a precise definition of organizational individuals.

For example, in the context of a company organization A, most observers would naturally consider the employees of company A as its organizational individuals. However, employees, as human individuals, are themselves biological organizations composed of cells. Thus, both the employees and their cells are subsets of organization A. This necessitates clear and explicit rules to determine who qualifies as the organizational individuals of company A. In another scenario, if the shareholders of company A are also employees of organization B, and the employees of organization B are defined as its organizational individuals, does this mean that organization B, which includes employees who are also shareholders of company A, is an organizational individual of company A?

To address these questions and ambiguities, I propose the following definition:

Under the Intelligenism framework, the organizational individuals of an organization (Intelligent Consortium) are defined as any individuals who have direct rights and responsibilities delineated by the organization and are directly constrained by its rules. Under this setting, it implies that individuals must have some form of uncompleted rights Conversion with the organization. Therefore, theoretically, as long as there is an uncompleted rights Conversion, an individual can be defined as an organizational individual. (The concept of rights Conversion will be discussed in detail below.)

For instance, if an employee of an Intelligent Consortium organization is directly constrained by the organization's rules and has corresponding rights and responsibilities with the organization, they can be considered an organizational individual of that organization. However, the employee's cells or organs are not directly constrained by the organization's rules, nor do they have direct rights or responsibilities with the organization. In other words, the organization's rules do not target the employee's cells, and the rules and rights-responsibility relationships of the cells are accountable to the human body, not the organization. Therefore, the employee's cells are not organizational individuals of the organization.

Based on this definition, if a movie theater operates as an Intelligent Consortium, a customer who enters the theater to watch a movie is also considered an organizational individual of the theater. Similarly, a consumer dining at a restaurant is an organizational individual of the restaurant organization. The theater's service providers or outsourced employees, who also have corresponding rights and responsibilities and are constrained by the organization's rules, are likewise organizational individuals.

When two cooperating entities (organization A and organization B) are both organizations and have mutual rights and responsibilities and are constrained by each other's rules, they can be defined as mutual organizational individuals. From the perspective of modern corporate structures, this resembles a cross-shareholding

relationship between organization A and organization B.

Temporal Limits of Organizational Affiliation

Based on the Intelligenism concept's definition of organizational individuals, individuals can join or leave an organization. For example, an employee is recognized as an organizational individual when they sign a labor contract and join the organization. Once they complete their work handover and leave the company, ending all direct constraints by the organization's rules and any direct rights or responsibilities, they are considered to have exited the organization. Similarly, a movie theater's audience is regarded as an organizational individual upon purchasing a ticket, but this status ends once they finish watching the movie and leave the theater. Under this setting, the definition of organizational individuals in Intelligenism is broader than that in traditional commercial organizations. A standardized rule-based relationship defines it, and the temporal nature of organizational affiliation is diverse. Individuals are considered organizational individuals as long as they meet the standardized rule-based relationship; otherwise, they are not.

Diversity of Organizational Individual Characteristics

The above definition and examples demonstrate that the definition of organizational individuals under the Intelligenism framework is relatively broad, resulting in greater diversity in the forms that organizational individuals take within the organization compared to traditional commercial organizations. Under the Intelligenism framework, suppliers and consumers can become organizational individuals for a specific period. Compared to organizational individuals, such as investors or employees, different types of organizational individuals are subject to different organizational rules and have varying forms of rights and responsibilities.

Likely Types of Organizational Individuals in Intelligenism Organizations

- 1. Capital-Supplying Organizational Individuals:** Similar to shareholders or creditors in traditional commercial organizations.
- 2. Labor-Supplying Organizational Individuals:** Similar to employees in traditional commercial organizations.
- 3. Consumption-Demanding Organizational Individuals:** Similar to consumers in traditional commercial organizations.
- 4. Goods and Services-Supplying Organizational Individuals:** Similar to upstream suppliers of goods and services in traditional commercial organizations.

5. Other Types of Organizational Individuals: These cannot be strictly defined and may include advisors, opinion leaders, forum fans, potential consumers, etc. Intelligenism organizations can define additional types of organizational individuals based on organizational development needs, expanding the organizational boundaries and increasing the number of organizational individuals to achieve higher intelligence potential or other organizational development goals.

Organizational Boundaries

Based on the defining characteristics of organizational individuals under Intelligenism, the boundaries of an organization exhibit continuous dynamic changes. As different organizational individuals (members) are added or removed over time and as business activities unfold, particularly for consumers or suppliers, their time as organizational individuals is relatively short if they are solely regarded as consumers or goods and services suppliers (without other roles) and if their consumption or supply does not involve after-sales service terms or corresponding rule constraints. According to the rule that "any individual with direct rights and responsibilities delineated by the organization can be considered an organizational individual," the number of organizational individuals in an Intelligenism organization will be significantly larger than in traditional commercial organizations. Moreover, organizations can develop more personalized identification schemes for their organizational individuals, thereby expanding the total number and types of organizational individuals, making the organization's boundaries not only dynamic but also relatively fluid. Due to the variability and continuous dynamic nature of this definition of organizational individuals, more individuals have the potential to become organizational individuals of a given organization and participate in its planning and development.

Definition of Power and Rights

Definition of Rights

The rights inherently possessed by an individual include bodily autonomy, the right to think, and the right to act. These rights of self-determination are innate. This does not mean that these rights are necessarily protected, but individuals inherently can exercise control over themselves. While other individuals or organizations may infringe upon these rights, this does not negate the individual's inherent right to self-determination. When an individual interacts with the external environment, these rights of self-determination are considered the individual's rights. As individuals engage in more activities, the types of rights they possess also increase, including ownership and control over property, money, and so forth.

The process of an individual becoming an organizational individual involves the exchange of rights with the organization (the procedure of exchange is also referred to as rights conversion in my book). For example, in a restaurant (organization), a chef exchanges their right to control eight hours of their daily time for the right to own and control several thousand yuan per month. During this rights conversion, the chef's right to control eight hours of their daily time is transferred to the restaurant (organization). Similarly, a consumer relinquishes part of their ownership and control over money to gain ownership and control over food, as well as the right to enjoy the food in the restaurant. During the rights exchange process between the chef and the restaurant, and between the consumer and the restaurant, both the chef and the consumer have corresponding rights and responsibilities with the restaurant. Therefore, as long as the rights and responsibilities delineation is not concluded, both the chef and the consumer are organizational individuals of the restaurant. However, compared to the chef, the consumer's rights and responsibilities relationship concludes more quickly, so the consumer's organizational individual status has a shorter duration.

All of an organization's rights originate from its organizational individuals. An organization is essentially a container or processing center for the rights Conversion from its individuals. By managing, restructuring, or even engaging in further rights exchanges with other organizations, the organization expands and transforms the types of rights it possesses. It then redistributes these rights to its organizational individuals to fulfill their individual goals.

In the restaurant example, the restaurant manages the rights Conversion from various organizational individuals, accumulating money and other rights (increased ownership and control over money) through continuous rights exchanges. Greater control over money can be transformed into future investment returns for capital-supplying organizational individuals (such as shareholders or creditors) or future wage income for labor-supplying organizational individuals (employees). However, the total rights possessed by the organization are not necessarily equal to the sum of the rights Conversion from its organizational individuals. If the organization operates inefficiently and incurs losses, the rights it possesses may be less than the sum of the rights Conversion from its individuals in the past. Conversely, if the organization operates effectively and generates profits, its rights may exceed the sum of the rights Conversion from its individuals. However, considering that certain organizational individuals, such as capital suppliers (e.g., shareholders or creditors), may demand greater ownership and control over money in the future after their capital investment, or labor suppliers may demand higher wages as the organization's accumulated rights increase, it can be concluded that all of the organization's rights ultimately belong to certain organizational individuals.

Calculation and Description of Individual Rights

Since it is impossible to fully describe or calculate all of an individual's rights, when calculating an individual's rights, one can only describe and estimate the types and quantities of rights gained or lost after joining one or more known organizations. This calculation method does not require detailed computation in later parts of the book, nor is it necessary to derive calculations using formulas in constructing an Intelligenism organization. Therefore, readers only need a basic understanding of this definition. Understanding this concept of calculation and description allows readers to gain a deeper understanding of the form of individual rights Conversions. Skipping this section will not substantially affect the knowledge of the book's content.

When defining the changes in an individual's rights after joining a specific organization, one must first assess the individual's rights status before joining the organization. For example, if individual A, when not part of organization B, can freely control their time from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. daily, but after joining organization B, the organization requires them to work from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, in exchange for a monthly right to own and control 5,000 yuan. In the relationship between individual A and organization B, to express the rights Conversion, it is impractical to calculate all the rights individual A possesses. Instead, the expression of rights Conversion only needs to reflect the difference between the scenarios of joining and not joining organization B. When expressing individual rights, it should not be understood as the rights an individual can control after leaving all organizations (as this is not feasible in reality). Instead, the change in individual rights must be understood within the context of the specific relationship between the organization and the individual. When examining individual rights from the perspective of individual A and company B, A's individual rights (from the standpoint of company B) are the sum of all rights A possesses when not part of organization B. This relationship is expressed as: A individual-B organization-individual rights.

The A individual-B organization-individual rights expression reflects only the difference between the total rights A possesses when not part of organization B and the total rights after joining organization B. In this process, given the variety of rights involved and the fact that many types cannot be directly converted into the same unit for quantitative comparison, the lost right to control time and the gained right to control money cannot simply offset each other. Instead, these differences should be listed to describe the state of rights changes. For example, after joining organization B, individual A must work from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., resulting in a reduction in their disposable time. However, the total rights A possesses when not part of organization B does not mean A is not part of any other organizations; it may include the rights A possesses after joining other organizations, such as C, D, E, F, etc.

Rights Conversion and Expansion

Joining an organization is a way to transform rights forms, to change the form of an individual's rights to achieve their personal goals. If the method used in the rights transformation process is appropriate, the total sum of an individual's rights can

increase. However, the value of rights varies from person to person, and different individuals assign different values to various forms of rights. An individual may believe their total rights have increased, while others may perceive their total rights as unchanged or reduced. Enhancing one's abilities can make rights transformation more advantageous and indirectly increase the total sum of rights. Expanding individual capabilities enables individuals to accomplish tasks or achieve goals that were previously unattainable, and the expansion of an individual's behavior and capability range inherently expands their rights.

When an organizational individual has an uncompleted rights Conversion relationship within a specific organization, they may hold certain powers within that organization. They can also engage in rights exchanges with other individuals outside the organization. During rights exchanges with other organizations, the individual can convert the power within the organization into their own or others' rights, thereby expanding individual rights. Thus, power can be understood as a form of rights that can be converted into rights held by individuals, achieving the expansion of individual rights. (Power will be further discussed below.)

Under the Intelligenism organization setting, market transactions, organizational employment, investment, and consumption are all defined as rights Conversions. For example, consumption involves a consumer relinquishing their right to control money to gain control over a certain item. By introducing the concept of rights Conversion, the Intelligenism framework unifies various types of commercial activities—such as consumption, investment, and employment—within the dimension of rights Conversion. By recognizing organizational individuals through rights Conversions, individuals engaging in different types of commercial interactions with the organization are unified under the category of organizational individuals. This is one of the foundational premises for the settings and construction of the Intelligent Consortium, which will be elaborated upon in subsequent sections.

On Power

Definition of Power

In the process of managing rights within an organization, specific individuals (members) possess the authority to allocate the organization's rights, and this authority is not fully constrained by organizational rules (i.e., the behavioral path is not singular), allowing these individuals to exercise initiative in their allocation decisions. This is when power emerges. When an individual has such non-singular decision-making paths, we can conclude that they possess certain powers within the organization. It can be said that power arises from the non-standardized process of allocating and distributing rights within an organization. Suppose the redistribution of

rights is mandatory and unalterable (i.e., a singular path). In that case, individuals can only passively follow rules during execution (able to execute but not decide), and in such cases, power does not exist. Therefore, under the framework of Intelligenism, power is contingent upon the organization. If individuals are isolated and not part of an organization, they only possess rights (control over their own possessions) but not organizational power.

The dominance (power) of an individual within an organization is not inherent but primarily granted by organizational rules, with the following characteristics:

1.1: Sources of Organizational Power

For example, determining whether the mining rights of a mine belong to Zhang San or Li Si theoretically requires a final decision-maker (a specific organizational individual). This decision-maker has the authority to decide the ownership of the mining rights, and if this authority is exclusive, it can be considered a form of power. Suppose the decision-making authority for mining rights can be held by A, B, or any of dozens of individuals within the organization without requiring approval from others. In that case, the power associated with the mining rights decision becomes weaker. In this scenario, we cannot say that a matter decidable by dozens of individuals is not power; instead, the power is diluted because exclusivity does not equate to uniqueness. The power still exists within the organization, but at the individual level, it is weakened. However, from the perspective of the entire organization, this power remains exclusive but not unique. To extend this further with a more extreme example, if an organization has 100 members and 97 of them have the authority to decide mining rights while the remaining 3 do not, the 97 individuals still hold exclusivity over the 3 in matters of mining rights. However, when the decision-making power is distributed among 97 individuals, the power of any single individual is significantly reduced. Suppose these 3 individuals aim to secure the mining rights, which would yield a 1 million surplus benefit. If the decision-making power rests with only one person, that individual would likely claim the majority of the 1 million surplus. If 97 individuals hold the decision-making power, they face a prisoner's dilemma in competing for the 1 million surplus. They might collectively agree to split the surplus equally, or one individual might betray the group, accepting a 100,000 benefit to grant the mining rights. Regardless, the dilution of power affects the ability to secure the benefits tied to that power.

1.2: Degree of Power

Continuing with the case from 1.1, whether the mining decision-making power is held by one individual or distributed among 97 individuals, exclusivity

objectively exists. Thus, I propose that the primary prerequisite for power is exclusivity, but this only explains the formation of power from 0 to 1. To evaluate the magnitude of power, we need to discuss it further. This section introduces the concept of the "degree of power" to assess the ability of power to claim benefits. Assuming exclusivity implies the existence of power, from the perspective of measuring the strength of individual power, the degree of power must lie somewhere between absolute power (1) and absolute lack of power (0). When a single individual holds the decision-making power in mining, their degree of power in this matter is closer to 1. If 97 individuals have it, each individual's degree of power approaches 0. As subsequent sections unfold, the concept of the degree of power will be referenced frequently.

1.3: Power and Benefits

Based on the scenario involving the 1 million surplus benefit from section 1.1, applying the degree of power concept from 1.2 leads to a straightforward conclusion: the degree of power determines the distribution of benefits. This means that when the degree of power for a specific matter within an organization approaches or reaches 1, the individual with that power can claim a larger share of the benefits in that matter—conversely, a lower degree of power results in a smaller share of benefits.

1.4: Power Dispersion

Further exploring the example from 1.1, in an organization of 100 members where 97 hold the mining decision-making power, the dispersion of this power is extremely high. This leads to more potential for internal competition within the group, significantly reducing the ability of the power-holding group (the 97 individuals) to claim benefits from the other 3 (those competing for mining rights). The exclusive group might only secure 50% or even 10% of the 1 million surplus, rather than the majority (e.g., 80% or more). If the power-holding group consists of only 3 individuals or even 1, the power dispersion is lower, allowing the exclusive group to claim a larger share of the surplus. Thus, the degree of power dispersion is inversely proportional to the share of surplus benefits obtained by the power-holding group: higher dispersion leads to a lower share of benefits, and vice versa.

On Mobilization

When discussing organizations, it is essential to consider the efficiency and significance of the organization's external actions, which inevitably involve examining the issue of organizational mobilization, as the strength of mobilization is a key indicator of an organization's capability.

2.1: What is Mobilization?

Before discussing mobilization, it is necessary to define what mobilization is. I define mobilization as the execution volume of rights conversion from organizational individuals to the organization. This rights conversion refers to the process by which non-organizational individuals become organizational individuals through rights conversion, or the process by which existing organizational individuals convert their rights to the organization. In this book, mobilization is a relative quantitative indicator for evaluating mobilization behavior. Others outside this book may have different definitions of mobilization, but in the context of this book, the terms "mobilization" and "mobilization strength" adhere to the definition provided above.

Suppose two villages, A and B, engage in a conflict over survival resources. Village A has 3,000 people and mobilizes 300 to fight, while Village B has 500 people and mobilizes 100. In terms of absolute mobilization numbers, Village A surpasses Village B. However, in terms of mobilization proportion, Village A's is 10%, while Village B's is 20%, meaning Village B has a higher mobilization proportion. Regarding the mobilized individuals, those from Village A may be more cautious about risking their lives and less willing to endure hardship compared to those from Village B. Some mobilized individuals in Village A might merely show up to make up numbers, without considering how to ensure the organization's victory, or even being reluctant to engage in combat. Given these micro-level differences among mobilized individuals, an indicator is needed to evaluate the degree of mobilization of individuals, which I term "individual mobilization degree."

Thus, the formula is: Mobilization Strength = Mobilization Proportion * Individual Mobilization Degree

Unfortunately, quantifying an organization's mobilization strength in reality is a challenging task. However, the mobilization strength formula still offers evaluative and observational guidance. Particularly in constructing organizations, the concept of mobilization strength can provide design guidance for organizational builders and offer better observational perspectives and dimensions for mobilization-related activities during organizational operations.

2.2: Reflections on Individual Mobilization Degree

Using ancient warfare as an example, in earlier times, soldiers were primarily farmers during peacetime, trained and conscripted into soldiers during wartime. Later, professional soldiers emerged, receiving fixed salaries and more extensive professional training. From the perspective of individual mobilization degree, the former is significantly lower than the latter. However, in terms of mobilization proportion, the former is likely higher than the latter. Delving deeper into the individual mobilization degree reveals many details worth discussing. I propose that individual mobilization degree is synchronized with the amount of information mobilized: the higher the mobilization degree, the greater the information mobilized. In the earlier example, militia-like soldiers engaged in daily production during peacetime without continuous military training. Thus, their actions in military operations were simpler and cruder compared to those of professional soldiers. In combat, they might merely wield weapons to make up numbers, lacking in tactical coordination and combat skills compared to professional soldiers. Hence, their individual mobilization degree is low, reflected in the smaller amount of information mobilized.

In summary, a higher individual mobilization degree corresponds to a greater amount of information mobilized. As the info mobilized by individuals increases, the amount of information that needs to be managed also grows, requiring managers to have stronger information monitoring, feedback, and evaluation capabilities to manage highly mobilized individuals effectively.

The content corresponding to individual mobilization degree, from low to high, can be roughly categorized as follows (this is a personal understanding, not a standardized quantifiable classification):

- 1. Presence;**
- 2. Simple physical execution (physically observable);**
- 3. Complex coordinated actions (physically observable but requiring training);**
- 4. Information processing and response;**
- 5. Autonomous decision-making;**
- 6. Proactive and extended learning;**
- 7. Creative innovation.**

As individual mobilization degree increases, organizational managers must address not only the challenge of managing larger amounts of information but also the issue of increasing information uncertainty. Returning to the evolution from militia to professional soldiers, while tactical coordination and professional actions increased the amount of information involved, this information remained perceptible, observable, and evaluable. However, when the individual mobilization degree further increases, it consists of mobilizing individuals'

creativity, decision-making, and proactive learning enthusiasm—elements of "mental actions." At this stage, organizational managers face the challenge of perceiving and understanding the operational state of the individuals' intelligence they manage. As discussed in the sections on "Perception of Intelligence" and "Limitations of Intelligence Perception" in the chapter "On Intelligence," intelligence-related information processing exhibits characteristics of a black box. In high-mobilization-degree states, some individual behavioral information cannot be assessed through tangible data or observable dimensions, making explicit management difficult. Thus, as the degree of individual mobilization increases, the need to optimize or even radically restructure management models and organizational structures arises to address these intelligence-related management challenges. Historically, early management focused on obedience for grassroots soldiers. In modern warfare, some countries have formed independent tactical units that, beyond obedience, require autonomous analysis, coordination, and decision-making. Maintaining a mechanical obedience-based management approach in such scenarios would lead to significant competitive disadvantages.

An organization's capability and advancement may largely depend on the individual mobilization degree of its members. The more advanced an organization, the higher the individual mobilization degree should be, leading to greater development potential and competitiveness.

This topic will be further explored in the discussion of the Intelligent Consortium in subsequent sections: High mobilization degree implies managing large amounts of information. Rule-based systems (cybernetics) can only manage low-information, low-complexity systems, so cybernetic or mechanistic management systems face bottlenecks in managing high mobilization degrees. Connectionism-based systems may enable higher-order mobilization management.

2.3: The Source of Mobilization

Exploring the source of mobilization requires addressing the question: "Why are organizational individuals willing to be mobilized or ultimately mobilized?" Different individuals weigh benefits differently. For example, some prioritize honor or their children's lives over their own, while others prioritize their own survival. Overall, each individual's behavior exhibits particular preferences and limitations, but these behaviors result from their pursuit of maximum benefit within cognitive and environmental constraints.

Based on the conclusions from the section on "Reflections on Individual Mobilization Degree," higher individual mobilization degrees are associated with greater individual agency and more rights mobilized. As the mobilization degree increases, individuals engage in more critical thinking, enabling goals that were

previously unachievable at lower mobilization degrees to be realized. High mobilization typically means individuals are willing to mobilize more intellectual rights, demonstrating a greater supply of thinking rights. However, this supply of thinking rights is difficult to observe and cannot be evaluated using methods for assessing low-mobilization behaviors. The relationship between mobilization and being mobilized involves a rights exchange process. In this process, the mobilizing party uses environmental constraints, coercion, inducement, or suggestions to reach a rights exchange agreement with the mobilized party, resulting in some degree of mobilization. Whether the individual mobilization degree meets the mobilizing party's expectations depends on the specific circumstances. The effectiveness of mobilization depends on the mobilizing party's ability to employ mobilization methods, supervise the process, leverage management experience, evaluate outcomes, and enforce rules. Insufficient capabilities may prevent the mobilizing party from achieving the desired results. (Here, the mobilizing party typically refers to the organization or its decision-makers.)

In a slave society, slave owners impose environmental constraints by restricting slaves' personal freedom and use punishments, death, or hunger as means of mobilization (rights exchange). Given that slaves cannot leave this environment, they choose options they believe maximize their benefits, such as avoiding death or hunger. If a slave prioritizes survival, they may choose labor to secure non-death or non-hunger outcomes. However, some slaves might choose death over labor, reflecting a different set of values.

In essence, mobilization is the execution process of rights exchange. In the slave example, under continuous supervision by slave owners and overseers, slaves might choose to work but not to think about improving work quality, making decisions to maximize the slave owner's interests, or engaging in continuous learning. However, if slave owners introduce a clause allowing slaves to gain freedom by making significant contributions, some slaves might be motivated to think and learn in ways that align with the slave owner's interests.

2.4: Diminishing Marginal Efficiency of Individual Mobilization

As mentioned, higher individual mobilization degrees can enhance an organization's development potential. However, increasing mobilization degrees often requires more resource investment or organizational arrangements by the organization. When an organization invests more in specific individuals to achieve higher mobilization degrees, it should be aware of the diminishing marginal efficiency of individual mobilization. Continuous investment or better organizational arrangements can indeed increase individual mobilization degrees to some extent, but whether the organizational contributions from these increases can offset the costs of sustained investment and the negative impacts of reduced investment in other individuals' mobilization degrees is a long-term topic for

organizational research and optimization. Thus, while aiming to increase mobilization degrees, organizations should also improve mobilization efficiency to achieve mobilization goals at lower costs.

For specific individuals (e.g., exceptional talents like Steve Jobs or Elon Musk), sustained high mobilization degrees may yield significant organizational benefits. However, for others, similar levels of investment and organizational support may not produce comparable results. Moreover, the ability of elite individuals to create substantial surplus value is inherently uncertain, meaning significant investments in specific individuals to achieve sustained high mobilization degrees carry considerable risks. Therefore, under limited investment and organizational coverage, organizations should develop differentiated mobilization strategies based on external environments and internal talent structures to maximize organizational benefits.

Organizational Approval and Organizational Approval Degree

Under the framework of Intelligenism, organizational approval refers to the Approval by organizational individuals of various elements within the organization, such as its systems, network structures, personnel arrangements, operational strategies, and reward-punishment mechanisms. The organizational approval degree is an evaluative metric introduced based on this definition to assess the overall acceptance of the organization by its members. To evaluate the organizational approval degree, each individual's acceptance of the organization is assessed, and the average of all individuals' acceptance constitutes the organizational approval degree. Both individual and organizational approval degrees are defined as values within the range (0, 1), where 0 indicates a complete lack of acceptance and 1 indicates full Approval of all considered organizational elements. However, given the variety of elements covered by organizational approval and the differing evaluation methods and criteria, I believe it is challenging to quantify the degree of organizational approval precisely. If monitoring and assessing the organizational approval degree is necessary, indirect methods such as surveys of organizational individuals or counting negative expressions in organizational forums may provide some insight. However, any study or evaluation is theoretically only a partial assessment, offering limited guidance for determining the degree of organizational approval.

Although precise measurement of organizational approval degree is infeasible in reality, it is still possible to infer that certain strategies can enhance it. For example, encouraging organizational individuals to discuss, vote on, and evaluate organizational systems and structures can drive optimization, gradually aligning these elements with the preferences of most individuals to achieve relatively higher

organizational approval degrees.

Organizational Approval Degree and Mobilization

Efficiency

In an organization with a relatively higher organizational approval degree, individuals typically believe that the organization's elements align more closely with their cognition or value judgments (i.e., they are more "correct"). Humans tend to believe that schemes they deem correct will yield better outcomes. Thus, higher organizational approval degrees often lead individuals to be more optimistic about the outcomes of the organization's network operations, fostering a belief in higher rights conversion efficiency in the present or future. Additionally, a more optimistic view of the organization may translate to greater confidence in the prospects of rights conversion between individuals and the organization (i.e., higher certainty). Furthermore, since humans often evaluate their own efforts optimistically, if an increased organizational approval degree is accompanied by individuals' efforts to adjust organizational elements, this may further enhance their trust in the organization.

Based on the earlier definition that mobilization is essentially the execution process of rights conversion, individuals assess the success probability of rights conversion (e.g., whether a purchased car will be delivered or whether promised wages will be paid) and the actual efficiency of rights conversion (e.g., whether a purchased product is cost-effective or whether work involves unpaid overtime or poor conditions). Low expected success rates or efficiency may lead individuals to demand higher immediate rights conversion to compensate for these uncertainties. For example, consumers may lower their willingness to pay due to poor after-sales service or lack of confidence in a company's sustainability. Similarly, employees may demand higher immediate wages to compensate for uncertainties about salary payments, overtime, or promotion prospects. Investors may require higher returns to offset perceived risks, increasing financing costs for the organization. Conversely, when individuals are confident in the organization's development or optimistic about their rights conversion prospects (high certainty or expected higher efficiency), mobilization becomes easier to achieve.

Organizational Consensus and Consensus-Building

Mechanisms

If identity is based on individual values and analytical judgments, consensus is independent of personal beliefs, analyses, or derived opinions. Regarding the definition of consensus under the framework of Intelligenism, I do not agree with

Baidu Baike's description of consensus as a shared understanding or common Approval, values, and ideals sought by different social strata or interest groups. Instead, my definition aligns closely with Wikipedia's definition of consensus: a community solution accepted by conflicting parties (even if reluctantly or by shelving disputes).

(<https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:%E4%BD%95%E8%B0%93%E5%85%B1%E8%AF%86>)

According to Wikipedia's definition, consensus does not imply a subjective right or wrong, but rather serves as a solution to reconcile differences in individual perspectives. Under this definition, consensus does not equate to Approval or agreement among organizational individuals. It is a sustained state enabling the organization to function effectively under recognized rules, even when the organizational approval degree is not 1 (i.e., individuals hold differing views on organizational elements). In many scenarios, organizational consensus means that individuals can resolve disputes over opinions or interests within a recognized framework to reach a provisional outcome, which I term a "consensus-building mechanism." These mechanisms may include persuasion, voting, or discussion, but consensus does not aim to eliminate all dissent or achieve complete agreement. Instead, it seeks an acceptable conclusion that individuals relatively acknowledge despite differing opinions.

For example, in a company, potential employees sign labor contracts, but in practice, employees and the company may not always agree on all terms of the employment relationship. However, they can reach a consensus on a dispute resolution mechanism (e.g., resolving disputes through litigation in court). Similarly, in disputes between consumers and sellers, consensus can be reached by seeking government intervention under consumer protection laws or through legal action. These examples illustrate consensus-based dispute resolution mechanisms in the absence of full identity.

Relationship Between Organizational Consensus and Organizational Approval

An organization with an organizational approval degree of 1 is an ideal that does not exist in reality, as individuals have different values, cognitions, and interests. Thus, achieving complete agreement among all individuals is infeasible. However, through consensus-building mechanisms, organizations can still function. In decision-making scenarios, individuals with differing views may agree to follow a majority-rule voting process to reach a final decision. Some individuals may remain skeptical of the solution but still accept the outcome (achieving consensus). If individuals cannot agree on a solution or accept a majority-rule approach (losing organizational

consensus) and the organization fails to find a consensus-building mechanism for differing views, it may face internal conflicts, zero-sum competition, open confrontations, or even dissolution.

Thus, I believe organizational consensus must precede organizational approval. Discussing organizational approval is meaningless without consensus, as an organization with an approval degree below 1 will encounter issues such as internal friction, zero-sum games, overt conflicts, or disintegration. Effective consensus-building mechanisms and high-quality consensus can guide organizations toward higher approval degrees and greater competitiveness.

Definition of Execution and Decision-Making

The behavior of organizational individuals can be divided into two dimensions: decision-making and execution;

1. Execution: Execution is the process of implementing actions based on a pre-determined and fixed path, or in other words, execution is the process of carrying out the current rights exchange scheme between the organization and its individuals to achieve the ultimate rights conversion.

2. Decision-Making: Decision-making is the process of determining a single behavioral path based on information, cognition, worldview, interests, and other factors when there exists a specific range of optional paths. Decision-making is used to determine the efficiency and form of future rights exchange schemes within the organization, which are then implemented through execution.

In an organization, all behaviors of organizational individuals can be categorized as either execution or decision-making. Execution by an organizational individual must be based on a singular path. If an individual faces non-singular choices during execution, it implies a certain degree of decision-making is involved, as the process of moving from multiple paths to a single path is decision-making. The future efficiency and form of rights transformation in the organization are determined by decision-making.

Under the framework of Intelligenism, the execution behavior of organizational individuals does not involve the application of information, as execution is merely the process of acting along the singular path determined by decision-making. However, the execution process can generate information. In contrast, decision-making itself does not create new information; instead, it collects and applies existing information. When an individual decides without executing it, there is no interaction with the external environment, so the external environment remains unchanged, and no

information is generated as a result of the decision-making process.

There is no such thing as pure execution devoid of any decision-making elements. We can define absolute execution as 0 and absolute decision-making as 1. Every organizational individual's behavior within the organization lies somewhere within the execution/decision-making range of (0,1). When an individual's organizational behavior leans closer to 0, it indicates a lower decision-making component, and conversely, a higher decision-making component when closer to 1. In a perfect and thorough execution process, no information is invoked—it is purely the realization of a certain path. Information invocation occurs in decision-making behavior, where information is utilized, organized, and analyzed by the individual to arrive at the final decision result, which is the singular path for execution. Since each organizational individual's behavior lies somewhere within the (0,1) execution/decision-making range, the amount of information invoked by different individuals within the organization varies.

In the example of a restaurant organization, the purchasing manager's decision on which wholesaler to buy seafood from is a decision-making behavior. During this process, the manager uses available information to make a decision (formulating the final purchasing execution plan). After the decision, if the purchasing manager needs to implement this decision, they must decide whether to assign a purchasing agent or go personally. In this scenario, choosing who performs the purchase is another decision-making process initiated by the manager. Whether formulating the purchasing plan or selecting who executes it, both the manager and the purchasing staff only impact the external environment when they take action, and this action is execution. During human reading, an individual merely acquires information from the book without selecting a singular path from multiple options, so reading itself is an execution behavior rather than a decision-making one. In daily life and work, decision-making and execution often alternate or occur simultaneously. For instance, typing on a computer is an execution behavior, but deciding what to type is a decision-making behavior. Typing causes changes on the computer screen, generating information. If one only makes a decision without executing it, no new text appears on the screen, and the information that would have been generated through execution does not materialize. During the typing process, decision-making and execution alternate or simultaneously impact the individual and the external environment. In the era of slavery, when slaves moved heavy objects, it was not purely execution; decisions about how to move, apply force, or navigate were all decision-making behaviors. However, many of the slaves' decision-making paths were restricted, such as being unable to demand a cart or devise a collaborative plan. Thus, for organizational individuals, execution and decision-making are complementary. In the organizational framework of Intelligenism, executors are typically defined as individuals primarily responsible for "execution" tasks, meaning some of their behavioral path selection rights are transferred to decision-makers. Based on this setting and reasoning, neither the organization nor its managers can completely

eliminate an individual's decision-making behavior; they can only impose certain restrictions on specific paths.

Decision-Making and Power

Based on the content of *On Power*, “In the process of managing rights within an organization, some individuals possess the right to configure rights, and this configuration right is not fully constrained by organizational rules (allowing for non-singular paths), enabling these individuals to exercise initiative, thus generating power.” It follows that the source of power is the configuration right that is not fully constrained by rules. This unconstrained configuration results in non-singular behavioral path choices, and the process of moving from multiple paths to a single path is decision-making. This leads to the conclusion that decision-making stems from power, and decision-making is the process of exercising power.

For example, a restaurant's purchasing manager tasked with buying crabs at the market can choose from five vendors, indicating non-singular path choices. The purchasing plan is not fully constrained by organizational rules, which may only require the manager to devise a plan to purchase crabs at or below a specified price. Thus, the manager must decide to determine a singular path and execute it either personally or through another individual. In this case, the purchasing manager holds power and exercises it through decision-making. Here, the restaurant is the organization, the purchasing manager is the individual, and the purchasing action is a rights exchange between the restaurant and seafood wholesalers. The restaurant typically sets a baseline (the worst tolerable scenario) for the rights exchange, allowing the manager to make decisions above this baseline. The manager aims to maximize their own rights transformation efficiency within this framework, such as choosing a vendor with non-lowest prices but better service to reduce future workload (achieving the same monetary gain with less effort, thus improving rights transformation efficiency) or selecting a vendor with familial ties (not necessarily the best cost-performance).

In a design company, a designer, as an organizational individual, also faces non-singular paths when designing a project, indicating they hold power. Their design may require specific materials sourced from a particular supplier, potentially reducing their workload through additional services or enabling extra rights exchanges (e.g., monetary or other benefits). Alternatively, the designer may aim to create superior work to gain promotions or accolades.

In both cases—the purchasing manager and the designer—their power exhibits exclusivity (as defined in the power section of *On Power*). For instance, the decision to purchase crabs lies solely with the purchasing manager, and the design proposal

originates from the designer.

As an organization's power concentration increases, decision-making rights consolidate to fewer individuals, leaving others with more execution tasks. As mentioned, execution generates information, while decision-making only applies it. Power concentration means fewer individuals handle more information, some from natural environmental changes (unrelated to individuals) and some from execution behaviors and feedback, leading to greater data processing demands for decision-makers.

Greater power and decision-making space allow decision-makers to select paths that maximize their rights transformation efficiency, enabling further rights and power expansion. Thus, organizational individuals tend to make decisions that create more opportunities for future decision-making, driving the evolution of organizational power expansion.

Execution, Decision-Making, and Mobilization

The execution and decision-making behaviors of organizational individuals are part of their rights exchange with the organization. Execution implements a predetermined rights exchange scheme (single path), while decision-making selects a single path from multiple options. When choosing a path, individuals tend to select the scheme most favorable to their rights exchange (either maximizing short-term execution benefits or securing opportunities for future efficiency gains). Mobilization, for organizational individuals, is the process by which the organization presents or promotes a rights transformation scheme. This is akin to displaying goods in a marketplace; when individuals accept the internal value and price of the goods, they exchange rights (e.g., time, money) to complete the "transaction" and take the goods (completing mobilization). Thus, organizational mobilization involves collecting, processing, managing, and delivering information about the needs and goals of individuals, who then make decisions and execute in a manner they deem acceptable to complete the rights conversion.

Decision-making by organizational individuals occurs constantly, accompanied by various execution behaviors that impact the organization or external environment. These decisions continuously adjust the individual's behavioral path to align with what they perceive as most advantageous. When the behaviors of mobilized individuals benefit the organization as a whole—enabling the organization to gain greater overall rights in interactions with the external environment—mobilization is positive. Otherwise, it is negative.

In the "executor" category, "executors" are individuals primarily tasked with execution within the organization, distinguished from "decision-makers." This does

not mean executors lack decision-making; it indicates many of their decision-making paths are restricted, even if they believe certain decisions could benefit both the organization and their future rights transformation efficiency. Executors cannot act on their judgments. While they retain decision-making in areas not restricted by “decision-makers” or organizational rules, their inability to influence the organization or predict decision-making benefits makes them more passive and short-sighted. With significant decision-making space stripped away, their potential to influence the organization diminishes, reducing interest in information related to long-term organizational development. Executors either trust that current “decision-makers” will provide better rights transformation prospects or focus on maximizing short-term efficiency within limited decision-making paths. Long-term organizational development becomes an unrealistic and hollow aspiration. For example, it is challenging for managers to inspire dishwashers in a restaurant or factory workers to focus on the organization’s long-term future, as their enthusiasm for organizational improvement wanes under sustained execution-focused work.

In the “decision-maker” category, traditional top-down organizational systems mean most decision-makers are subordinate to a higher decision-maker, limiting their decisions to specific authority scopes. When systemic issues across organizational modules require holistic optimization for further development, decision-makers with limited authority may realize their decisions cannot drive organizational progress for greater future efficiency. If they can maximize personal rights transformation by harming the organization within their limited authority, they may propose decisions detrimental to the organization’s overall interests.

Both “executors” and “decision-makers” are like children in a toy pile; without meticulous control from parents or guardians, maintaining order is challenging. In most traditional organizations, mobilization remains effective when systems and basic development logic are functional, akin to a supermarket profiting despite minor theft or employee opportunism. However, in rapidly deteriorating external environments with rising operational and competitive pressures, outdated and inefficient management may fail. Implementing better mobilization and management schemes or curbing harmful behaviors may help, but decision-makers still are decision-makers, executors still are executors as well, and the cybernetic system’s limitations persist, capping mobilization potential.

Decision-Making and Intelligence

In the actions of organizational individuals, execution is a manifestation of pure mechanism and cybernetics, because execution is merely the process of organizational individuals taking action based on the only path derived from decision-making. As

stated earlier, execution only produces information and does not apply existing information, so observing pure execution cannot assess an individual's or organization's intelligence degree. Thus, the intelligence of individuals and organizations is realized through the decision-making process, with execution serving as the manifestation of that intelligence.

Based on this reasoning, what constitutes good organizational decision-making, and what constitutes good organizational intelligence? Are the two equivalent?

When an evaluated organization, as an individual within a larger organization, achieves better external rights transformation efficiency while satisfying internal individuals' rights transformations, it can be said to exhibit good organizational decision-making. According to the theory presented in the chapter "***On Intelligence***," good intelligence means that an intelligent agent has better adaptability to its external environment, enabling it to acquire more external resources. In the Intelligenism definition of intelligence performance, good organizational decision-making ability is nearly equivalent to the high intelligence performance of intelligent agents. Organizations make diverse decisions that are distributed among individuals, and effective organizational decision-making relies on individuals making quality decisions. As introduced in the "***On Intelligence***" chapter regarding deep learning architecture, constructing an organizational network structure akin to a neural network—by treating individuals as neurons—may enhance decision quality, leading to improved organizational decision-making efficacy. The chapter On the Intelligent Consortium will explore this construction approach.

Limitations of Information Processing in Top-Down Organizations

Every intelligent agent's information processing capacity is limited, constrained by the memory, time, and energy required to absorb and process information. Although human intelligence is a product of connectionism, human limitations in memory, time, and energy impose significant constraints on information processing. In organizational management, individuals must assess their own and others' information processing limitations and devise efficient information processing schemes (making the most efficient and valuable decisions with limited time and energy). Traditional top-down organizations, rooted in mechanism and cybernetics, face limitations as noted in Fundamentals of Machine Intelligence: "Cybernetic systems require standardized judgment and decision-making rules, which are typically ill-equipped to handle complex real-world scenarios with diverse data types and large data volumes (numerous nonlinear features), making them inherently unsuitable for informal,

nonlinear contexts.” Moreover, cybernetic systems cannot improve performance by increasing the volume of data.

Traditional organizations (cybernetic systems) often separate decision-making and execution behaviors, with some individuals responsible for applying information to make decisions and others executing the provided paths. This separation creates another issue: decision-making individuals use information, while execution generates it, meaning executors often generate and provide information. However, executors’ decisions are driven by maximizing their own rights transformation efficiency, so the information they provide may be biased. The separation of decision-making and execution concentrates decision-making among a few individuals, increasing their workload as they collect potentially biased information from executors and process all or most of the organization’s information within limited time and energy. Their decisions also aim to maximize personal rights transformation efficiency, leading to issues of biased information sources, decision-making biases, and information processing capacity limits.

Given these factors, cybernetic organizations face significant information processing limitations, with greater decision-making concentration exacerbating risks. However, when information volume is low (small organizations, simple operations, or less information-heavy historical periods), cybernetic organizations can still perform well. As information volume and complexity increase, these organizations may face developmental and survival challenges.

Cybernetic Organizations and Heroism

Despite the information management limitations of cybernetic organizations, most current companies remain cybernetic and have driven societal progress for centuries, with many excellent traditional cybernetic companies still serving humanity. Thus, there is no intent to deny their value or future potential, as they will likely remain the dominant commercial organizational form, continuing to create value.

As discussed in the Execution, Decision-Making, and Mobilization section, mobilization of “executors” and “decision-makers” in cybernetic organizations has limitations (see the section above for detailed logic). However, for a few “decision-makers”—the ultimate controllers or owners of the organization—who hold significantly greater decision-making power and control over residual rights distribution, their mobilization degree and action enthusiasm far exceed others. These individuals are termed organizational elites.

When these elites possess cognitive abilities far surpassing the organizational average, combined with high enthusiasm, they can drive significant organizational development. For example, Elon Musk at Tesla exemplifies an elite capable of leading

leapfrog development. Many such elites create organizational value that overshadows cybernetic limitations, exhibiting a superior intelligence degree, making it optimal for others to relinquish decision-making and follow their paths. This development exhibits strong heroism, a recurring theme in successful cybernetic organizations. For individuals in such organizations to achieve better prospects, they must assess whether exceptional elites exist or will emerge to break through organizational limitations for sustained growth. As cybernetic organizations grow and face increasing environmental complexity and information volume, elites' high intelligence and enthusiasm are offset by amplified organizational limitations, leading to mediocrity.

Organizational and Individual Development

Human societal development is a process of continuously increasing information volume, so human organizations, as subsets of society, face rising information demands. Pure execution does not require information application, so as societal information volume grows, the decision-making/execution ratio in organizational work rises, increasing the proportion of decision-making tasks. This process is accompanied by rising production efficiency and average rights transformation efficiency for individuals.

The increasing volume of information and the decreasing difficulty of diffusion elevate the importance of organizational decision-making. Organizational development, from ancient times to the present, has adapted to the increasing volume of information in human evolution. In slave societies, slaves acted as relatively pure executors with most paths predetermined. According to the Execution, Decision-Making, and Mobilization section, their limited decision-making capacity restricted organizational mobilization, thereby limiting production efficiency. As the volume of information grew, slave systems, with many individuals unable to participate in decision-making, had a lower information processing capacity compared to other organizational forms.

With the advancement of civilization, the efficiency of information dissemination increased, expanding societal information capacity and the proportion of individual decision-making. In modern divisions of labor, individuals with greater information processing and decision-making capacities secure more resources and better prospects. Organizations must handle increasing complexity (rising information volume) and leverage more individuals' decision-making potential to gain competitive advantages.

With the advent of the AI era, execution value seems to decline further, reinforcing that individuals with higher decision-making ratios earn more. As execution value diminishes, organizations increasingly standardize and devalue execution tasks, with

many execution and simple decision-making tasks likely to be replaced by machine intelligence and automation. Thus, future organizational value will largely depend on managing complex intelligence.

Self-Organization and Self-Organizational Degree

Self-organization, as defined by Wikipedia, also known as spontaneous order in the social sciences, is a process in which local interactions among parts of an initially disordered system create some form of overall order. With sufficient energy supply, this process occurs spontaneously without external control. It is typically triggered by seemingly random fluctuations, amplified by positive feedback. The resulting organization is fully decentralized, distributed across all system components, making it robust, capable of withstanding significant disturbances, and self-repairing.

I agree with Wikipedia's definition of self-organization and will base this section's discussion on it. Per the Balance, Fit, and Structural Features of Intelligence section in On Intelligence, the world's construction is a process of individuals seeking external fit and internal-external balance. According to the Intelligence Degree Definition section, higher intelligence enables better adaptability to external environments. Thus, intelligence in nature is a manifestation of self-organization, with spontaneous order being a prerequisite for the construction of organizational intelligence. Self-organization naturally possesses better resilience and self-repairing capabilities. When exploring the introduction of intelligence concepts into human organizations or constructing connectionism-based organizations under Intelligenism, attention must be paid to the self-organization attributes and degree, as a higher degree of self-organization may expand organizational intelligence potential, which is the core goal of Intelligenism.

However, self-organization and non-self-organization are not binary, as it is not a black-and-white distinction. Since self-organization is spontaneous, a completely self-organized entity should not be formed by any individual's (including those who endorsing Intelligenism) deliberate framework. An organization heavily influenced by a specific individual's will is not purely self-organized. Thus, I propose the concept of self-organization degree, ranging from (0,1). Human organizations fall within this range, never achieving complete self-organization due to human will's influence. If an organization's individuals have completely decentralized wills (no specific individual influencing others) while maintaining normal operations, its self-organization degree approaches 1. No human organization can achieve complete non-self-organization (degree 0). Under the Intelligenism framework, cognizing the link between self-organization and organizational intelligence necessitates exploring how to evolve organizations toward higher self-organization degrees for greater intelligence potential and performance.

Self-Organization Degree and Organizational

Mobilization Cost

Based on the definition of mobilization, Organizational mobilization is the process of collecting, processing, managing, and delivering information about individuals' needs and goals, after which individuals make decisions and execute in a manner they deem acceptable to complete rights conversion.

Mobilization costs primarily arise in three areas:

*1. **Information Management and Distribution:** Mobilizers collect information on individuals' rights transformation goals, analyze, reconstruct, and redistribute it. Mobilizers act as facilitators, and individuals assess the efficiency and form of the rights transformation based on the distributed information. If individuals accept the terms and participate, mobilization is achieved. However, if individuals are dissatisfied with the terms, they may refuse participation, requiring mobilizers to enter the persuasion and education phase.*

*2. **Mobilization Persuasion and Education:** When mobilizers' terms fail to attract sufficient participation, they may attempt persuasion and education, akin to sales persuasion, to encourage individuals to reassess value or understand the transformation's worth through additional details. The greater the gap between terms and individual goals or cognition, the higher the persuasion and education costs.*

*3. **Mobilization Management:** In some cases, individuals participate but exploit rule loopholes to achieve their goals while harming organizational interests or not fully meeting mobilizers' objectives. Mobilizers must supervise and manage the rights transformation process to ensure organizational goals are met.*

(While restricting individuals' ability to disengage from the organization could lower mobilization costs, such behavior is strongly opposed under Intelligenism and is not discussed separately.)

In organizations with higher self-organization degrees, tasks such as information collection, distribution, persuasion, education, and rule management are more spontaneously handled by individuals. In a flea market scenario, vendors independently decide their offerings, disclose product information, and communicate with buyers. A management office may set market rules, but vendors monitor their impact and negotiate if they are unfair. In contrast, a top-down supermarket has departments devising unified purchasing and sales plans, with goods owned by a single entity (the supermarket) before sale. Comparing these, the flea market exhibits

a higher self-organization degree, while the supermarket has a lower one. Suppose flea market stall rents are set through periodic auctions, and an elected vendor team manages the rules. In that case, the market cedes more responsibility to individuals, thereby further increasing its self-organization degree.

In higher self-organization degree organizations, individuals face greater information and decision-making challenges, necessitating enhanced autonomous information collection, comparison, and decision-making balancing. This reflects a decentralization of the three mobilization cost components (information management, persuasion, education, and management). Higher self-organization degree organizations exhibit reduced retention of rights by core decision-makers and increased allocable rights for most individuals, who also bear more mutual management, persuasion, education, and information disclosure tasks. As individuals assume tasks previously handled by decision-makers, mobilizers' efforts decrease, reducing mobilization costs. Some mobilization tasks are replaced by individuals' self-driven motivation, leading to a lower-energy equilibrium state.

Self-organization does not necessarily mean complete decentralization. The final form depends on the external environment and individuals' states. In some contexts, centralized structures may better fit the environment, leading even highly self-organized organizations to temporarily adopt centralized forms (voluntarily chosen by individuals). Nonetheless, higher self-organization degree organizations can bottom-up determine interactions with the external environment, achieving a more balanced state through continuous self-adjustment. Overall, they exhibit distributed states, devolved decision-making, and lower internal energy consumption compared to lower self-organization degree organizations under similar conditions.

On the Intelligent Consortium

Introduction

The following two chapters will discuss the basic organizational unit under the framework of Intelligenism: the Intelligent Consortium. The chapter "On the Intelligent Consortium" primarily introduces the principles and settings of the Intelligent Consortium. In contrast, the chapter "Construction of the Intelligent Consortium" will outline the construction process of the Intelligent Consortium based on the principles and settings established in the preceding chapter. In this chapter, I will first briefly introduce the characteristics and limitations of traditional cybernetic organizations, and then gradually expand on the principal setting of the Intelligent Consortium organization. This approach will provide readers with a clearer understanding of the perspectives and design principles of the Intelligent Consortium, thereby avoiding the organizational limitations of similar cybernetic organizations.

As the fundamental organizational unit of intelligenism, the Intelligent Consortium not only represents the real-world manifestation of intelligenism but also serves as a prerequisite for its realization. Suppose intelligenism can be compared to the computer game Minecraft. In that case, individuals (humans, as the intelligent agents within the Intelligent Consortium network) are the building blocks for constructing diverse content within the game. In the process of constructing this building block into the overall content, the intelligent consortium serves as functional modules within this overall content. Their construction can be achieved through the use of human individuals, other traditional business organizations (such as companies and partnerships), other intelligent consortium, and even artificial intelligence programs.

The primary purpose of "On the Intelligent Consortium" is to propose some foundational settings for the construction of the Intelligent Consortium. Under the non-cybernetic organizational framework of Intelligenism, I have no intention of establishing overly substantive rules for either Intelligenism or the Intelligent Consortium. Both the concept of Intelligenism and the construction settings of the Intelligent Consortium should be built upon a sufficiently simple foundation. As Laozi stated in the Tao Te Ching, "The Dao gives birth to one, one gives birth to two, two gives birth to three, and three gives birth to all things." The conceptual settings of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium should ideally remain at the level of "one," leaving the progression from "two" to "all things" to future practitioners. I hope that the conceptual settings for Intelligenism in this book are not rigid or unchangeable; perhaps one day they can evolve into more varied options, providing intelligent individuals with additional theoretical and methodological approaches

when facing external environments, thereby enabling organizations to achieve greater theoretical adaptability in diverse scenarios. In summary, as I proposed in the concept of "The Philosophical Foundation of Intelligenism": "Reject asserting absolute truth, and instead focus on the theoretical adaptability of individuals in practice." This is what I consider the most fundamental setting of Intelligenism, reflecting its pragmatic nature.

The chapter "*Construction of the Intelligent Consortium*" will build upon the foundational settings of "*On the Intelligent Consortium*" to conduct a deductive construction process. However, this process is inevitably experimental and speculative in nature, as I, as the proponent of this system, currently face the unavoidable challenge of lacking real-world practical experience. Thus, the adaptability of this deductive construction process and its value in specific scenarios cannot be determined at this stage. This chapter is, at best, a form of thought experiment, and I cannot assert its value as an absolute truth. Nevertheless, "*Construction of the Intelligent Consortium*" presents readers with a thought experiment aimed at realizing the vision of Intelligenism. I foresee that, whether during the reading process or in future practices, readers and practitioners will generate many ideas regarding both the experimental outcomes and the experimental process (steps), and they may conceive various implementation paths. This does not signify the failure of Intelligenism or this book; instead, it highlights the vitality of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium. Perhaps one day, countless practitioners will prove that the construction process of the Intelligent Consortium proposed in this book is naive and inefficient, and I will gladly accept this fact, taking pride in the fact that more people are thinking and experimenting along this path. I also hope that Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium can serve as a new canvas, much like the game Minecraft, for future practitioners to realize their visions and ideas.

Reflections and Critique on Traditional Commercial Organizational Forms

Before proceeding with this section, I must clarify one point: in the chapter "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," I described the characteristics and limitations of cybernetic organizations (traditional organizations). This does not mean I deny the value of cybernetic organizations. These organizations will likely remain the dominant form of human organization in the foreseeable future. The Intelligent Consortium (connectionist organization) I propose cannot fully replace cybernetic organizations; at best, it serves as a supplement to the types of human social organizations, providing individuals who need to build organizations with a new option or tool. Moreover, I cannot make truth claims about this bottom-up connectionist concept; everything must be left to future practitioners to evaluate and

continuously adjust the social positioning of this organizational type in a bottom-up manner. Considering that connectionist organizations may be a novel concept, the visions and construction plans I propose are merely a starting point, not absolute truths, nor the final form of the Intelligent Consortium. As stated in the chapter "The Philosophical Foundation of Intelligenism," we need to assess the theoretical adaptability of this theory and its corresponding plans based on practice and individual environments.

Limitations in Information Management

As mentioned in the chapter "On Intelligence," a "rule-based system" is a computer system built under the cybernetic framework. The evolution from "rule-based systems" to "classical machine learning" and later to deep learning represents a transition from a cybernetic framework to connectionism. When analyzing traditional corporate organizations, it can be concluded that they resemble a composite system combining elements of "rule-based systems" and "classical machine learning." In this system, managers (decision-makers) collect operational information to analyze and formulate execution rules and performance plans for grassroots employees (executors). Grassroots employees carry out tasks based on the rules and performance plans set by management. The cybernetic characteristics are evident in this system, with processes such as order management and process supervision being given relatively high importance. A lack of order management or process supervision may even be regarded as mismanagement or operational failure.

Due to the cybernetic nature of traditional corporate structures, when companies face increased scale, complex market environments, or rising competition—situations where information entropy increases—the difficulty of management rises exponentially. Studies on the operational efficiency of classical machine learning in relation to data volume and type show that its effectiveness plateaus after data reaches a certain threshold. However, since traditional companies are a hybrid of "rule-based systems" and "classical machine learning" decision-execution systems, their performance in scenarios with significantly increased data (and information entropy) may not only stagnate but could even regress significantly, manifesting as the commonly referred to "large organization disease."

In the top-down structure of traditional companies, most organizational individuals (executors) typically have limited decision-making space. These small blocks of decision-making authority are like isolated black boxes, and a small number of decision-makers in specific positions usually manage their processes and authority. The decision-making blocks of the entire organization are analogous to the various functions in a software program. They have their own information input and output

pipelines, but the intermediate processes are packaged. Lower-level executors take actions based on their output (execution paths). Higher-level decision-makers use the information obtained through the information pipeline transmitted from the bottom up to evaluate the quality of their decisions and issue further instructions for decision-making. (Based on the view of "Intelligenism Organization Setting": Information is generated by executors and transmitted to decision-makers through information pipelines)

Limitations in Incentive Structures

The value of decisions is determined by their returns and significance:

In small organizations, although decision-making is somewhat isolated, the limited number of individuals means that an individual's decision output still has a noticeable impact on the organization as a whole. In such cases, the limitations of cybernetic organizations are less pronounced due to the smaller scale, allowing specific incentive mechanisms to have a positive mobilizing effect at the individual decision-making level. Individuals can still feel that better decision outputs positively impact the organization, leading them to believe that high-quality decisions can improve their rights conversion efficiency. However, in large organizations, two factors suppress individual decision-making motivation: 1) The large scale of the organization means a vast amount of information, making it impossible for individuals to independently analyze the direct causal relationship between their decisions and organizational development; 2) A larger number of individuals implies more decision-makers, naturally reducing the proportion of influence a single individual has on the organization. As a result, individuals may feel a sense of powerlessness when evaluating the value of their decisions, perceiving that even significant efforts have minimal impact on the organization. This ultimately leads individuals to prioritize decisions based on their immediate personal interests rather than the organization's overall objectives.

When individuals lose the ability to influence the organization through their decisions, they tend to abandon decision-making approaches that prioritize the organization's overall interests, as such decisions become nearly irrelevant to improving their own rights conversion efficiency. Meanwhile, organizational development and rights conversion efficiency primarily depend on a small number of top-level decision-makers, who typically drive grassroots decision-making by setting a series of KPIs. These KPIs are cascaded downward, with the hope of mobilizing all organizational individuals. As stated in the chapter "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," executors generate information during execution, which is transmitted upward through various levels of information pipelines. The content and manner of information transmission often determine the interests (rights conversion efficiency) of different decision-makers and executors, leading them to transmit information in

ways that maximize their own benefits. In large organizations with vast amounts of information, the layered processing and filtering of information result in top-level decision-makers receiving heavily distorted information, rendering them unable to make decisions that positively impact the organization. When top-level decision-makers fail to make effective decisions, organizational development faces significant issues. Based on the perspective from the section "Cybernetic Organizations and Heroism" in "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," individuals in cybernetic organizations often rely on the correctness of elite individuals' decisions to maintain confidence in the organization's continued development. When organizational development encounters clear problems, individuals gradually lose trust in top-level decision-makers (the elite individuals in their minds). As the situation worsens, they ultimately lose most of their confidence in the organization. In a context where individuals hold negative expectations of the organization, they further reinforce decision-making preferences that prioritize short-term individual benefits. As most individuals' behaviors deviate due to weakened confidence, the effectiveness of elite individuals' management further declines, leading to a worse organizational state and further eroding individual confidence. When the organization's state enters a sustained downward spiral, large organizations lose competitiveness and gradually decline.

However, during this process of worsening organizational conditions, managers can still seek breakthroughs in specific areas and slow the organization's decline by improving management capabilities. Top-level decision-makers (elite individuals) can strive to enhance their judgment of industry and economic trends, making as many correct decisions as possible to maintain or rebuild confidence in themselves and their organization. However, a mechanical hard drive remains a mechanical hard drive; even if its performance improves, its underlying structure prevents it from competing with solid-state drives in certain aspects. This is not because there are fewer or less capable researchers developing mechanical hard drives, but because it represents a leap in technological paradigms or even the beginning of a shift in organizational forms. (From Clayton Christensen's *The Innovator's Dilemma*.)

Deliberately Simplified Information

In the real world, any scenario can be observed, perceived, interacted with (through executors' actions), and generate information. This information can be infinitely detailed and inevitably contains both useful and useless data. In the actual management of traditional organizations, considering that increased information volume raises management difficulty, information collection by executors in a bottom-up manner cannot be overly detailed. During the information collection process, executors evaluate decision-makers' cognitive preferences (to please decision-makers) and their own interests (to maximize personal benefits), filtering and adjusting the information to be transmitted accordingly. As a result, decision-makers

often see more of what they want to see or what executors want them to see. Ultimately, the cognitive limitations, biases, and internal interest dynamics of decision-makers, as well as the organization's own interests, determine the content and conclusions of information transmission and analysis.

However, real-world information should be objective, and the set of information derived from real-world scenarios is also objective. Traditional organizations often struggle to process this information objectively. Additionally, the risk of information processing at each node cannot be diversified through a parallel circuit-like approach; instead, it is transmitted node by node in a serial manner, leading to significant information distortion. It is foreseeable that many large cybernetic organizations' top-level decision-makers often navigate the organizational ship using a map that seems to belong to no place on Earth.

Information Control in Cybernetic Organizations

As mentioned earlier, in traditional cybernetic organizations, when information is transmitted between individuals, they selectively process, filter, and transmit information based on their own interests, meaning information is effectively under control during transmission.

A Real-World Example

In a large service-oriented listed company (part of a conglomerate with multiple listed companies, one of which was once a Fortune 500 company), a finance manager A (from the accounting team) was assigned a subordinate B (an accounting position with a salary of approximately 5,000 RMB). After receiving B, A expressed concerns to their direct supervisor C, stating that B's salary was too low for the accounting role and that their capabilities were insufficient for the job (believing that B's position with a salary of 8,000–9,000 RMB would be more suitable). However, C, A's direct supervisor, suggested proceeding with the work and providing feedback or adjustments later if any issues arose.

In subsequent work, B indeed exhibited insufficient capabilities and low motivation due to the low salary, frequently making excuses to delay tasks. This led to frequent errors and delays in the tasks managed by A through B. A became increasingly convinced that B was unfit for the role and communicated with C again, requesting B's dismissal or reassignment within the company (A lacked the authority to independently dismiss or reassign B or establish reward and penalty mechanisms). After multiple discussions, C began to acknowledge some issues with B but still lacked a detailed understanding of the situation. C's response to A

was that, according to the HR department's rules, B could only be reassigned after receiving a C-grade evaluation for three consecutive months. C instructed A to minimize errors in B's work during this period to reduce the impact of mistakes, with the goal of seeking B's reassignment after three months. Unfortunately, B continued to make errors, and in one instance involving tax-related financial operations, a mistake by B required significant manpower and resources from multiple subsidiaries' business leaders, the tax team, and the accounting team to rectify.

In this example, the information generated within the C-A-B accounting team management chain was transmitted solely within this chain throughout the entire process. C's direct supervisor (at the deputy director level) was utterly unaware of B's issues, and other departments (such as the tax team or HR) and subsidiaries (business units) were also uninformed about B's situation. A, likely due to the nature of their position, only dared to report the issue to their direct supervisor C, as escalating the problem could harm C's position and hinder A's future development. Thus, only three people (C, A, and B) were aware of B's issues. This led other departments, when collaborating with B, to assume B was a competent employee capable of performing the job, while in A's and C's eyes, B was a problematic employee unfit for the role. For A, this was a tragedy, as they were fully aware of B's issues and reported them multiple times, yet could only watch errors occur repeatedly. After B's major mistake, C likely minimized the issue and reported selectively, while the HR department's systemic flaws remained unaddressed (no one escalated the issue to HR). B likely remained in the position for nearly three more months. We cannot blame C, A, or B individually—this is a common occurrence in traditional cybernetic organizations, driven by human nature and systemic mechanisms, making such outcomes inevitable.

The Meaning of the Intelligent Consortium

Before formally introducing the organizational settings of the Intelligent Consortium, it is necessary to define its meaning. In traditional corporate organizations, based on their cybernetic and mechanistic settings, company owners and managers act as decision-makers, while grassroots employees typically take on the role of executors. Executors' behaviors can be understood as either an extension of the decision-makers' will or a substitute for their physical actions. Generally, I also consider machines to be physical extensions of human behavior, performing functions that transform the physical world beyond the limitations of human physical capabilities. As highlighted in the earlier critique, the effectiveness of mechanistic and cybernetic systems is influenced by information complexity, and overly complex information sets lead to diminished effectiveness in real-world organizational decision-making.

The Intelligent Consortium is an alternative to the organizational structure of cybernetic and mechanistic systems, resembling the architecture of a deep learning neural network based on connectionism. In the Intelligent Consortium organization, individuals are regarded both as intelligent agents and as neurons within the organizational network, and the organization itself is seen as an intelligent agent with higher intelligence potential, composed of these individuals. As demonstrated by the characteristics of deep learning network frameworks, each neuron serves as a decision-making unit within the intelligent program, contributing substantially to the final output. Similarly, in the Intelligent Consortium organization, every individual is considered a decision-making unit, influencing the organization's external output through their decisions.

Drawing on the characteristics of connectionism, the organizational structure of the Intelligent Consortium, similar to a deep learning network, can circumvent the limitations associated with cybernetic computer programs (as mentioned earlier). It should enhance the intelligence potential of the intelligent agent by increasing the number of organizational individuals and incorporating larger amounts of information. Based on the perspective from "Decision and Intelligence" in "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," which equates improved organizational decision-making effectiveness with increased organizational intelligence degree, it can be inferred that increasing the number of individuals and expanding information volume may similarly enhance the organization's decision-making effectiveness.

Organizational Evaluation Perspective of the Intelligent Consortium: Intelligence Degree

When observing traditional organizations, people often evaluate their quality based on historical performance. However, an organization's historical performance is influenced by multiple factors. For example, a company may achieve impressive results due to a booming industry, but this does not necessarily mean it deserves high praise from an internal operational perspective. People may also evaluate an organization based on the state of its managers. For instance, when encountering a charismatic and eloquent manager, observers may naturally give the organization higher praise. If the organization behind such a manager also has an impressive historical performance, evaluations may be filled with admiration and acclaim. In my professional experience, I often discuss investment firms and their managed funds with friends in the financial industry. I've found that most people's evaluations of fund companies and their products are heavily influenced by recent historical performance, as well as the PPT design skill, presentation content, the spokespersons'

performance, and even the spokespersons' attire. Thus, their evaluations are often swayed by the "hot hand" effect of fund historical performance, with few analyzing the company's organizational structure, decision-making mechanisms, or execution mechanisms in depth. Even when mentioned, such topics are usually brought up casually without further exploration.

However, an objective organizational evaluation should move beyond the influence of historical performance and managers, focusing purely on analyzing and judging the organizational structure and operational mechanisms. Only in this way can the quality of an organization's core be objectively assessed.

In evaluating the Intelligent Consortium (organization), the intelligence degree should be a key perspective for observation and evaluation. When assessing computer neural network intelligent agents, we similarly evaluate internal structural characteristics such as neuron layout, activation function choices, the number of convolutional layers, and dropout structures. While training results and practical application effects remain important considerations, they are influenced by datasets and cannot fully reflect the model's intelligence potential. The internal structural characteristics, as the foundation of the model's intelligence degree, determine the intelligent agent's intelligence potential. For example, a model with only 50 neurons and two network layers may suffice for simple tasks, such as recognizing digits from 0 to 9. Still, it would inevitably fail at complex tasks, such as face recognition (even with sufficiently high-quality training images), as such a simple model lacks the potential intelligence required for complex tasks. Under the Intelligenism framework, organizations are viewed as intelligent agents. When organizations are constructed based on intelligent agent architecture (the Intelligent Consortium), we can similarly develop and apply an analytical framework akin to neural network analysis to evaluate the organization's intelligence potential and intelligence degree.

Redefining Organizational Management Capability

In traditional cybernetic organizations, organizational order is reflected in effective responses and obedience from the bottom up. When executors carry out tasks according to decision-makers' intentions and provide effective feedback, the management capability is considered good. Conversely, when executors fail to follow decision-makers' intentions or their responses and feedback are chaotic, the management capability is deemed poor. Thus, external observers evaluate traditional cybernetic organizations by observing decision-makers' decision outputs and executors' execution. In this framework, good management capability is disconnected from the organization's adaptability to the external environment in terms of its outputs. For example, a company producing goods that the market does not accept does not necessarily indicate poor management capability, as decision-makers must balance the

adaptability of the external environment with internal management. Consequently, in cybernetic organizations, internal management and external marketing are typically divided into separate departments, often led by different decision-makers.

In the Intelligent Consortium framework, the organization is viewed as an intelligent agent. Based on the perspective from the section "Decision and Intelligence" in "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," a good organizational decision is defined as one where the organization, as an individual entity, achieves better rights conversion efficiency or completes rights conversions that satisfy the needs of its organizational individuals. Drawing on the definition of high intelligence in "On Intelligence," good intelligence means that an intelligent agent has better adaptability to its external environment, enabling it to acquire more external resources. Organizational management capability is reflected in the effective execution of the entire process, from the intelligent agent achieving external environment adaptability to obtain external resources (gaining more rights from the external environment) to completing internal rights conversions among individuals (with optimal overall rights conversion efficiency). This process is underpinned by the effective operation of the intelligent agent's structure.

Comparing the definitions of good organizational management capability between traditional organizations and the Intelligent Consortium reveals that traditional organizational management capability does not evaluate the effectiveness of organizational outputs. In contrast, the Intelligent Consortium's organizational management capability evaluation encompasses the process by which the organization, as an intelligent agent, seeks to adapt to its external environment to acquire resources. In this process, the goal of organizational individuals is to promote the organization's pursuit of external adaptability, thereby gaining more resources and enabling the organization to achieve rights conversions from the organization to its individuals. This process is not swayed by any decision-maker's perspective, and all decision-makers' views must serve this process. Suppose a decision-maker's views conflict with this goal and cannot be corrected or restrained. In that case, even if the organization continues to function normally, it should be understood as a problem with the Intelligent Consortium's organizational management capability.

Under good organizational management capability, the Intelligent Consortium should at least ensure that the fundamental rights conversion goals of all organizational individuals are met, and on this basis, pursue higher external environment adaptability to acquire more rights (as an intelligent agent) or seek higher future rights conversion efficiency. When the Intelligent Consortium achieves rights conversions beyond expectations, the excess should be distributed in a manner approved by organizational individuals to further enhance their benefits. Similarly, when changes in the external environment prevent the Intelligent Consortium from achieving expected rights conversions, adjustments should be made transparently, procedurally, and fairly within the organization, through methods approved by its individuals.

The Decision-Making and Execution Unit Structure of the Intelligent Consortium




Figure 1:

Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of a neural network. The Intelligent Consortium refers to inspiration from this framework when constructing its organizational network. However, this does not imply that the overall architecture of the Intelligent Consortium is a replica of a neural network's basic structure. In the structure shown in Figure 1, the output transmission of each network layer can be likened to the decision-making and execution outputs within the Intelligent Consortium's organization. In the actual operation of a business organization, the number of decision-making and execution units is neither singular nor fixed and can be numerous. Moreover, different decision-making and execution units involve distinct organizational individuals and tasks with significantly varied content. Therefore, simply modeling the organization mechanically as a neural network framework similar to Figure 1 is impractical, as the diverse output types in the Intelligent Consortium involve different decision-making and execution nodes, as well as complex real-world affairs. Managing various distinct real-world organizational network tasks with a deep learning neural network framework is not feasible.

To address this issue, I propose that within the Intelligent Consortium, each decision-making and execution node should independently construct a deep learning-like network structure. This means multiple network structures, similar to those in Figure 1, will emerge within the Intelligent Consortium, with each network's final output corresponding to a specific decision-making or execution unit. In other words, each decision-making or execution node is treated as an output unit. Within this structure, each decision-making or execution unit owns a complete neural

network structure that can be regarded as an intelligent agent (akin to an agent playing a game under reinforcement learning) that interacts with other decision-making or execution units inside the organization or external environment outside the organization. In the neural network of a reinforcement learning intelligent agent, organizational individuals act as neuronal units, forming the neural network structure that outputs decision results (as shown in Figure 1). Through reward feedback from the intelligent agent's behavior, internal adjustments are made to optimize decision-making and execution.

Remark: Each decision-making and execution unit possesses its own independent neural network structure (similar to Figure 1).


Please consider an Intelligent Consortium restaurant organization as an example. Based on the theory setting above, multiple complete neural network-like organizational structures should exist within the organization. For instance, procurement as an execution unit is backed by a decision-making unit, such as the procurement manager. The group driving the procurement manager's decisions forms a neural network-like structure, with the final output being the procurement manager's instructions to procurement staff. Similarly, chefs, Dining Area managers, and operations managers each have their own complete neural network-like structure, with different organizational individuals (employees, capital providers, and consumers) acting as "neurons" that continuously influence the decision-making and execution units through the corresponding driving mechanisms within the organizational network.

Definition of Action Nodes and Driving Nodes


The decision-making and execution units mentioned above refer to the final output layer in a neural network, where the output signifies the organization taking action. In the Intelligent Consortium, decision-making and execution are two forms of behavior, often intertwined within each organizational individual. Thus, these two forms are collectively referred to as actions, and decision-making and execution units are collectively called action nodes.

In a neural network, the output result is supported by numerous neurons responsible for parameter adjustments and computations. In the Intelligent Consortium, as mentioned earlier, each action node (output behavior) has its own independent neural network structure, meaning that some or all organizational individuals can serve as neuronal nodes within the neural network corresponding to that action node. These neuronal nodes (organizational individuals) primarily drive the action nodes by exerting influence through methods such as suggestions, supervision, voting,

appointments, or rule-setting. In this framework, all nodes in the network, except the action nodes, are referred to as driving nodes.



NOTICE: Network B is a sub-network(driving node) of network A.



At the same time, a driving node in one network may serve as an action node in another, smaller subnetwork. For example, a restaurant's procurement team consists of three members, each corresponding to an action node. At the level above the procurement team, it is driven by a finance team, a supervisory team, a consumer opinion leader group, and other teams. The final opinions or delegated representatives from these teams can be considered driving nodes, which influence the procurement team and its three action nodes through supervision, suggestions, appointments, or reward/punishment mechanisms. Upon further analysis of the finance team, it consists of two financial staff members who evaluate procurement information and process payments. These two staff members are also action nodes for the organization's financial behavior. As mentioned earlier, each decision-making and execution individual can be understood as an action node, with each action node having a complete network structure, and the driving nodes within that structure may also be action nodes in another network (with decision-making and execution functions).

(To simplify the discussion, decision-making and execution units will henceforth be referred to as action nodes.)

Differences Between Artificial Intelligence Structures and the Intelligent Consortium

The mathematical relationships in neural network architectures cannot be applied to the Intelligent Consortium's network, as the organizational individuals in the Intelligent Consortium are themselves intelligent agents. Their feedback and adjustments reflect human dynamic responses, which cannot be quantified or expressed using precise mathematical formulas, as in computer neural network architectures.

However, the organizational form and action methods of the Intelligent Consortium can draw inspiration from neural network-like processes, resembling a form of "bionics" that borrows from mechanical structures. While bionics typically involves machines imitating biological systems, the Intelligent Consortium borrows from the intelligent network architectures of computers and applies them to human (biological) organizations.

Differences in Activation Functions and Output Characteristics

In computer neural networks, activation functions are used to introduce nonlinearity to the weighted output of neurons, allowing the network to overcome the limitations of simple linearization and enhance its adaptability to the external environment. The mathematical relationships of activation functions in artificial intelligence programs are clear and fixed at the network design stage, remaining constant during operation. However, in the Intelligent Consortium's organizational network, since the neurons (organizational individuals) are also intelligent agents (typically humans), their outputs are inherently nonlinear (humans naturally exhibit nonlinear characteristics) and vary in form, lacking clear, measurable quantitative features.

In the Intelligent Consortium's neural network, the output forms of organizational individuals regarded as neurons are complex and varied. These can include

supervision, suggestions, electoral appointments (e.g., establishing sub-organizations like supervisory committees, investment committees, expert groups, or product opinion leaders), organizational voting (involving reward/punishment systems, information disclosure mechanisms, etc.), or consumer choices. Through these behavioral outputs, organizational individuals influence lower-level neurons, ultimately affecting the network's final output (node decisions and executions). Therefore, while the Intelligent Consortium features a bottom-up driving structure similar to neural networks, the nonlinear transformation and activation functions found in computer neural networks are unnecessary, as the native intelligent output forms of human organizational individuals replace them.

Reward Calculation and Feedback Process for Action Nodes in the Intelligent Consortium (Backpropagation and Gradient Descent)

As mentioned earlier, the intelligent structure of the Intelligent Consortium aims to construct all action nodes as multiple independent reinforcement learning networks containing neural network structures (Figure 1). In a reinforcement learning framework, an intelligent agent compares the expected reward value with the actual reward value through network computations, calculates the reward difference, and adjusts the neuron's weight values and network behavior (preferences) through backpropagation and gradient descent. Similarly, in the behavior of the Intelligent Consortium's action nodes, a comparable concept of expected reward exists. All nodes in the network behind an action node (including a certain number of driving nodes) assign an expected reward to the action node's impending action. The expectations and opinions of all driving nodes directly influence the action node through driving behaviors. These influences, combined with the action node's own expectations and ideas, form the action node's final action plan and the corresponding expected action reward. Since driving nodes are also action nodes in another network, when observing the entire network from the perspective of an action node, it is possible to determine an action plan generated by that network and executed by its action node, along with the corresponding expected reward. After receiving the actual reward, the action node compares it with the expected reward, and the resulting difference is backpropagated to all driving nodes in the network behind the action node. The driving nodes adjust their perspectives to modify their subsequent driving methods, thereby altering the action node's action plan. This process resembles the backpropagation and gradient descent used in deep learning neural networks. However, in the Intelligent Consortium, the human-constructed network involves numerous non-quantitative factors, making it similar to computer neural networks only in form and procedural

steps, not in the mechanical application of mathematical algorithms.

Before calculating the reward difference for action nodes or constructing the network, a consensus must be reached within the network regarding the information feedback (publication) system. This system can take any form conceived by organizational members. It can be continuously optimized and improved during the development of the Intelligent Consortium to achieve more efficient and accurate information feedback.

Organizational and Individual Goals in the Intelligent Consortium


In traditional cybernetic organizations, the top decision-maker typically sets the organization's overarching goal. Some organizations may align the personal goals of the top decision-maker or owner with those of the organization. Regardless, the organization as a whole is bound to a singular organizational goal. In some organizations, this goal is clear and known to most or all organizational members, potentially becoming an integral part of the organizational culture and guiding its development. In others, the true organizational goal may be covert or non-public, either because the decision-maker unintentionally overlooks its communication or because the actual goal conflicts with traditional values, individual visions, or external environmental acceptance, leading to deliberate concealment or disguise. For example, a charitable organization may operate under the guise of charity to fraudulently obtain government subsidies, with its true purpose being to acquire subsidies. Since this true purpose is unacceptable to the external environment and contradicts mainstream societal values, the decision-maker disguises it as a form of charity. In summary, in traditional organizations, the organizational goal is typically set by the decision-maker and is highly generalized, reflecting the top-down structure of cybernetic organizations.

In the Intelligent Consortium, based on the settings in the chapter Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, the organization's purpose is to achieve the goals of organizational individuals through rights exchange. Since the goals of organizational individuals are inherently diverse, these varied goals are realized by organizational individuals acting as driving nodes to influence the action plans of action nodes.

The rights conversion benefits of each organizational individual acting as an action node are determined not only by the actual rewards from their actions but also by the influence of other driving nodes in the network, as the allocation method is also a means by which driving nodes exert influence (drive) on action nodes. Therefore, the

goals and actual rewards of driving nodes are tied to the action nodes in the network. As mentioned earlier, driving nodes are also action nodes in another network, exerting influence on the larger network by taking action as action nodes in their respective networks. (For specific diagrammatic examples, see the next section, On the Nested Relationships of the Intelligent Consortium's Intelligent Network.)

On the Nested Relationships of the Intelligent Consortium's Intelligent Network




This section provides a simple diagrammatic case study of the relationship between driving nodes and action nodes described above:

In the simplified network structure shown above, there are six nodes: X1, X2, X3, Y1, Y2, and Z1. In this network (referred to as Network A), Z1 is the action node, and the remaining five are driving nodes. Within Network A, two subdivided networks, B1 and B2, can be identified. Network B1 includes nodes X1, X2, X3, and Y1, with Y1 as the action node and the other three as driving nodes. Network B2 includes nodes X1, X2, X3, and Y2, with Y2 as the action node and the other three as driving nodes. This demonstrates the nested relationship, where Networks B1 and B2 are embedded within Network A. Although X1, X2, and X3 are depicted as terminal driving nodes in the diagram, in the intelligent structure, they can be further subdivided into smaller nested networks. For the sake of this chapter, the decomposition stops at the X-level nodes. In this example, Y1 is both a driving node in Network A and an action node in Network B1. However, Y1's driving role in Network A is provided by its role as an action node in Network B1. For instance, Z1 could be the head chef of a restaurant organization, responsible for managing dish production and developing menus. Network A is the organizational network with the head chef as the action node. Y1 is a consumer opinion leader group, and Y2 is the team leader for procurement. The procurement team, through its leader, provides the head chef with information on raw

material supply and availability during different periods. The opinion leader group provides ongoing customer feedback and suggestions for adjustments. Both the procurement leader and the opinion leader influence the head chef (Z1) through their roles as action nodes in their respective subnetworks B1 and B2. However, their ultimate role in affecting the head chef's behavior is as driving nodes, with the head chef's actions being the output of Network A.

The following diagram illustrates a more specific nested structure, showing Network A's nesting of Network B:



On the Multi-Role Characteristics of Organizational Individuals in the Intelligent Consortium

In neural networks, neurons typically function independently, with neurons in different or the same layers having independent parameter sets and operating in separate computational processes. Of course, this is based on my understanding of network structures, and it does not rule out the possibility of new network architectures emerging with advancements in the industry.

In the Intelligent Consortium's network structure, organizational individuals can take on different roles at multiple nodes, performing various driving and action functions. For example, in a restaurant organization, Individual A can be a basic organizational individual (company employee) acting as a driving node at the lowest level of the organizational network, a member of the operations oversight team (supervising procurement and finance), and a member of the kitchen department (e.g., a chef developing new dishes or designing cooking processes).

Different nodes in the Intelligent Consortium's network have distinct action or driving roles, with individuals at these nodes assuming the corresponding responsibilities. If

an organizational individual takes on multiple responsibilities, they should appear at various nodes. However, if multiple nodes have the same function, an organizational individual should only occupy one of those nodes.

For example, members of an employee committee are elected representatives chosen by all organizational individuals (employees). If the organization has 10 employees, the employee committee is driven by these 10 employee nodes (influencing the committee through elections). The committee consists of three members, from whom a leader is appointed to express employee demands and opinions about the company. In this case, Employee B can be one of the 10 employee nodes, one of the three committee members, or the committee leader (unique). However, B cannot be two or more of the 10 employee nodes or two or more of the three committee members. This is because, according to the established rules, an organizational individual can appear at multiple nodes in the larger or subnetworks to perform driving and action roles. Still, these nodes must have different functions, not identical ones. If B were to appear as two or more of the 10 employee nodes, it would violate this principle by occupying multiple nodes with the same function. However, if B appears at an employee node, a committee member node, and the committee leader node, these three nodes have different functions, and thus, it does not violate the rule.

Reflections on the Forms of Rights Conversion for Organizational Individuals in the Intelligent Consortium

According to the definition in Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, an organizational individual is any entity directly subject to the organization's rules and involved in the division of rights and responsibilities. Based on this definition, the following introduces the types and characteristics of organizational individuals in the Intelligent Consortium. This section merely provides a conceptual introduction to different forms of rights conversion. I will provide more elaboration on their application and rule design in the chapter Construction of the Intelligent Consortium. Moreover, there is no universal answer for rights conversion rule-setting, and the Intelligenism framework does not impose specific limitations on these rules. They are determined through open discussions, innovations, and experiments by all individuals constructing the Intelligent Consortium, gradually forming an organizational consensus.

Capital Provider

Capital providers in the Intelligent Consortium are similar to investors in traditional company organizations. In conventional frameworks, investors can be creditors (with the company as the debtor) or shareholders, providing debt or equity funding.

In the Intelligent Consortium, capital providers are also considered organizational individuals. Within the Intelligenism framework, there is no distinction between creditors and shareholders. All funding and investment activities are classified as rights conversion, with the only difference being the form of rights conversion. The Intelligent Consortium can, through organizational negotiation, establish unique funding and return terms for capital providers. This process is established during the organizational formation phase, and further optimization and adjustment within the organizational framework are possible. Furthermore, a provisional arrangement of financing and return terms is essential for the formation and operation of an Intelligent Consortium.

Order Provider

In traditional business organizations, there is typically no dedicated role or position for providing order, which the organization's managers usually supply. In the Intelligent Consortium, order supply includes two main aspects: first, providing a network structure plan constructed by organizational individuals and establishing a foundational organizational framework for its actions and network driving mechanisms; second, during network operation, based on the needs and behavioral characteristics of different nodes, organizational individuals may need to drive from the bottom up through voting, suggestions, supervision, or other means. Thus, order supply also involves providing an information platform to support various driving methods, facilitating the construction and ongoing maintenance of organizational order. Additionally, providing a punishment mechanism for behaviors that violate order rules or harm the organization or other individuals is also part of order supply. In an Intelligent Consortium, one or more order-supplying individuals may be needed to provide different order solutions.

During the initial construction of the Intelligent Consortium, potential organizational individuals must reach a consensus on selecting an organizational template through a mutually consensus negotiation mechanism (consensus and consensus-building mechanisms will be discussed in the chapter Construction of the Intelligent Consortium). They must also choose an existing information platform or construct a new one to support the feedback of driving and action information for driving and action nodes. The initial organizational template is the first step in building the organizational network and is a prerequisite for its operation. This template may be

provided by third-party service providers or experienced individuals or may emerge from spontaneous exploration by potential organizational individuals under the consensus-building framework, but it must be implemented only after achieving consensus among potential individuals. The organizational template serves as the skeleton of the Intelligent Consortium and the foundation for its operation.

Moreover, the organizational template is not static. During the organization's construction and ongoing operation, organizational individuals can adjust and upgrade the initial template to adapt to business needs and the external environment.

Under the concept of Intelligenism, "state" and "regional governance bodies" can also be considered order suppliers. However, given the practical limitations of constructing an Intelligent Consortium, I do not believe that "state" or "regional governance bodies" currently have the capacity or willingness to act as organizational individuals and take on driving roles in organizational development. Therefore, the order suppliers mentioned above do not include the "state" or "regional governance bodies" roles.

Organizational Operations Provider

Operations here refer to participants similar to employees in traditional business organizations, who become organizational individuals by being employed by the organization. Whether they are workers on the production line, accountants in the finance department, or HR managers, they fall under the category of operational participants. Action node individuals in the organization are more likely to be operational participants, as they maintain the organization's daily operations, much like employees in traditional organizations. Thus, most external actions of the organization are carried out through the daily work of operational participants. However, unlike conventional business organizations, the Intelligent Consortium is not a cybernetic organization and does not have the traditional top-down structure.

Raw Materials Provider

Raw material suppliers typically refer to other organizations or individuals providing raw materials to the Intelligent Consortium. For example, in a restaurant organization, suppliers of water, electricity, ingredients, or seasonings are categorized as raw material suppliers. In traditional business organizations, raw material suppliers are generally not considered organizational individuals, and the relationship between the organization and suppliers is typically established through procurement contracts. However, in the Intelligent Consortium, procurement relationships are considered a form of rights exchange, aligning with the rule that "any individual directly subject to the organization's rules and involved in rights and responsibility divisions is an

organizational individual." Thus, raw material suppliers are included as organizational individuals.

Consumers

The definition of consumers in the Intelligent Consortium is essentially the same as in traditional business organizations: individuals or organizations that demand and consume the organization's goods or services. In conventional organizations, consumers are typically not considered organizational individuals. However, in the Intelligent Consortium, consumption is regarded as a form of rights conversion between consumers and the organization, making consumers organizational individuals. As mentioned in the chapter Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, the duration of rights conversion associated with consumption may be short. For example, moviegoers cease their rights conversion with the cinema organization once they leave the theater. Thus, under this definition, cinema consumers are organizational individuals only for a relatively short period. However, the driving role of consumers as organizational individuals significantly enhances the organization's adaptability to the external environment. Therefore, organizational individuals need to continuously propose settings that maximize the benefits of rights conversion for consumers after the organization is established.

Other Possible Types of Organizational Individuals

Other organizational individuals include those who do not fit into the above categories, such as consultants for fire or food safety, venue designers, or external equipment maintenance workers. As stated in the chapter Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, any external individual with an ongoing rights conversion with the organization can be defined as an organizational individual. It is difficult to exhaustively list all forms of organizational individuals within a limited scope. However, for network construction and organizational mobilization, similar to how adding more neurons to a computer's artificial intelligence neural network increases its intelligence potential, including as many organizational individuals as possible and formulating reasonable driving plans is a key means of enhancing the intelligence potential and intelligence degree of the Intelligent Consortium's organizational network.

Driving, Action, and Mobilization

To ensure the continuous and regular operation of the Intelligent Consortium network, organizational individuals must ensure that Action Nodes and Driving Nodes within the network are fully mobilized and fulfill their intended roles. During network operations, the effectiveness of Action Nodes is relatively easy to observe and evaluate, as actions inevitably produce results and feedback. By analyzing these results and external feedback on the environment, the performance of Action Nodes can be assessed. When the Action Nodes of the entire network are refined to a single organizational individual, although this Action Node (organizational individual) encompasses both “Decision-making unit” and “Execution Unit,” considering that this organizational individual is the most basic unit within its organization (indivisible further, as defined in the chapter “Definition and Description of Organizational Individuals” in Organizational Settings of Intelligenism), and since we do not need to subdivide further the network of the most basic organizational individual (e.g., analyzing it from the perspective of neural networks structures), this basic organizational individual, which includes both “Decision-making unit” and “Execution Unit,” can be regarded as the “Execution Unit” component of the Intelligent Consortium’s organizational network (i.e., blurring its “Decision-making unit” and “Execution Unit” into a single “Execution Unit” entity). At this point, the output results are typically easy to attribute responsibility to and evaluate for quality. When focusing on Driving Nodes, it is undeniable that any Driving Node, in performing its driving function, relies on Action Nodes within a smaller, subordinate network. For instance, a Driving Node’s role may involve providing suggestions, voting, or determining rewards and penalties for Action Nodes within the same network. In the smaller, subordinate network corresponding to this Driving Node, actions such as issuing suggestions, conducting votes, or determining reward and penalty outcomes inevitably involve action elements.

However, for the purpose of observing and evaluating network operations at a single network structure level, when analyzing a network as a Driving Node, we treat the Driving Node as a purely driving entity, ignoring the “action” characteristics it may exhibit in its subordinate network. This is because, during observation and evaluation, we should not consider the Nested relationships between the network and its subordinate networks or the issue of infinite network subdivision, as excessive subdivision can lead to confusion in evaluation and responsibility attribution.

After clarifying the observation dimensions for Action Nodes and Driving Nodes, it becomes evident that evaluating the results (effectiveness) of Action Nodes is relatively straightforward, while evaluating the results (effectiveness) of Driving Nodes is more challenging. For example, when a procurement officer (as an Action Node) completes a cost-effective and satisfactory procurement, or a salesperson (as an Action Node) secures a large order, observers within the organization can easily

assess the procurement officer's or salesperson's work results and calculate their performance. However, evaluating the effectiveness of the opinion groups (providing operational suggestions) or appointment groups (determining the appointment of the procurement officer or salesperson) behind these Action Nodes is much more difficult. The challenge lies in the fact that without the empowerment from Driving Nodes within the network, Action Nodes may not be able to complete their tasks successfully. Without a comprehensive and advanced evaluation and reward mechanism for Driving Nodes, their contributions may go unrecognized.

For the Intelligent Consortium's organizational network to operate continuously and perform well, the sustained functioning of both Driving Nodes and Action Nodes is essential. In this process, effectively mobilizing each node is key to the network's successful operation, as better mobilization means that organizational individuals within the nodes can leverage higher levels of intelligence degree, enabling the organizational network to achieve a higher degree of intelligence degree manifestation.

Based on the definition of mobilization in Organizational Settings of Intelligenism: "Organizational mobilization is a method by which an organization provides information to organizational individuals, who then make decisions, determine actions in a manner they approve (achieving a Rights conversion form they are satisfied with), and ultimately complete the Rights Conversion." Therefore, the purpose of mobilizing organizational individuals is to enable them to complete their Rights Conversion with higher efficiency. Whether for Action Nodes or Driving Nodes, mobilization follows the following framework:

The Node Individual Mobilization Degree (m) is determined by the Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio (G) and Driving Influence (A):

Node Individual Mobilization Degree (m): Refers to the mobilization degree of the organizational individual corresponding to any node (see the chapter "Reflections on Individual Mobilization Degree" in Organizational Settings of Intelligenism for the definition of mobilization degree).

Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio (G): The ratio of an Individual's total uncompleted rights conversion value in the specific organization to their Individual's total uncompleted rights conversion value across all organizations.

Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio = Individual's total uncompleted rights conversion value in the specific organization / Individual's total uncompleted rights conversion value across all organizations

For example, suppose Individual X has an uncompleted rights conversion value of 80

yuan in a specific organization and 100 yuan across all organizations. In that case, their Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio in that organization is 0.8. If Individual Y has an uncompleted rights conversion value of 100 yuan in the specific organization and 200 yuan across all organizations, their Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio is 0.5. Although Individual X's rights conversion value (80 yuan) is lower than Individual Y's (100 yuan), Individual X's benefit ratio (0.8) is higher than Individual Y's (0.5), suggesting that Individual X is theoretically likely to have a higher Node Individual Mobilization Degree than Individual Y in that specific organization.

Driving Influence (A): Refers to the extent of an individual's influence within a specific organization. A higher A value indicates greater influence, meaning their opinions are more likely to affect the behavior of other organizational individuals. In comparison, a lower A value indicates less influence, making it harder for their opinions to impact the decision-making or execution of others. When exerting influence, organizational individuals must act as nodes (either Driving Nodes or Action Nodes) within an organizational network structure. Driving Nodes exert influence through methods specified in the network's consensus-building mechanisms (e.g., suggestions, voting, or reward/penalty decisions). In contrast, Action Nodes exert influence by acting on the external environment, combining the Driving Influence of Driving Nodes with their own preferences.

Based on the settings of Intelligenism, I believe that an individual's Node Individual Mobilization Degree (m) is determined by $G \cdot A$ (positively correlated). In an output network, if an individual has high G and A values, they will be more motivated to make decisions (drive) the network to achieve better Rights Conversion benefits for themselves. If G is high but A is low, meaning the benefits from the network are critical to the individual but their ability to influence the network is weak, they may become passive or disengaged. Conversely, suppose G is low but A is high, meaning the benefits from the network are insignificant to the individual despite their strong influence over the network's output. In that case, they may also become passive or disengaged.

The total mobilization degree of the entire network is denoted as M . In network operations, the goal is to maximize each individual's m to achieve the maximum value of M . When M reaches its maximum, the network's total mobilization degree is considered to be at its peak. However, in real-world operations of the Intelligent Consortium network, M can only approach its maximum value infinitely, but is unlikely to reach the absolute maximum $M(\text{MAX})$. Thus, the goal is to make M as large as possible rather than achieving a perfect $M(\text{MAX})$.

In an organizational network, ensuring that individuals with a high Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio (G) also have a high Driving Influence (A) is key to approaching $M(\text{MAX})$. In the formula $m \propto G \cdot A$ (m is positively correlated with $G \cdot A$), G is an

independent variable (determined by the individual's allocation of rights resources). At the same time, A is a dependent variable (determined by other organizational individuals and consensus-building mechanisms). Since a specific organizational individual cannot significantly alter their Driving Influence (A) within the organization through their own actions, to make M approach M(MAX), the network's mechanisms should quantify an individual's G value and then derive a quantified A value based on G, using A as the determining factor for the individual's influence within the organizational network.

However, in the practical planning and management of a specific organizational network, determining an individual's Rights Conversion Benefit Ratio (G) is challenging because it requires knowing the individual's total uncompleted rights conversion value across all organizations in which the individual is involved. Since organizations cannot thoroughly investigate the uncompleted rights conversion values of all other organizations associated with an individual, calculating a fair G is impractical. To address this challenge, a substitute metric, Proportion of an Individual's Uncompleted Rights Conversion in the Organization (G'%), is introduced to improve the design of the individual mobilization scheme.

G'% : Proportion of an Individual's Uncompleted Rights Conversion in the Organization

G' : Individual's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization

G'TOTAL : Total members' uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization

$G'% = G' / G'TOTAL$

Admittedly, G' may not be as accurate as G in reflecting an individual's motivation. Referring to the earlier example, calculating G shows that Individual X is theoretically more motivated than Individual Y. However, calculating G' cannot confirm that Individual X is more motivated than Individual Y. The G' metric can only revert to the conclusion: "Since Individual X's uncompleted rights conversion value in the network is lower than Individual Y's, Individual Y is more motivated." Although this conclusion may not be entirely accurate, from the perspective of the entire organizational network, the logic that "those with greater interests are more engaged and motivated" still holds some guiding significance. Since G' only requires assessing an individual's actual situation within the organization, its calculation is significantly less complex, making the derivation of A based on G' more practical. (As noted in the chapter Philosophical Foundations of Intelligenism, Theoretical Adaptability is constrained by the Cost-Benefit of Theoretical Adaptability. While G has stronger guiding significance, in practice, we must resort to G' to construct the

network. Although G' has weaker Theoretical Adaptability, it offers a higher Cost-Benefit of Theoretical Adaptability.)

Calculating G'

Driving Influence Weight Ratio = Individual's A value in the organization / Total A value of all members in the organization.

Based on the earlier framework, a higher Driving Influence Weight Ratio indicates a stronger driving force of the organizational individual on the network. To make the network's M value approach M(MAX) (the state of maximum driving motivation), the organizational network must establish consensus-building mechanisms that assign higher Driving Influence (A) to individuals with a higher Proportion of an Individual's Uncompleted Rights Conversion in the Organization (G'%). Thus, calculating G' and G'% is a prerequisite for determining A.

The algorithm for calculating G' should vary depending on the type of organizational individual and the business forms covered by the organization. The G' algorithm can also be adjusted during network operations to change the A values of driving individuals, thereby altering the network's operational logic.

Special Note

The following G' algorithm settings and logic for different types of organizational individuals are merely suggestions. In the actual operation of the Intelligent Consortium, individuals can innovate and modify these algorithms. It is emphasized again that the following settings are only reference proposals, not representing any truth or guaranteed effectiveness. They are merely temporary ideas provided by the author to offer readers some inspiration, serving as a starting point for further exploration. In practice, readers can propose more innovative calculation methods during organizational construction and optimization to make the Intelligence Potential-driven aspects of the organization more personalized.

Example 1: Organizational Employee

Organizational Individual A is an employee whose Rights Conversion logic involves participating in the organization's daily work (8 hours a day, 5 days a week) to earn a base salary plus performance-based commissions. In this case, the organization needs to predict Individual A's future tenure and business capabilities (which determine

performance commissions). Individual A's G' should be tied to assumptions about their future tenure and business capabilities, and the organization must establish a predictive algorithm to calculate Individual A's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization.

When designing the organizational framework, factors such as the employee's historical employment duration, performance evaluation scores, and business capability assessments should be taken into consideration. A longer employment duration may indicate higher job stability, suggesting a greater likelihood of continued tenure. Higher performance and capability scores indicate stronger job competence, lower likelihood of termination, and higher potential for long-term employment. Additionally, higher performance and capability scores may also indicate greater future commission potential, enabling the organization to offer higher future base salaries and commissions to such employees.

Based on this framework, employees with higher scores in historical employment duration, performance evaluations, and business capability assessments should have a higher Individual's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization (G'), leading to a higher Driving Influence (A).

Example 2: Consumer

Organizational Individual B is a consumer whose Rights Conversion logic involves paying for the organization's products or services. In this case, factors such as the consumer's historical consumption frequency, consumption amount, and post-purchase service demands influence their G'.

When designing the organizational framework for products like movie screenings or restaurants that require minimal or no long-term after-sales service, the weight of after-sales service in the calculation can be minimal or even ignored. However, for low-frequency products that require stable, long-term after-sales service, such as video games, software, smartphones, or cars, the weight of after-sales service should be significantly increased. For high-frequency products, a consumer's total spending over a period may indicate their future consumption potential. For example, a game player's in-game spending over three months may predict their spending over the next six months, making their spending amount a key variable in calculating G'.

Overall, different G' algorithms should be designed for different products, covering various calculation variables. The goal is to empower consumers, as individual organizational members, to drive the organization's development while ensuring that its products and services better meet consumer needs, thereby unlocking greater consumption potential.

Example 3: Investor and Capital Provider

A capital provider achieves Rights Conversion by providing capital to the organization in exchange for future returns and the recovery of principal. In this case, the risk level of the organization's project determines the capital provider's risk premium expectations, which should be clearly defined before the organizational network is constructed. These expectations may include fixed annual capital returns and other specified forms of return. Although fixed returns can only be paid once the network is operational and generating profits or positive cash flow, the expected returns can be negotiated and set by organizational individuals before operations begin. For example, suppose Organizational Individual C, as a capital provider, provides 1 million yuan in capital to the Intelligent Consortium, taking into account operational risks, C demands a 20% annualized base return and 1% of annual operating revenue as an additional specified return. Before the network generates revenue, C's G' can be calculated as 1 million yuan in unrecovered principal plus 200,000 yuan in annual risk premium returns, discounted to present value.

Suppose in the third year, the organization's annual revenue reaches 3 million yuan. C's return for that year would be: 200,000 yuan (base return) + 3 million yuan * 1% (30,000 yuan additional return) = 230,000 yuan total. At this point, C's G' can be calculated as the present value of future cash flows (based on 230,000 yuan) plus the 1 million yuan principal. Suppose the organization fails to pay C's 200,000 yuan base return in the first and second years. In that case, C may set a rule at the network's inception stating: "Current year principal = Previous year principal + Previous year unpaid returns."

If, in the second year, C receives returns and recovers 500,000 yuan of the principal, the third-year return would be: 500,000 yuan * 20% + 3 million yuan * 1% = 130,000 yuan. At this point, C's G' = 500,000 yuan unrecovered principal + the present value of 130,000 yuan.

If, by the fifth year, C has recovered all principal, and the organization's revenue is 10 million yuan, C's Individual uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization would be the present value of 100,000 yuan (1% of revenue) in additional returns.

In this hypothetical case, as C recovers its capital, its G' and G'% in the organization significantly decrease, indicating a shift in organizational influence toward consumers, employees, and other types of organizational individuals. The concepts and logic related to capital recovery will be further elaborated in the chapter *The Concept of Organizational Disengagement of Organizational Individuals*.

Example 4: Product and Service Provider

When evaluating Organizational Individual D as a product or service provider, their G' calculation depends on the scarcity and critical importance of the products or services they provide to the Intelligent Consortium. When the product is in a buyer's market, D's G' may be smaller; in a seller's market, it may be larger. The organization can

also assess D's G' based on the market and value of the provided products.

For example, suppose NVIDIA's AI chips are critical to an organization's operations and cannot be substituted by other suppliers. In that case, NVIDIA may become an organizational individual with significant G', potentially decisively influencing the operational rules of the organizational network.

Example 5: Order Provider

Organizational Individual E, as an order provider, supplies Organizational Templates or assists organizational individuals in setting organizational rules during the initial construction of the Intelligent Consortium. This includes G' calculation schemes for future potential organizational individuals and methods to drive the organizational network based on A values derived from G' and G'%. (The necessity of Organizational Templates will be detailed in the chapter, *The Concept of Organizational Template and Action Template*.)

During order operations, E provides foundational driving services to enable organizational individuals to influence and drive the network within the rules, where fairness and impartiality are crucial. E may also serve as an independent third-party information dissemination medium, providing fair network operation information to all organizational individuals.

E's G' can be calculated by discounting the organization's revenue or fixed fees to present value, or more innovative G' algorithms for E can be developed in practice.

Additional Considerations

The above examples mainly cover mainstream, generic types of organizational individuals and their G' algorithms. However, organizational individuals can take diverse forms. For instance, consumers can act as capital providers by pre-purchasing products or services before the network operates, and product/service providers can act as capital providers by supplying equipment or raw materials during network construction. These and other unlisted possibilities indicate that the boundaries of organizational individuals' roles can be fluid and dynamic, and G's algorithms must adapt to the network's real-world environment and needs, potentially requiring innovation. In classifying organizational individuals and designing G' algorithms, participants are encouraged to explore diverse and creative possibilities.

Setting and Timing of G' Algorithms

In the pre-construction phase, when the organization has not yet been established, potential organizational individuals may only include potential consumers, capital providers, or employees. At this stage, creating an Organizational Template for the nascent organizational network is essential. This template must consist of initial G' calculation schemes for future business operations. As the network begins operating, the initial Organizational Template can be adjusted periodically to better align with

the network's development. During the sustained operation of the Intelligent Consortium, consensus-building mechanisms can be established to review and optimize the Organizational Template regularly, including adjustments to G' algorithms.

In the early stages of network construction, when there are no consumers or suppliers, potential organizational individuals may only include a few potential employees, order providers, and capital providers. During this phase, capital providers' G' is likely to be significantly higher than that of other individuals, though this depends on the business type covered by the Intelligent Consortium. For example, businesses heavily reliant on specific key technical personnel may assign higher G' values to those individuals.

During operations, the organization's priorities may shift across different stages. At inception, capital providers may be critical to launching the network. In the early operational phase, consumer opinions may take precedence. In the mid-term, capable employees' contributions may become vital, and sustained profits may enable capital providers to recover principal and returns, reducing their G'% and G'. When the organization undergoes transformation and introduces new capital providers, its G'% may increase again.

In summary, the design of G' algorithms is a critical factor in driving the network's operations and motivating Driving Nodes. Well-designed G' algorithms can unlock new heights of Intelligence Potential.

Analysis of $G'\% = G' / G'TOTAL$: When a network's output is determined by five individuals, $G'TOTAL$ is the sum of their G' values, and G'% is the ratio of an Individual's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization to Total members' uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization ($G'TOTAL$).

From G'% to A

Driving Influence (A): Refers to the extent to which an individual's decisions can influence the final outcome. When $A = 1$, the individual fully determines the outcome; when $A = 0$, their decisions have no impact. When a network's output is determined by five individuals, the sum of their A values ($A(TOTAL)$) equals 1.

Addressing the Practical Challenge of Driving Influence Weight Ratio Allocation

As mentioned earlier, to make M approach $M(\text{MAX})$, individuals with higher $G\%$ should be assigned higher A values. However, determining how Driving Influence (A), as a measure of driving influence, can be applied to drive the network and ensure that individuals with high $G\%$ have greater influence is a design challenge.

According to the framework, in the main or subordinate networks of the Intelligent Consortium, Driving Nodes (except Action Nodes at the network's output end) exert influence through diverse forms, including but not limited to suggestions, voting, supervision, and appointments. For many driving forms like supervision or suggestions, it is difficult for the network to mandate that Action Node individuals prioritize or value the supervision or suggestions from Driving Nodes with high $G\%$ or disregard those from nodes with low $G\%$. Thus, deriving a high Driving Influence Weight Ratio for Driving Nodes from high $G\%$ faces practical challenges.

The Concept of Organizational Template and Action Template

To address the challenge of allocating Driving Influence to different driving individuals, the Intelligent Consortium network should establish two modules:

1 . Organizational Template

2 . Action Template


The Organizational Template is predefined during the initial construction of the Intelligent Consortium, serving as a rule template that the Action Template must follow. Before the network is built, potential organizational individuals must establish an initial, mutually agreed-upon Organizational Template, similar to the initialization parameters of software. This template can be determined through voting or negotiation among the initial potential organizational individuals.

As the network operates, this template will inevitably require adjustments and optimizations, which must be carried out in accordance with the rules of the Organizational Template through voting or other fair methods by all existing organizational individuals. The Organizational Template is akin to the network structure design of a neural network. Unlike neural networks, which only adjust weights during training, the Organizational Template not only sets the basic parameters for network operations but also determines the operational methods and network structure in collaboration with organizational individuals or potential individuals with direct interests in the network.

If the Organizational Template is considered a network, its role is to modify the Action Template. The Action Template, as another part of the Intelligent Consortium network, enables the Intelligent Consortium to interact with the external environment and engage in Rights Conversion with other external intelligent agents. Thus, the Intelligent Consortium operates with two main networks: the Organizational Template and the Action Template.

The Action Template must operate in accordance with the rules established by the Organizational Template. For example, in an Intelligent Consortium restaurant, the Organizational Template may define subnetworks within the Action Template, such as consumer opinion groups, procurement supervision groups, or dish evaluation groups, and set basic configurations for their staffing, driving methods, and evaluation methods. In summary, the operational rules and network structure of the Action Template must be defined within the Organizational Template, and organizational individuals and nodes within the Action Template must conduct business operations in accordance with these rules.

All organizational individuals in the Intelligent Consortium should participate in driving the Organizational Template network, while most also serve as Action Nodes or Driving Nodes in the Action Template network. For instance, a restaurant's chef or procurement officer is an Action Node in the Action Template (cooking, dish development, procurement) and a Driving Node in the Organizational Template, participating in voting or providing suggestions to optimize the Action Template network. Consumers may serve as members of a dish opinion group (Driving Node, offering improvement suggestions) in the Action Template while also participating in the Organizational Template network, alongside chefs, procurement officers, and capital investors, to vote on optimizing the Action Template network.



The diagram illustrates a simplified network structure of an Intelligent Consortium

restaurant. In this network, four organizational individuals determine the content of the Organizational Template through a template management group, including, but not limited to, defining the structure of the Action Template network. These four individuals also serve as Driving Nodes in different sub-networks of the Action Template, with some acting as Action Nodes to produce outputs. The Action Template comprises three sub-networks: a Financial Decision Team, a Kitchen Management Team, and a Dining Area Management Team, each exhibiting a typical network structure. While real-world Intelligent Consortium networks are inevitably more complex, this simplified structure provides readers with a basic concept of the Organizational Template and Action Template.

Using Organizational Templates to Achieve Driving Influence (A)

The Organizational Template is key to realizing the concept of Driving Influence Weight Ratio. Typically, as outlined earlier, the Action Template network's driving forms are diverse, and assigning quantitative Driving Influence to individuals across subnetworks is challenging. However, the Organizational Template network focuses solely on proposing and determining the structure and rules of the Action Template through voting or other fair methods. Its driving forms are simpler, and participation can include most or all organizational individuals, making it easier to allocate A based on G%. This allows individuals to exert influence through the Organizational Template onto the Action Template, affecting the Intelligent Consortium's external environment adaptability and its Rights conversion form and efficiency.

In practice, network builders or organizational individuals can calculate each individual's G% and use it to determine their voting weight in forming the Organizational Template's framework (one way to reflect A). The final Organizational Template can be decided by a majority vote (e.g., 60% or 50%, depending on the network's rules). Alternatively, network builders and individuals can negotiate other decision-making forms to finalize the framework.

Nesting and Linkage Between Intelligent Consortiums

In an Intelligent Consortium, organizational individuals can include not only individuals but also traditional commercial organizations, other Intelligent Consortiums, or other organizational forms. Based on the earlier framework, service

or product suppliers are considered organizational individuals, and their trading counterparts, consumers, are also organizational individuals. When Intelligent Consortia trade with each other, they become organizational individuals within each other's networks, forming Nested relationships. In a society where Intelligenism is widespread and Intelligent Consortia are numerous, they will form interconnected, web-like networks, resembling a blockchain's peer-to-peer structure. This larger network structure, extending beyond individual Intelligent Consortia, may give rise to new systems of trust and contractual constraints.

The organizational and Actual Boundaries of the Intelligent Consortium in the Real Business World

In The Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, the definition of an organizational individual is as follows: any individual who has a direct delineation of rights and responsibilities with the organization and is directly constrained by its rules is considered an organizational individual. This means that as long as an individual has an uncompleted rights conversion relationship with the organization, they are regarded as an organizational individual. Therefore, as mentioned in On Organization, customers in the process of consumption, customers post-consumption (with after-sales service), suppliers, and even other roles collaborating with the Intelligent Consortium are all considered organizational individuals under the organizational rules of the Intelligent Consortium.

Unfortunately, in the current global business environment, if we aim to form a business organization through the Intelligent Consortium, we may still need to operate within the existing organizational frameworks of business organizations (including but not limited to partnerships, limited liability companies, or other organizational forms) to achieve our business objectives. However, existing business organizations (including but not limited to limited liability companies and partnerships) have legal restrictions on the Approval of organizational members. For instance, in a limited liability company, corporate law imposes organizational constraints on shareholders, directors, supervisors, and employees. At the same time, consumers or suppliers are subject to certain legal constraints under other commercial agreements or consumer protection laws. However, these protections or contracts typically function in areas such as payment and quality assurance for consumers. In practice, they do not treat consumers or suppliers as organizational members of the business organization, nor do they assume that consumers have the rights that organizational members of a business organization should have. It must be acknowledged that current business organizational structures typically assume a top-down organizational structure under traditional cybernetics theory.

This implies that the Intelligent Consortium, as a bottom-up connectionism-based organization, has actual organizational boundaries that do not align with the assumed organizational boundaries under the legal frameworks of traditional business organizations. However, as a business organization, the Intelligent Consortium must still comply with existing organizational frameworks. Therefore, building an Intelligent Consortium organization under the current world's traditional business organizational framework may face numerous challenges. We must all recognize the technical challenges faced by the Intelligent Consortium and Intelligenism as a new solution for our society, requiring practitioners to explore more innovative solutions in real-world environments. (I will attempt to propose some solutions to some of these challenges and issues in the Construction of the Intelligent Consortium chapter.)


The Relationship Between the Intelligent Consortium and Traditional Business Entities

As mentioned above, the organizational boundaries of the Intelligent Consortium do not align with those of traditional business entities, as the Intelligent Consortium is likely to exhibit more dynamic, broader, and fuzzier organizational boundaries. Although the organizational boundaries of the Intelligent Consortium are likely larger than those of traditional business entities, in the current business society, commercial activities such as payments, procurement, exercising legal responsibilities, and purchasing fixed assets must still be conducted through traditional, legally recognized business entities. While the Intelligent Consortium may conduct commercial activities based on a blockchain framework in the future, the current state of blockchain company development indicates that many operations still rely on the traditional business company framework. In this context, conventional business entities will continue to be the primary operational tools for the Intelligent Consortium to carry out commercial activities in the foreseeable future.

Considering that the organizational boundaries of the Intelligent Consortium are larger than those of traditional business entities, and that conventional business entities are viewed as tools for the Intelligent Consortium to execute its organizational intentions, the settings of the Intelligent Consortium should be above those of traditional business entities. Traditional business organizations are considered subordinate organizations under the Intelligent Consortium framework, primarily used to implement the organizational actions of the Intelligent Consortium. Under this thinking, conception, and construction of Intelligenism, an Intelligent Consortium could theoretically extend to one or even multiple traditional business entities.

For example, in an independent restaurant Intelligent Consortium, the traditional business entity registered by the restaurant (possibly a limited liability company or

partnership, among other rights conversion forms) may be its only business entity. However, the Intelligent Consortium could also designate procurement, independent kitchens, and restaurant properties as separate business entities, allowing the Intelligent Consortium to own multiple traditional business entities. In a multi-restaurant franchise system under the Intelligent Consortium framework, each restaurant may be an independent subordinate Intelligent Consortium, resembling a feudal kingdom's vassal structure. At the same time, each franchised restaurant, as a subordinate Intelligent Consortium, is also an organizational individual of the brand operator, participating in organizational formulation through the brand operator's Intelligent Consortium organizational template and further influencing the brand operator's organizational network operations by acting as specific driving nodes under the action template. Under this setting, the brand operator is simultaneously an organizational individual within the franchised restaurant's Intelligent Consortium, influencing the franchised restaurant's organizational network actions by becoming a driving node in its organizational template and action template.



As shown in the figure above, the Intelligent Consortium should be a larger organizational collection than traditional business entities, potentially encompassing one or multiple traditional business entity subsets as tools to realize the organizational intentions of the Intelligent Consortium. These conventional business entity subsets may also be subordinate Intelligent Consortium. However, the real-world relationships and collaboration methods between the Intelligent Consortium collection and its subsets need to be determined based on the commercial forms, purposes, and the organizational network construction preferences of the organizational individuals within each Intelligent Consortium.

The Concept of Organizational Disengagement for Organizational Individuals

Before discussing organizational disengagement, it is necessary to clarify its definition. Here, I define organizational disengagement as the behavior of an organizational individual terminating future potential rights conversion relationships, which can also be understood as the individual detaching from a specific organization, ceasing to be regarded as an organizational individual of that organization. The Philosophical Foundations of Intelligenism argues that under the Intelligenism framework, individuals should be able to engage in theoretical disengagement (abandoning theoretical belief disengagement and turning to believe in or create a new theory), and the Intelligenism framework considers the freedom to disengage from theories as a key driver of theoretical openness and development in human society. In The Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, it is noted that in a slavery organization, slaves, as organizational individuals, cannot autonomously complete organizational disengagement, and this restriction on disengagement is one of the reasons for the low node individual mobilization degree of slave organizational individuals. Based on the views in the "Connate and Dis-Connate Organizations" section, individuals find it difficult to disengage from Conate organizations. In contrast, disengagement from Dis-Connate organizations is easier and less costly, which, in terms of organizational iterative evolution, manifests as Dis-Connate organizations evolving at a much faster rate than Connate organizations when measured by the lifespan of organizational individuals. This also reflects that the difficulty of organizational disengagement is negatively correlated with the efficiency of organizational iterative evolution.

Under the Intelligent Consortium organizational framework, organizational disengagement by organizational individuals is permitted and should be a frequent occurrence within the organization. During organizational construction, the Intelligent Consortium should refine disengagement rules for different types of organizational individuals to ensure that future disengagement behaviors by various kinds of organizational individuals can proceed in an orderly manner. Before an organizational individual joins the organization, the organization should provide clear disengagement rules for each type and for each individual. Organizational individuals should retain the right to disengage whenever the organizational template is fully adjusted. When specifying disengagement rules for different types of organizational individuals, reasonable disengagement mechanisms should be established for the following three typical scenarios:

- 1. Non-organizational template adjustment nodes; routine daily time nodes;**
- 2. Organizational template adjustment nodes; when the organizational network adjusts its institutions and changes rules;**
- 3. Unexpected or special nodes triggered by certain special clauses, such as buyers encountering product quality issues and returning goods, the**

organization facing unexpectedly high losses, or the organization being unable to fulfill salary commitments, etc.

For consumer organizational individuals, disengagement mechanisms may seem less necessary in some scenarios because, in the rights conversion relationship between the individual and the organization, consumers typically provide monetary ownership and control rights to obtain other goods or services. For one-time purchase consumers, the organization usually does not impose responsibility restrictions on the individual, so these consumers have no obligations or responsibilities toward the organization, making the necessity of disengagement less significant. However, for consumers who only need to make payments, if subsequent payment processes involve mandatory elements, establishing a disengagement mechanism to allow consumers (organizational individuals) to terminate such mandatory processes prematurely becomes necessary.

The nature of labor supply organizational individuals within organizations is similar to employees in traditional business organizations, and their organizational disengagement process resembles the resignation behavior of employees in traditional organizations. Therefore, the disengagement system for labor supply organizational individuals can largely adopt the settings of conventional resignation systems.

Disengagement Characteristics of Capital Supply Organizational Individuals

The disengagement characteristics of capital supply organizational individuals may be the most unique among all general types of organizational individuals. In traditional business organizations, capital suppliers are typically equity investors, creditors, or business partners. In conventional business organizations, equity investors can normally only exit through private equity transfers or stock market sales, rarely able to exit without a counterparty; however, they can generally obtain corresponding organizational voting rights based on their equity share. Creditors in traditional business organizations have higher priority repayment rights than equity investors, and debtors (the organization) typically have a full obligation to repay the principal of the debt. I will not delve too deeply into analyzing the partnership shares of partners here, as their settings are more flexible and variable, making it difficult to provide a specific definition.

Returning to the Intelligent Consortium organization, given the bottom-up organizational characteristics of a connectionism network, it is difficult to finance through mechanisms similar to equity or debt investments in traditional business organizations. In conventional business organizations, the amount of equity typically determines the proportion of control rights, which can also be reflected as the driving influence of equity holders on the organization. In the Intelligent Consortium, an

individual's driving influence is determined by their proportion of uncompleted rights conversion in the organization, meaning that other organizational individuals, such as consumers or labor suppliers who may not hold equity in the traditional companies under the Intelligent Consortium, can also gain significant driving influence. In conventional business organizations, company policies and decision-making schemes are typically decided directly or indirectly by equity holders, who bear the potential investment losses from company risks and cannot exit without a willing buyer (even if the company still has significant cash on its balance sheet). Instead, equity holders can ensure the security of their investments by participating in setting company policies and development plans. In the Intelligent Consortium, company policies and development directions are influenced not only by capital suppliers but also by consumers, labor suppliers, and suppliers of goods or services, meaning capital suppliers cannot solely rely on being the primary decision-making units for company policies and development plans to secure their interests. Additionally, in a bottom-up organization, it is difficult to pinpoint a single decision-making unit (final decision-maker), making it challenging for creditors to hold most individuals (group decision-making units) accountable for debt repayment when the organization fails to repay principal or interest as agreed. In summary, compared to traditional business organizations, capital suppliers in the Intelligent Consortium may face organizational template arrangements and development plans proposed by other types of organizational individuals that are not in their favor, and they cannot pursue debt recovery from a large number of organizational individuals as creditors. Therefore, capital suppliers in the Intelligent Consortium need to establish capital supply rules distinct from those of traditional equity investors and creditors, accompanied by a disengagement system tailored to the characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium.

Suggestions for the Disengagement System for Capital Suppliers

Definition of Residual Capital Supply Amount:

Before discussing the disengagement mechanism for capital suppliers, it is necessary to determine the amount of capital they can disengage, which I refer to as the "residual capital supply amount." During capital disengagement, the residual capital supply amount represents the maximum disengagement limit. In my framework, the following items are included in the residual capital supply amount (though, considering the differences between projects, organizational individuals can add, remove, or innovate different items as per organizational requirements):

1. Original capital supply amount: The actual monetary amount invested by the capital supplier into the organization.

2. Unallocated portion of capital profit requirements: Based on the calculation method for G' (individual's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization) in Example 3 (investors, capital suppliers) from On the Calculation of an Individual's Total Uncompleted Rights Conversion Value in the

Organization, when the annual profit compensation for capital is not distributed, it accumulates and converts into the residual capital supply amount.

3. In the initial stages of organizational construction and certain subsequent periods, some labor suppliers may convert all or part of their entitled labor remuneration into capital reinvested into the organization. For instance, in the early stages of organizational construction, if the organization faces capital shortages, some organizational individuals may provide labor services without receiving salaries, and their entitled salaries can be converted into the residual capital supply amount based on a calculation method recognized by other organizational individuals. This portion of the residual capital supply amount, under organizational rules, can receive future profit compensation like other capital supplies and may also be disengaged in the future under the name of the capital supplier.

4. In the initial stages of organizational construction and certain subsequent periods, some service or product suppliers can convert all or part of their services or products into capital reinvested into the organization. Referring to the third item above, they can similarly obtain a residual capital supply amount, receive future profit compensation, and disengage in the future under the name of the capital supplier.

The organization should establish an advanced announcement system for the disengagement of the residual capital supply amount. When a capital supplier needs to disengage capital, they must announce the disengagement action to all organizational individuals in advance and wait for a period before withdrawing funds from the organization's liquid assets. During this waiting period, other capital suppliers may also request capital disengagement. In such cases, the organizational individual who first requested disengagement should disengage fairly and equitably with other affected capital suppliers during the waiting period. If capital is insufficient, multiple capital disengagers should proportionally divide all available organizational funds. During the waiting period, the organization can seek new capital supply sources to replace the capital being disengaged after the announcement.

When the organization's liquid funds are less than the residual capital supply amount, after the capital supplier withdraws all funds from the organization's account, they may achieve capital disengagement by liquidating company assets. Still, they cannot pursue recovery from other organizational individuals. Capital suppliers should consider the opportunity cost of capital disengagement and the potential for organizational paralysis resulting from ill-timed disengagement, which could lead to losses from failing to recover the full capital investment. Other types of organizational individuals need to fully assess the importance of capital suppliers and their interests when adjusting organizational templates, operational schemes, network structures, and consensus-building mechanisms, avoiding overly unfavorable adjustments that


could lead to capital disengagement and ultimately cause organizational stagnation or collapse.

In summary, the capital in the Intelligent Consortium exhibits more flexible withdrawal characteristics than equity investors in traditional business organizations, as it can announce disengagement at any time and proceed with capital withdrawal. However, unlike traditional business creditors, Intelligent Consortium capital faces similar principal loss risks as traditional equity investments and cannot pursue joint recovery from other organizational individuals.

To ensure the disengagement rights of capital suppliers, the execution units (traditional corporate organizations or partnerships, etc.) under the Intelligent Consortium are typically controlled by the capital supplier group. However, the information platform, operational data, and communication channels of the Intelligent Consortium are owned by all organizational individuals and can be stored as independent third-party or decentralized distributed tools. This means that even if capital disengagement causes specific execution units of the Intelligent Consortium to cease operations, it does not mean the organization collapses. Other organizational individuals can still seek new capital suppliers based on the existing consensus-building mechanisms, information accumulation, and organizational template, reactivating existing execution units or establishing new ones for commercial operations.


Information Transmission Characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium

Information Transmission Diagram of the Intelligent Consortium:



In the organizational network of the Intelligent Consortium, action nodes generate information through executing actions and then feed it back to driving nodes. In the network structure shown in the diagram, each action node is connected to three driving nodes, and each driving node connected to an action node is further connected to four other driving nodes. This means that the information feedback from an action node is first transmitted to three driving nodes, which then pass it to four subsequent driving nodes. In this organizational network, information transmission exhibits a diffusion pattern, meaning information is more easily disseminated to a larger number of organizational individuals.

Information Transmission Diagram of a Cybernetics Organization:



In a cybernetic organization, execution units generate information through interactions with the external environment and report it to their immediate superior (mid-level decision-making unit), who organizes and adjusts the information before reporting it to the top-level decision-making unit. In this structure, all execution unit information is transmitted in a single line, from “execution unit → mid-level decision-making unit → top-level decision-making unit.” Outside this single-line transmission, other organizational individuals have difficulty gaining comprehensive and direct access to the information. The black-box nature of this single-line transmission means that when errors or distortions occur, top-level decision-making units struggle to verify or correct the information through multiple sources.

Simplifying things leads to the filtering of the information they contain, as mentioned in *From the Mystical Characteristics of Wave Theory to the Dilemma of Defining Things*. Because the definition boundaries of things are typically somewhat fuzzy, and cybernetic organizations must define them. Within the information transmission pipeline, the fuzzy boundaries of things may be arbitrarily delineated (forcefully quantified or qualified) during transmission, leading to the loss of significant detailed information and analytical direction. Therefore, in a top-down control process, whether it is the process of decision-making units receiving information (information simplification) or issuing directives (arbitrary delineation), the information about things loses its flexible definition and evaluation space. In the Intelligent Consortium, decision-making is bottom-up, with each driving node having different information understanding and definitions. The output of action nodes can be influenced by different driving nodes, meaning the final delineation method is affected by more information. Although this influence is indirect, the involvement of more information and definition methods makes the output more aligned with the real external environment (reducing information loss from simplification and deviations in individual information transmission).

By comparing the two information transmission diagrams, it can be seen that the information transmission in traditional cybernetic organizations is one-to-one pipeline transmission. The limited information reception and processing capacity of top-level decision-making units means they cannot devote excessive effort to verifying bottom-up information reports. However, the connectionism-based structure of the Intelligent Consortium requires an action node to provide information feedback to multiple driving nodes. In smaller networks, these driving nodes act as action nodes in sub-networks, feeding information to more driving nodes in those sub-networks. This transmission results in an exponential increase in the number of information recipients, ultimately ensuring that nearly all organizational individuals are aware of organizational operations. This one-to-many information transmission means that individuals providing information are accountable to multiple parties, significantly increasing the risk for the information provider if information is deliberately concealed or unintentionally erroneous. Additionally, the mutual collaboration among

organizational individuals enables information from different action nodes to spread quickly to most individuals in the organization, and logical contradictions in the information provide opportunities for some individuals to identify transmission errors, significantly increasing the difficulty of falsifying or concealing information.

Organizational Cognition Beyond All Individuals

Throughout my investment career, I have developed numerous trading strategies and later introduced multi-factor models and other strategies that utilize simple machine algorithms and neural networks. These strategies statistically show a clear probabilistic advantage (higher winning odds), but after thorough research, I often could not understand why the trading system selected certain stocks. In the new development structure of the company, I have largely withdrawn from intervening in the decision-making of other investment personnel. I observed that my colleagues often made investment decisions that contradicted my cognitive understanding and expectations, or were incomprehensible to me. Yet, their subsequent results were quite successful, with some strategy modules significantly outperforming the portfolios I managed. Examples like a young mother unaware of her pregnancy being recommended baby products by online platforms or AlphaGo AI defeating nearly all human Go players demonstrate that decision-making systems created by humans can sometimes produce decisions that surpass human cognition. Based on various examples I have encountered, I firmly believe that as long as the system architecture is scientifically sound, the constructed organization can create decision-making schemes that surpass the cognition of all organizational individuals.

Under the concept of Intelligenism, the Intelligent Consortium is seen as an organizational form with an autonomous intelligence degree, likely inevitably exhibiting local or overall behaviors that exceed the cognition and understanding of most or all organizational individuals. In such a system, where operations exceed the comprehension of most or all organizational individuals, we should not feel confused or skeptical, as this may precisely be an inevitable manifestation of a higher intelligent degree. As normal humans, we cannot even fully understand all the thoughts and behavioral meanings of a pet dog or cat. When facing a higher-level neural network with humans as its neurons, we inevitably encounter situations where we cannot fully understand or feel puzzled by some or most of its behavioral outputs. Just as in the stock market, if viewed as a bottom-up neural network-like structure, an individual human, as one of tens of thousands of neurons, cannot fully comprehend the meaning expressed by the overall market trend.

Reconciling with the Decision-Making Black Box

In a society deeply rooted in cybernetic ideology, the observable, evaluable, understandable, and predictable characteristics of an organization become the primary sources of security and control for many traditional organizational managers. Driven by this sense of security and control, they strive to make the organization operate according to their willing, vision, and expectations. To achieve this, “managers” set numerous goals, KPIs, management rules, information systems, and corporate cultures to ensure the organization does not “lose control.” However, such “control” may cause the organization to operate in a low-intelligence degree state, unable to break through to a higher state of external environment adaptability. In the intuition of many, a high-intelligence degree or excellent organization should have a higher probability of making better major(big) decisions, a view I oppose. I believe a high-intelligence degree organizational network should exhibit behaviors from its internal network action nodes that generally have higher external environment adaptability. The external environment is always complex, and a high-intelligence degree intelligent agent should demonstrate greater adaptability in response to complex external factors, inevitably exhibiting more complicated, nonlinear characteristics. Human observation, evaluation, and prediction are often based on limited factors, reflecting the cognitive limitations of humans themselves.

Therefore, to some extent, accepting the “loss of control” of the organizational network is a necessary step toward developing a higher intelligence degree. Just as parents must eventually accept that their children may make decisions beyond their understanding or expectations, this may be the necessary path for a child to surpass their parents and become stronger. Here, I express this acceptance of “loss of control” as reconciling with the decision-making black box, akin to accepting and understanding the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics—a reality that potential organizational individuals of the Intelligent Consortium must accept.

Breaking Through the Information Volume

Bottleneck of Traditional Organizations

By observing the operational characteristics of deep-learning networks in computers, it can be seen that larger training sample sizes and more neurons typically imply greater potential for intelligence. An increase in organizational individuals in the Intelligent Consortium may yield similar efficiency. Conversely, in traditional organizations, increasing the number of individuals raises management costs, weakening organizational vitality, which is similar to the efficiency characteristics of

information processing systems under cybernetics.

Breaking through the information volume bottleneck enables greater intelligence potential, a higher total mobilization degree, and increased node individual mobilization degree. As stated in The Organizational Settings of Intelligenism regarding mobilization, a higher node individual mobilization degree leads to greater information uncertainty, increasing the difficulty of process management for individuals by the organization. Additionally, a higher node individual mobilization degree leads to greater information invocation, increasing management difficulty for the organization. However, when the Intelligenism organization breaks the information volume bottleneck of traditional organizations, it means the new paradigm organization can accommodate larger information volumes while maintaining healthy operations, enabling the Intelligent Consortium to mobilize high-node individual mobilization degree individuals.

The inverted triangle feedback structure of the Intelligent Consortium means that it exhibits an information diffusion state during operation, while traditional organizations continuously simplify and filter information, leading to a continuous contraction of information. This makes the Intelligent Consortium inherently expand and complicate information volume, and the increase in information complexity and volume can fully leverage the intelligence potential of the deep-learning network (in deep-learning network training, larger sample sizes and broader sample coverage are more conducive to intelligent learning).

Based on the views in Polanyi's Personal Knowledge, objective knowledge ultimately evolves into the personal knowledge (tacit knowledge) of practitioners in practice, making personal knowledge more individualized and less replicable. In the mobilization process of traditional organizations, only the objective knowledge output of organizational individuals can be managed to a certain extent. Still, considering that the vast details of tacit knowledge cannot be fully described or summarized, actions based on tacit knowledge for decision-making and execution cannot be process-managed. They may even be restricted or weakened in traditional process management. After accepting the reality of tacit knowledge, directly applying it in the Intelligent Consortium for driving and action, while ignoring its generation process, is more preferable.

Redundancy in the Organizational Network of the Intelligent Consortium

In the Information Redundancy and Intelligence Potential section of On Intelligence, I proposed that creating redundancy is one of the key means to enhance intelligence potential. Based on this inference, when the following redundancies appear in the

Intelligent Consortium organization, they should not be regarded as waste. Organizational individuals, when building and gradually improving the organizational network, can consider further increasing redundancy and accepting its inherent characteristics to achieve the goal of enhancing the organization's intelligence potential.

Information Redundancy: As introduced in the "Information Transmission Characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium" section, the fractal diffusion characteristics of information transmission within the Intelligent Consortium have been discussed. Based on this characteristic, it can be foreseen that organizational information transmission is diffusion-like, with each action node's information being fully or partially transmitted to most organizational individuals. Even if some organizational individuals do not receive complete information during the initial transmission process, they can integrate information through other individuals when needed. To some external observers, this information transmission method may seem to unnecessarily pass information to a large number of organizational individuals who have no immediate interest in it, and they may believe this process lacks obvious value. However, from the perspective of information redundancy and intelligence potential, a large amount of redundant information may enable organizational individuals to generate more possibilities for information invocation and integration during their work or daily thinking, which is precisely the source of inspiration and innovation for these individuals.

Node Redundancy: From the introduction to the organizational network structure of the Intelligent Consortium, it is clear that each action node in the network structure is followed by a complete deep learning-like neural network structure, with a certain number of neuron-like driving nodes driving the behavior of the action node. In the actual operation of this network, not all driving nodes consistently play a sufficiently significant role, just as many neurons in a deep learning neural network often do not provide decisive contributions to the final output, instead playing minor or even negligible roles at times. However, we cannot deny the value of these nodes simply because some driving nodes or neurons do not play a decisive or any role in many cases. These nodes precisely reflect the growth potential and intelligence potential of the network. During organizational operations, organizational individuals cannot accurately predict which specific driving node will play a particular role in a specific action scenario. The driving process exhibits a high degree of randomness and uncertainty, but a sufficient number of driving nodes remains necessary. They are the source of new ideas and thoughts, and a key element that distinguishes the Intelligent Consortium from traditional cybernetics organizations.

Attention and Thinking Redundancy: The information diffusion characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium mean that organizational information will continuously spread from within the organization to the outside, potentially sparking ongoing attention and discussion among organizational individuals and external individuals. Organizational

individuals should accept and even encourage this phenomenon of information diffusion from within the organization to its external network and the resulting attention and discussion. In my view, this seemingly inconsequential attention and debate reflect the redundancy of attention and thinking provided by individuals to the organization's operations. Although we cannot precisely predict the specific impact of this attention and thinking redundancy on the organization at a given time, this attention and thinking itself is the soil for theoretical differentiation and proposal, bringing potential possibilities for theoretical openness and new organizational individuals to the organization.

Construction of the Intelligent Consortium

Introduction

Following the discussion on the fundamental conception of the Intelligent Consortium in the chapter "On the Intelligent Consortium," this chapter will deduce the construction of the Intelligent Consortium, providing a relatively comprehensive implementation framework for building the Intelligent Consortium in reality. However, it must be acknowledged that the ideas presented below are merely speculative, derived from deductive reasoning. It is certain that, at least at the time of the first edition of this book, these views have not yet been validated in practice, and their adaptability across various scenarios remains unknown. Undoubtedly, they do not represent absolute truth. I hope that the perspectives on the construction of the Intelligent Consortium in this chapter can serve as a catalyst, inspiring readers who aspire to build such consortia. The content envisioned in this chapter is akin to a template design for a small house built with blocks in the game Minecraft. It has not yet been constructed even within the game. Readers can regard it as reference material for DIY organizational network construction.

Before delving into this chapter, I believe the term "Construction of the Intelligent Consortium" should be interpreted in a broader sense, rather than merely focusing on a micro-level elaboration of organizational network rules and personnel allocation. Before discussing the rules of organizational networks, we must first address the question of where the individual components of the organization come from. Individuals are the prerequisite for an organization; only when potential organizational individuals emerge does the formation of the Intelligent Consortium become possible. To achieve this prerequisite of acquiring potential organizational individuals, this chapter needs to discuss the construction of the Intelligent Consortium under a broader definition.

This chapter divides the content of constructing the Intelligent Consortium into two main parts: the first part discusses the developmental forms of Intelligenism, and the second part addresses the formation of the Intelligent Consortium. The first part will conceive the ecological environment for the formation of potential organizational individuals, attempting to deduce and envision how this ecosystem should manifest and how potential organizational individuals will emerge within it. The second part will discuss how to build various forms of the Intelligent Consortium from existing potential organizational individuals and elaborate on the issues these nascent consortia will face in their initial construction phase.

Through reading this chapter, readers should be able to form mental associations with Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium and conduct thought experiments by combining their imagination with real-world business scenarios to evaluate the potential value of the organizational network form of the Intelligent Consortium in practical business contexts. However, it must be admitted that there is a long and winding road between the value judgments derived from such thought experiments and their actual realization in practice. Nevertheless, a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. If this book and this chapter can provide even a modicum of theoretical support and practical guidance for future practitioners, it would be considered a significant success. Regardless, imagination is the starting point of everything, and with imagination comes possibility—this is the most fundamental role this chapter aims to fulfill.

The Path of Construction

Before discussing the two parts mentioned in the preface, it is necessary to briefly outline the content nodes included in these two parts and provide an overall guide to the detailed discussions that follow. This will enable readers to grasp the construction framework of this chapter from a broader perspective and gain a deeper understanding of the detailed content on organizational construction. It must be emphasized again

that the settings and definitions in this chapter are not absolute truths; they are merely speculative initial settings based on the theoretical framework of Intelligenism. Future practitioners can reinterpret and redefine them based on their own understanding.

In this chapter, I have outlined the broad construction of the Intelligent Consortium into the following content nodes:

1. *Theoretical Proposal;*
2. *Theoretical Differentiation;*
3. *Formation of Consensus;*
4. *Expansion of approval;*
5. *Formation of Organization;*
6. *Organizational Action;*

Among these nodes, nodes 1–4 are included in the first part ("Ecological Conception of Intelligenism"), while nodes 5–6 are included in the second part ("Construction of the Intelligent Consortium"). Here, I regard the entire theoretical framework of Intelligenism as an intelligent agent as well. The chapter "Construction of the Intelligent Consortium" is considered a subnetwork and neuron of the intelligent agent network within the broader theoretical framework of Intelligenism. Within this subnetwork, node 6 represents the execution phase of the corresponding intelligent agent. Referring to the concept of information generation through execution in the chapter "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," the information generated in the execution phase feeds back into the entire subnetwork to drive adjustments in nodes 1–4. As the construction process of the Intelligent Consortium (covered in this chapter) serves as the execution phase within the theoretical framework of Intelligenism, the information generated from the construction behavior will ultimately drive the adjustment and optimization of the Intelligenism theory through network feedback.

Completing the closed loop from "Theoretical Proposal" to "Formation of Organization" and ultimately achieving "Organizational Action" is the critical leap from theory to organizational execution in this book, and it is its most challenging goal. During the conceptualization of this chapter, I constantly lacked confidence in addressing this foreseeable challenge, which delayed the start of writing. At times, this chapter reminded me of the Chinese idiom "painting the eyes on the dragon" (the idiom is based on the setting--painting the eyes of the dragon is the last step to make the dragon alive)—whether the dragon of Intelligenism in this book can "come to life" depends on this chapter. Ultimately, by repeatedly reminding myself that the content of this chapter is merely a speculative framework based on the theory of Intelligenism, and that future readers and practitioners can refine it through continuous practical testing—or even completely rewrite it—I was able to begin writing the main text tentatively. Given my stance and definition of the content in this chapter, I urge readers to approach it with a critical perspective.

Part One: Ecological Conception of Intelligenism —

Theoretical Proposal

The chapter begins with a quote from the Tao Te Ching: "The Tao gives birth to one, one gives birth to two, two gives birth to three, and three gives birth to all things." Here, I believe that a theory should be categorized as "one," not the Tao itself. (I think the "TAO" here can seem like the rules of the universe in Western culture.) When a theory cannot be asserted as absolutely true, it is not the Tao or the rules of the universe; it is merely one way of interpreting the Tao and the rules. Once the Tao is articulated in words, it ceases to be the Tao itself and becomes merely an expression of the Tao based on the cognition of specific individuals. This is my understanding of Laozi's phrase, "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." The reason for starting this chapter with a reference to the Tao Te Ching is to establish a core premise: theories are mutable, while the Tao is inevitable and absolute. Thus, a theory is not the Tao. Intelligenism itself is a container for theories, so its manifestation is influenced by the collection of theories it contains. Consequently, the form of Intelligenism is mutable, which further echoes the theoretical premise in the "Path of Construction" section that Intelligenism itself is positioned as an intelligent agent.

Regarding the act of proposing a theory, the completion of this book proposes a theory. In the future, others may extend and interpret the theories and perspectives presented in this book and propose their own theories. It is also possible that someone, after partially agreeing with the book's perspectives, writes another book on Intelligenism, which would also be a form of proposing a theory. In summary, proposing a theory is not centralized. It is not the case that only extensions of the theory proposed by this book's author qualify as part of the Intelligenism framework. As mentioned earlier, Intelligenism is a theoretical container, and the theories in this book are merely one collection within that container. Although this book proposes the conceptual container of Intelligenism and provides some definitions, the overall theoretical core of Intelligenism is determined by the entire collection of theories within the Intelligenism container. Therefore, Intelligenism should allow different individuals to define it further, and any initiation of definitions or theoretical interpretations can be considered a proposal of a theory.

The means of proposing a theory are also diverse, achievable through various forms, including articles, books, videos, podcasts, and more. Thus, the starting point of the commercial ecosystem of Intelligenism is inevitably a distributed emergence of theories. Based on the understanding of Intelligenism's theoretical framework and the author's intentions, this book does not exclude new theoretical settings proposed by other individuals through different media. It can also be said that, while this book proposes Intelligenism, it is merely one neuron within the intelligent agent(intelligent network) of Intelligenism.

Part One: Ecological Conception of Intelligenism — Theoretical Differentiation

With the proposal of a theory, theoretical differentiation inevitably follows. Theoretical differentiation originates from a theoretical source, which can be understood as the trunk of a tree. In contrast, theoretical differentiation can be seen as the branching out (refinement and extension) from that trunk. It stems from the continuous deepening and extension of the trunk theory. When a theory extends to particular nodes, different individuals who agree on the same theoretical source may propose differing perspectives during the continued deduction, interpretation, and application of the theory, leading to theoretical differentiation. After differentiation occurs, theories can continue to extend and refine, potentially leading to further differentiation. In this process, the expansion of the theoretical tree exhibits a fractal expansion characteristic. Although new perspectives are continually proposed during theoretical differentiation, the overall process remains an extension within the same theoretical paradigm (refer to Thomas Kuhn's definition of paradigm).

Unlike theoretical differentiation, a theoretical proposal can be defined as the introduction of a source theory or a sub-theory under its extension. When more than one sub-theory emerges at a particular node of theoretical extension, that node is defined as theoretical differentiation. Thus, a theoretical proposal is not necessarily theoretical differentiation, but theoretical differentiation is always a form of theoretical proposal to some extent. Considering that a theoretical proposal can be defined as the emergence of a source theory, it follows that a theoretical proposal (trunk theory) must precede theoretical differentiation (the proposal of sub-theories).

With the proposal of the overall theoretical framework of Intelligenism in this book, different individuals will inevitably propose other perspectives based on their cognition and practical experience. When we define the form of theoretical proposal as distributed, these new perspectives and theories proposed by other individuals can be considered both a theoretical differentiation of this book's theory and a theoretical proposal within the Intelligenism container. The definitions of theoretical proposal and theoretical differentiation overlap; some theories are both products of differentiation from a source theory and can simultaneously be defined as theoretical proposals.

In any case, theoretical proposals and differentiation inevitably stem from discussion and critique of existing source theories. When various theories emerge through different media, discussions and critiques based on the proposed theories will follow, leading to theoretical differentiation and the proposal of new theories. Returning to the ecological construction of the Intelligenism conceptual theory, this chapter needs to provide a foundational conception of the theoretical ecosystem of Intelligenism. Its theoretical manifestations will inevitably take various forms, such as books or blogs. Considering that the foundation of theoretical differentiation is discussion, questioning, and critique, its carriers can include forums, multiple forums, podcast comment sections, or communication mailboxes provided in books, among other forms. While these carriers may seem commonplace to people today, it is still necessary to emphasize their essential role as the foundation for theoretical differentiation. This means that the theoretical ecosystem of Intelligenism must encourage the use of different carriers as fertile ground for the evolution of its theories.

Given that theoretical differentiation (theoretical extension) is a necessary step in the process of constructing the Intelligent Consortium, theoretical proposers need to seek suitable communication platforms to promote and achieve theoretical differentiation. Moreover, the discussion platforms for promoting theoretical differentiation are themselves products of the organizational network of the Intelligent Consortium. It is foreseeable that in the early stages of Intelligenism, the functions of the Intelligent Consortium's organizational network can also be positioned to provide services for the organizational construction of other, or even its own, Intelligent Consortiums. While I acknowledge that platforms for theoretical differentiation should exhibit multi-point emergence, decentralization, and distributed characteristics, the information aggregation function of communication platforms remains essential, as the collision of information can drive further theoretical differentiation and the proposal of new theories.

Under the settings of Intelligenism regarding theoretical proposal and differentiation, if theoretical proposers (including the author) aim to build an Intelligent Consortium based on their own theories, they should consider providing sufficiently open discussion platforms (such as comment sections, forums, communication mailboxes, or even live debates). They could further share perspectives from other discussion platforms on their own platforms to increase the volume of information, thereby promoting the differentiation of their own theories and the optimization and reconstruction of existing theories.

Theoretical System and Differentiation Form of This Book

Taking the theoretical system of this book as an example, it is undeniable that most readers will neither fully agree nor entirely disagree with its content. Suppose we view the content of this book as a theoretical tree, as the author. In that case, I have merely made choices at each decision node during the theoretical deduction process (starting from the source trunk) based on the theoretical directions I endorse. Suppose the theoretical tree of this book has 26 theoretical branching nodes from A to Z, starting from the source point 0. Readers may hold different views or propose alternative theories at specific nodes. The specification of 26 nodes does not imply that the theoretical tree has a fixed number of branching nodes; any theoretical system can be divided into different numbers of differentiation nodes using various methods. The 26 nodes here are merely a hypothetical example. Suppose a reader disagrees with the book's view at node X and proposes an X' theory, subsequently deriving Y' and Z' theoretical outcomes based on X'. In that case, it can be said that the theoretical system of this book begins to exhibit theoretical differentiation at node X. In my theoretical framework, the X'Y'Z' theoretical differentiation should be encouraged, and I will consider providing platforms for expression and discussion of such differentiations in the future, rather than suppressing or forcibly persuading against them.

Non-Binary Nature of Theoretical Paths and Theoretical Differentiation

A brief introduction to multi-factor strategy development: Multi-factor strategy development is a type of quantitative stock selection strategy. It involves identifying filtering conditions with positive value for stock selection from fundamental, technical, or other perspectives. By stacking multiple filtering conditions, the excess return potential of each condition is compounded. In the industry, these filtering conditions are referred to as factors, and this investment strategy development path is known as the "multi-factor stock selection strategy."

During the development of my multi-factor investment strategies in the past, I found that some factors, when used independently, did not exhibit a significant excess return value. However, in specific strategy directions, they performed exceptionally well. For example, when a factor combination leaned toward a momentum strategy, incorporating a filter for the top 20% quantile of stock price increases over the past six months could improve backtest performance. However, applying the same filter in a value strategy would degrade backtest performance. Similarly, using the lowest 20% quantile of the price-to-book (P/B) ratio as a screening factor could significantly benefit a multi-factor combination that leans toward value investment strategies. Still, it would have a negative impact when applied to a momentum strategy combination.

It must be acknowledged that both value investment and momentum strategies have long-term application value in both theory and practice. However, the filtering factors that should be applied based on their respective theoretical underpinnings differ or even contradict each other. This demonstrates that two completely opposing factor filters can provide positive value under different theoretical paths.

Based on the above experience in investment strategy development, it is clear that theoretical paths are not binary oppositions; two conflicting theoretical systems may both have positive value. Some operations or perspectives that are valuable in theoretical system A may have no value in system B. This means that when observing and understanding theoretical differentiation, observers and commentators should not make simplistic binary judgments (e.g., assuming that because path A is correct, path B is incorrect). Moreover, behaviors or perspectives should not be entirely dismissed just because they lack value in a particular path. This also highlights that the adaptability of a theory is more practically significant than its truthfulness.

Part One: The Ecological Vision of Intelligenism — Formation of Consensus

Derivation Based on Theoretical Differentiation

Based on the definition of differentiation characteristics in the theoretical extension discussed previously, as the source theory continues to extend, when the paths of extension and subdivision become sufficiently long, various theoretical forms will inevitably emerge. Although these theories may trace back to a common main thread when examined from their origin, differences, whether large or small, will inevitably exist among the theories accepted or proposed by individuals under the influence of different environments and cognitive frameworks. When a theory proposer or other individuals intentionally construct an organization based on a specific theoretical system, it becomes necessary to establish a mechanism to coordinate the theoretical differences among potential members of the organization.

Characteristics and Design of Consensus

Based on the definition of organizational consensus in the chapter "Organizational Design of Intelligenism," consensus is not a unified viewpoint or theory that different individuals fully agree upon, but rather a temporary conclusion or solution acceptable to different individuals, derived through the coordination of diverse theoretical perspectives. Only by establishing a coordination mechanism capable of accommodating different theories can an organization be constructed and achieve

long-term sustainable development, even in the presence of theoretical differentiation or opposition. This mechanism for coordinating different theories is referred to as a consensus-building mechanism. These mechanisms are not static; as the organization forms and develops, the consensus must be adjusted and expanded based on the organization's real-world scenarios and operational conditions. Moreover, the rules for adjusting and expanding the consensus-building mechanisms should also be part of the original consensus. In simple terms, the consensus-building mechanisms themselves are a consensus derived from an earlier consensus-building mechanism under coordination.

While the fundamental role of consensus-building mechanisms is to enable a group (before it becomes an organization) or an organization to function normally while preserving diverse theories and viewpoints, excellent consensus-building mechanisms can assist communities and organizations in exploring optimal solutions despite theoretical differentiation and conflicting viewpoints.

For example, consider a small group of five individuals (A, B, C, D, E) planning a group dinner. Their preferences are as follows: A prefers Western cuisine, B prefers barbecue, C prefers beef hotpot, D avoids pork, and E loves spicy food. The group could adopt a consensus-building mechanism, such as prioritizing A's preference for Western cuisine because it is A's birthday, or they could vote on each person's suggestion, or use a random draw based on a specific rule. While all consensus-building mechanisms can lead to a temporary consensus that allows the dinner to proceed without significant conflict, different mechanisms will result in varying levels of organizational approval (refer to the definition of organizational approval and organizational approval degree in Organizational Design of Intelligenism). Therefore, superior consensus-building mechanisms not only ensure the dinner proceeds smoothly despite differing preferences but also enhance the group's sense of organizational approval and satisfaction.

When forming a consensus through consensus-building mechanisms and selecting theories or action plans, the non-binary nature of theories should also be considered. This means that consensus-building mechanisms can not only select a single option from multiple theories or action plans but also maximize the positive value of multiple theories or action plans through methods like subgroup division. Consensus-building mechanisms should be both scientific and creative, incorporating artistic elements. For instance, in the dinner example, the consensus-building mechanism could result in a consensus where the five individuals dine separately or in smaller groups according to their preferences, then reconvene at a KTV or bar to enrich the overall experience, achieving the ultimate goal of strengthening friendships through the group activity while accommodating everyone's dining preferences.

From this example, it is clear that forming an initial consensus within an organization is often just the beginning of the task, not the end. Communities, groups, and

organizations often need to continuously refine their consensus through discussion, adjustment, and expansion in various scenarios. During this process, individuals must focus not only on tools for achieving consensus (e.g., discussions, voting, third-party suggestions) but also on process design, the evaluation of the effectiveness of consensus-building processes (e.g., participant feedback, third-party evaluations, complaint mechanisms), and iterative mechanisms based on feedback. These are all modules that consensus-building mechanisms must encompass.

Consensus and the Intelligent Consortium

As an overarching organizational network, the Intelligent Consortium likely contains numerous sub-organizational networks. Both the organizational network itself and its sub-networks require the construction of diverse consensus-building mechanisms to drive network actions. Consensus-building mechanisms serve as the driving mode for the nodes within the Intelligent Consortium organizational network. At the same time, the consensus is the decision-making conclusion (output theories, viewpoints, conclusions, and action plans) derived from the collective action of multiple driving nodes (akin to neurons). This is why, within the framework of Intelligenism, establishing key consensus-building mechanisms should precede the organizational design of the Intelligent Consortium. Only when the initial consensus-building mechanisms are established can the drive from theory to organization truly begin. In some scenarios, the driving role and significance of potential organizational individuals may dissipate before the Intelligent Consortium is successfully constructed if the organization fails to form.

Consensus and Intelligence

When reading works and articles on intelligence, a classic question often arises: Can a robot create another robot? This question reminds me of another classic dilemma: Which came first, the chicken or the egg? In Douglas Hofstadter's *Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid*, this paradox or dilemma is frequently and subtly expressed. If we define the Intelligent Consortium as an intelligent agent, we may face a similar dilemma in creating an Intelligent Consortium using an Intelligent Consortium. This requires answering the question: Where does the origin of an intelligent network begin? To address this dilemma, individuals must step outside the framework of the Intelligent Consortium and create pre-existing rules and settings from a higher perspective to enable the construction of the Intelligent Consortium. However, when we view the entire process of generating and iterating consensus-building mechanisms as a more fundamental intelligent agent, we face the same dilemma of how to create consensus-building mechanisms (intelligence) using consensus-building mechanisms. In this scenario, the initiating individual must step outside the framework of consensus-building mechanisms to establish a starting point (an original consensus-building mechanism), which I refer to as the "meta-consensus

mechanism.” The meta-consensus mechanism originates from the theoretical output of the initiating individual as an intelligent agent, meaning the organization’s initiator must create the “first egg.” From this premise, when I define the theoretical collection within the conceptual container of Intelligenism as an intelligent agent (refer to the Construction Path subsection), it is essentially a form of consensus-building mechanism with the potential for discussion, critique, and iteration. As the author, I am merely creating the first egg.

Structure of Consensus-Building Mechanisms

Content of Consensus-Building Mechanisms

The content of consensus-building mechanisms refers to all the elements that organizational individuals need to apply during the consensus-building process. Before designing consensus-building mechanisms, the initiator must have a clear understanding of the required content. Subsequently, the initiator can establish the content framework for the consensus-building mechanisms and convert it into a directory, then gradually fill in the content to complete the initial construction of the consensus-building mechanisms.

The content framework of consensus-building mechanisms itself is part of the mechanisms and must be completed before the detailed content is confirmed. Additionally, the content framework should be published as part of the consensus-building mechanisms before content filling. It should be subject to discussion, critique, and adjustment to reach a consensus with other potential organizational individuals.

In the "Structure of Consensus-Building Mechanisms" section, starting from the "Content of Consensus-Building Mechanisms" and continuing through subsequent subsections, I provide an initial content template based on my understanding of consensus-building mechanisms. This initial template may not encompass all the content necessary for consensus-building mechanisms in practical scenarios, allowing readers and future practitioners to refine and expand it further. Any additions or adjustments to the content of consensus-building mechanisms can be attempted, with all settings based on the initiator’s and subsequent discussants’ understanding of Intelligenism theory, personal cognition, and real-world environmental needs. As the organization gradually forms and operates, the nodes and sub-networks of the organizational network will increase, requiring substantial additional content in consensus-building mechanisms to support network structure, node distribution, and sub-network management. Thus, in a normally functioning Intelligent Consortium, the types and scope of consensus-building mechanisms will be complex, some of which will be introduced in subsequent chapters on organizational construction. However, I cannot list all possible content for consensus-building mechanisms, and more

personalized content will require continuous refinement by organizational individuals and other participants.

Objectives of Consensus-Building Mechanisms

The objectives of consensus-building mechanisms (referred to as mechanism objectives) are the primary elements that must be clarified when designing consensus-building mechanisms and serve as the foundation for their smooth operation. In the group dinner example, because the mechanism's objective was to strengthen friendships through a group activity, the final output of the consensus-building mechanisms could allow individuals to dine according to their preferences and then participate in additional activities to achieve the goal of enhancing friendships. However, if the objective of the mechanism were to evaluate a restaurant's dishes for a food critique media program, the consensus of dining separately would not achieve this goal. In this case, a random selection mechanism to choose the restaurant would be more appropriate.

Before constructing complete consensus-building mechanisms, the initiator can publish the development goals of the Intelligent Consortium and the overall mechanism objectives (here, the overall consensus-building mechanisms refer to those of the entire organization, not those of sub-networks). For instance, an initiator might propose a mechanism objective to explore the establishment and operation of an open-air barbecue campsite through the Intelligent Consortium. Unlike editing Wikipedia entries, this initiator needs to publish consensus-building mechanisms to provide a business plan that all potential organizational individuals can refine collaboratively. This business plan, at least initially, revolves around the mechanism objective of establishing and operating the campsite, though the mechanism objective itself may evolve through discussion and critique. Similarly, as the author, I could publish consensus-building mechanisms with the mechanism objective of exploring the establishment of a platform to assist various publishers (including myself) in publishing consensus-building mechanisms. On this platform, the content of consensus-building mechanisms and organizational development goals can be discussed and refined, with the platform providing tools such as voting systems and discussion forums to facilitate consensus-building and iterative improvement. In my current vision, while the theoretical origin of the Intelligent Consortium stems from Intelligenism, its construction begins with establishing initial consensus-building mechanisms, which are developed and refined around the mechanism objectives. Thus, the starting point of the Intelligent Consortium is the mechanism objectives, which also serve as the initiator's starting point for organizational construction.

Before constructing an organization, the organizational development goals must be established, and when publishing consensus-building mechanisms, the corresponding objectives of these mechanisms must be clarified. However, organizational

development goals differ from mechanism objectives: the former reflect the purpose of constructing the Intelligent Consortium, while the latter specify the group behavioral purpose needed to achieve group consensus through consensus-building mechanisms. Within an organization, there is typically only one organizational development goal; however, different sub-networks and action phases may have distinct sub-level consensus-building mechanisms, leading to non-unique objectives for these mechanisms. From the perspective of the organization's overall consensus-building mechanisms framework, the mechanism objectives align with the organizational development goals. Still, the sub-level consensus-building mechanisms of sub-networks and action phases may not align with the organizational goals.

As mentioned earlier, both consensus and consensus-building mechanisms are not static, and the objectives of these mechanisms also require continuous review and evaluation by the group or organization. In reality, as external environments change, groups and organizations should continually assess and evaluate the ultimate goals of the organizational network in light of its current state.

Consensus Population

The consensus population refers to the individuals covered by the initiator's and later organizational consensus-building mechanisms. The consensus population is not fixed; in the early stages of consensus publication, it may consist of browsers interested in the proposed consensus with only a vague understanding of the initiator's intentions and plans. As approval expands and consensus-building mechanisms are refined, the initiator may deem it necessary to plan organizational construction, requiring the attraction and screening of potential organizational individuals. These individuals may assume various roles in the future organization, such as capital providers, consumers, or labor providers, and may belong to one or more types of organizational individuals. This means the consensus population must be identified, treated differently, and assigned varying weights of driving influence (refer to the definition of Driving Influence (A) in the Driving, Action, and Mobilization section of On the Intelligent Consortium). Managing information about the consensus population is also critical, such as their history of participation in other Intelligent Consortium developments, their understanding of Intelligenism, and their discussion records in other organizations' consensus-building mechanisms.

Beyond identifying the consensus population in the early stages of consensus-building mechanisms (before organization formation), the mechanisms must further refine processes and settings to distinguish the population, manage discussion opinions, and establish voting schemes before the organization is formed. While consensus-building mechanisms initially involve an initiator, the Intelligent Consortium under the Intelligenism framework has a strong co-governance character. As consensus-building mechanisms attract more attention and discussion, the initiator's influence will

inevitably be diluted, a process that continues during the construction and operation of the Intelligent Consortium.

Relationship Between Theory and Consensus-Building Mechanisms

It must first be clarified that, while consensus-building mechanisms include an initiating objective, their content does not encompass the proposed theory itself. Consensus-building mechanisms address how to propose a series of theories around the initiating objective and how to discuss, evaluate, and select from this theoretical collection. For example, in the restaurant selection scenario, the mechanism's objective is to enhance group cohesion through a dining activity; however, the consensus-building mechanisms do not include potential dining options (e.g., Western cuisine, Chinese cuisine, or barbecue). Here, consensus-building mechanisms function like a computer program, with dining options serving as input values that are processed to produce an output value. While discussing a computer program, the characteristics of input values are considered, but the focus remains on the program's structure, processes, and operational form. However, when the output of consensus-building mechanism A is consensus-building mechanism B, the latter is considered a sub-level consensus-building mechanism of A. In this scenario, while consensus-building mechanism A's content does not include the theory itself, consensus-building mechanism B (the sub-level mechanism) can be seen as a product of the theory. When viewed from the perspective of consensus-building mechanism A, B is regarded as the output consensus. Thus, discussions at the level of consensus-building mechanism A still maintain that its content does not include the proposed theory itself (echoing the definition at the start of this section).

The definition of a theory here is broad, encompassing perspectives on specific matters, solutions to particular issues, values, adjustments to consensus-building mechanisms, or even disclosures of misconduct by the individuals within the Intelligent Consortium. Therefore, the input values for consensus-building mechanisms can be diverse and based on real-world scenario needs, with anything requiring consensus potentially included as an input item.

Defining Input and Output Values (New Consensus)

In a mature or potential organization with an extensive consensus system, each sub-network or decision-making unit within the main network may face decision-making scenarios arising from differing individual viewpoints, leading to the creation of diverse sub-level consensus-building mechanisms. Thus, when initiating a main network consensus-building mechanism, the decision-making scenarios under its mechanism objectives must be identified, and corresponding input and output value forms for sub-level consensus-building mechanisms must be determined. As mentioned earlier, the definition of output theories is extensive, and the input form

depends on the decision-making scenario. Some scenarios may require not only the input item's form but also supporting information, appendices, or data. For reference, consider Wikipedia's editing scenario, where editing a page requires attaching source references to support the edit's perspective or description.

After consensus-building mechanisms receive input values and complete processing, the form and content of the output values must also be specified, potentially including conclusions, single-choice results, reasons for the outcome, or disclosure methods, among other specially designated content elements.

The settings for consensus-building mechanisms in this chapter also include the input and output value settings mentioned in this section. Thus, the settings in Defining Input and Output Values can also serve as input values for a decision-making scenario's consensus-building mechanism, producing an iterated, "optimized" version of the input and output value settings. In some scenarios, input values can be past consensus processed through consensus-building mechanisms, allowing old consensus to be reprocessed to generate new ones, a common form of continuous consensus iteration.

Rules and Guidelines for Consensus-Building Mechanisms

Consensus rules and guidelines primarily refer to the execution requirements for sub-level consensus-building mechanisms in different decision-making scenarios, including execution methods, rules to follow, and operational guidelines. These rules and guidelines form the core of consensus-building mechanisms, determining the operational process and ensuring smooth operation among organizational individuals with differing theories, ideas, and viewpoints. This is akin to the body of a function in computer programming, responsible for processing input values to produce output values.

If a consensus-building mechanism involves voting, its rules and guidelines should encompass the entire voting process, including precautions and penalties for cheating. If it involves discussion, the rules and guidelines may include requirements for the format and length of statements, measures to prevent spam, and penalties for rule violations.

At the outset of establishing consensus rules and guidelines, their content must achieve consensus among organizational individuals. During the organization's subsequent development, rules and guidelines should undergo periodic consensus iteration or iteration triggered by specific mechanisms to ensure adaptability to different organizational stages or external environments.

The content covered by rules and guidelines may include:

1. **Operational Processes:** Regardless of the consensus tools used (e.g., voting, discussion), the corresponding tool's process must be confirmed.
2. **Recommendations:** During the process, non-mandatory suggestions can be provided to organizational individuals to guide participation in ways that benefit the organization and consensus-building.
3. **Prohibited Actions:** These are explicitly forbidden behaviors, such as election fraud, insulting other individuals during discussions, or malicious spamming.
4. **Penalty Mechanisms:** For individuals engaging in prohibited actions, clear penalty systems must ensure the normal operation of consensus-building mechanisms (see Execution, Supervision, and Information Disclosure for further details).
5. **Other Settings:** Given the diverse consensus-building mechanisms in an Intelligent Consortium network, organizational individuals can optimize or expand rule and guideline modules to suit real-world scenarios. For instance, a consensus-building mechanism involving appointments may require additional processes beyond voting or discussion, necessitating content beyond general rules and guidelines. For non-general modules not considered by the author, organizational individuals can add or refine them after reaching consensus.

Execution, Supervision, and Information Disclosure

Once consensus-building mechanisms are published, organizational individuals or other consensus participants engage in consensus operation according to consensus rules and guidelines. During operation, some individuals may deviate from these requirements or conceal actions that negatively impact the consensus mechanism or organizational network. Therefore, consensus-building mechanisms should include supervision schemes for individual behaviors under the framework of consensus rules and guidelines, along with clear penalty clauses for violations.

In the Intelligent Consortium, as it operates along consensus-building mechanisms, supervision of individual drives and actions comes not only from specific individuals but also from the fractal diffusion of information generated by network action nodes at various levels, allowing all organizational individuals to evaluate or supervise through information dissemination. Information generated during the operation of consensus-building mechanisms is typically public and transparent, with its disclosure form also specified and agreed upon in the execution and supervision module.

Publication of Consensus-Building Mechanisms

The publication of consensus-building mechanisms differs from the publication of output values (consensus publication). Output value publication refers to the external

release of results (new consensus) following the processing of input values (theories) through consensus-building mechanisms. In contrast, consensus-building mechanism publication involves publicly announcing the overall mechanism so that participants or organizational individuals can process input items to reach a consensus (output theory). However, as mentioned earlier, consensus-building mechanisms can also serve as input theories for higher-level mechanisms. In such cases, consensus-building mechanisms undergo a process of input, processing, and output to achieve optimization and iteration. Thus, consensus-building mechanism publication can be considered a specific type of consensus output presentation, though not all consensus output presentations are consensus-building mechanism publications.

The settings for consensus-building mechanism publication should cover the mechanism's publication form, timing intervals, replacement systems for old mechanisms upon new publications, and publication channels. The form and content of the consensus-building mechanism publication can also be optimized and iterated as input content. At different organizational stages, publication forms may vary, including but not limited to third-party platforms, self-operated official platforms, video, documents, or live Q&A sessions via on-site or online broadcasts.

Cycling and Iteration

According to the basic settings of this chapter, the input value–consensus–building mechanism–new consensus process does not conclude once the output value is confirmed. The process should exhibit continuous optimization and iteration. Whether the input values are viewpoints, theories, specific consensus-building mechanisms, or past consensus, once the **input value > consensus-building mechanism > new consensus** process is established, it should ultimately form a cyclical structure to enable continuous optimization and iteration of input values. In this cycle, past consensus can re-enter the consensus-building mechanism as input values for reprocessing, transforming into an **old consensus > consensus building mechanism > new consensus** cycle.

During continuous cycling and iteration, consensus-building mechanisms must specify when old consensus values should be re-entered as input values for reprocessing. For example, a consensus processed through a consensus-building mechanism may require reprocessing if over 60% of the consensus population objects, triggering rediscussion or revoting according to the mechanism's rules and guidelines. In this case, the objection by over 60% of the consensus population is the trigger condition. Different consensus-building mechanisms should include varying conditions for overturning or re-establishing consensus, determined by the mechanism's design intent, objectives, and rules. Since consensus-building mechanisms can also be overturned as consensus under certain conditions, their principles can refer to the Structure of Consensus-Building Mechanisms section:

Consensus-building mechanism B, as a sub-level mechanism of A, is a consensus reached through A's process. When B needs to be overturned, the initiator can include trigger clauses in B's content, allowing B to re-enter A as an input item for re-consensus upon meeting the trigger condition. Alternatively, A can set a re-consensus trigger mechanism for B, reprocessing B as an old consensus when triggered. Overall, consensus-building mechanism B can include rules and guidelines for triggering cyclical iteration to enable continuous adjustment. These may also include exemptions for not reprocessing old consensus after new mechanisms are formed.

In reality, some consensus may not require or allow cycling and iteration. For instance, in the dinner scenario, the dining consensus triggers a one-time action. Once the action (dinner) concludes, the consensus reached through the consensus-building mechanism is fully completed. However, if the dinner consensus-building mechanism includes a clause stating that the consensus must be reprocessed if over 60% of the group objects within five minutes, the consensus may still undergo cycling and iteration until a final consensus is reached that cannot be overturned within that time frame(5 minutes).

Consensus Expansion

Initially, there is no consensus among individuals when a theory is proposed. As external individuals recognize the theory, approval begins to expand. However, theoretical differentiation and opposition may prevent the transformation of a theory into an organization due to a limited degree of organizational approval (refer to the Organizational Approval and Organizational Approval Degree section in Organizational Design of Intelligenism). Given that the Intelligent Consortium is a bottom-up network structure, its construction relies heavily on the spontaneous participation of potential organizational individuals. Only when individuals' organizational approval degree for certain theories (consensuses) or consensus-building mechanisms reaches a certain threshold can the Intelligent Consortium based on these theories or mechanisms gradually form.

Consensus expansion manifests in two primary forms:

- 1. Increasing the Number of Individuals Covered by Theoretical Consensus:** *The number of individuals agreeing with a consensus grows.*
- 2. Expanding the Scope of Topics and Application Scenarios:** *As theories (or consensus-building mechanisms or other elements) of the organization are refined, they cover more topics and scenarios, leading to the creation of more sub-networks within the Intelligent Consortium. More sub-networks necessitate additional consensus-building mechanisms, a necessary step in the evolution from theory to organization.*

For the progress of consensus expansion in the first form, initiators and subsequent groups must track the number of individuals in the consensus population, monitor expansion progress, and develop plans for continued expansion. For the second form, consensus-building mechanisms should provide a planning log for future expansion directions during initiation. This log, akin to update notes for games or software (detailing update directions), serves as a showcase for the development direction of consensus-building mechanisms. The corresponding consensus expansion plan must also achieve consensus through consensus-building mechanisms before implementation. Additionally, the planning log should outline potential setup ideas for future sub-level consensus-building mechanisms, which can then be processed as input values to facilitate consensus.

Nested Features of Consensus-Building Mechanisms

In the organizational structure of the Intelligent Consortium, various consensus-building mechanisms inevitably exist. Whether in organizational templates, action templates, or action nodes within sub-networks, decisions or executions must form network consensus within the corresponding network (the essence of driving and action is achieved through consensus formation). As mentioned in the “Nested Relationships of the Intelligent Network” section of *On the Intelligent Consortium*, “the Intelligent Consortium organizational network contains numerous nested sub-networks,” which also have complete driving/action node structures. These sub-networks’ nodes must form consensus with the driving nodes of larger networks as their action nodes, creating nested relationships akin to the network structure in both the overall Intelligent Consortium and its microscopic sub-networks.

As the overall consensus-building mechanisms are refined to form the Intelligent Consortium, they must include a consensus-building mechanism based on the organizational template, thereby achieving organizational consensus on the content of the rules among potential organizational individuals. This organizational consensus (organizational template) will make general arrangements for the network structure of the action template and the required consensus-building mechanisms. The consensus-building mechanisms for the overall action template network, sub-networks, and their driving/execution nodes must adhere to the rules set by the organizational template’s existing consensus-building mechanisms and latest consensus, enabling the organizational template to drive the operation of the action template’s organizational network.

Summary

The construction of consensus and consensus-building mechanisms holds a significant position in the development process of the Intelligent Consortium. Their establishment and operation mark the substantive beginning of the Intelligent

Consortium's construction. As a bottom-up, semi-autonomous organizational network, its operation relies on consensus among organizational individuals, with a rigorous and robust consensus system forming the foundation of the Intelligent Consortium.

Given that this construction process is rare in traditional top-down organizations, many people may find consensus and its operational mechanisms unfamiliar, with consensus structures and expansion models resembling the complexity and wonder of a jungle ecosystem. Just as it is difficult to imagine how a remote village or a small grove with a few trees could evolve into an international metropolis or a thriving forest ecosystem over time, practitioners must engage in more exploration and experimentation when building organizations and corresponding consensus-building mechanisms in the early stages of theoretical development.

To help readers further understand consensus and consensus-building mechanisms, the following cases are provided:

1. Wikipedia's Consensus Framework: Readers can explore Wikipedia's consensus content by searching for "consensus" on the platform. Wikipedia's consensus-building mechanisms for editing entries closely resemble the vision outlined in this book, and I speculate that certain scenarios for consensus-building mechanisms can be likened to transforming Wikipedia's entry editing into collaborative editing of business plans or organizational network institutions. Readers can draw inspiration from Wikipedia's consensus-building mechanisms, which align with the book's vision.

2. Consensus Mechanisms in Cryptocurrency Projects: Some cryptocurrency and smart contract projects provide insights into consensus mechanisms, though not all have robust systems.

3. Larry Dressler's Consensus Decision-Making: This book introduces tools for consensus-building mechanisms. However, its application is primarily for traditional top-down commercial organizations, which differ from the collaborative scenarios proposed in this book for the Intelligent Consortium, so it cannot be directly applied. Nonetheless, it can deepen readers' partial understanding of consensus and consensus-building mechanisms and provide insights into their application in traditional organizations.

Vision of the Final Form

As mentioned in the Wikipedia case, my envisioned form of consensus-building mechanisms closely resembles Wikipedia's mechanisms for editing entries.

However, in the context of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium, the “editing” objectives focus on:

- 1. Re-editing the theoretical system of this book.*
- 2. Collaborative editing of business plans derived from Intelligenism concepts.*
- 3. Collaborative editing of the operational institutions (consensus-building mechanisms) of the Intelligent Consortium based on business plans.*

I hope that through a Wikipedia-like collaborative editing model or other consensus-building mechanisms, we can achieve outputs that balance content rationality and enhance the group's organizational approval degree. When content coverage and organizational approval degree reach the threshold required for organizational construction, the consensus-building mechanisms can serve as the operational framework for the Intelligent Consortium organizational network.

Part 1: Ecological Vision of Intelligenism - Expansion of approval

Continuing the Discussion on Consensus and Approval

Following the previous discussion on consensus and consensus-building mechanisms, this section will focus on the concept of approval. Unlike the explicit operational process of constructing consensus-building mechanisms outlined earlier, expansion of approval is not a distinct process but rather a byproduct that coexists with the construction and formation of consensus. During the process of constructing and forming consensus, initiators, group members, and organizational individuals must not only refine the details of organizational structure and operations but also guide potential organizational individuals toward a state of high approval. Sufficiently high approval is a necessary condition for transforming ideas and consensus into organizational development. Within my theoretical framework of Intelligenism for constructing the Intelligent Consortium, expansion of approval is one of the primary objectives of consensus-building mechanisms and consensus formation. It can be said that, before the organization is fully constructed, the iterative optimization of consensus-building mechanisms and consensus formation aims to achieve organizational construction by continuously expanding approval among potential organizational individuals.

In this section, I will revisit the definition and significance of approval, propose methods to evaluate the expansion of approval with the goal of achieving organizational construction, and explore how consensus-building mechanisms can evolve into an organization under a sufficiently high state of approval.

Revisiting Organizational approval and Mobilization

Based on the settings in the section "Organizational approval and Mobilization Efficiency" from the chapter "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism," it can be inferred that organizational approval is positively correlated with mobilization efficiency. According to the section "The Origin of Organizations" from the same chapter, an organization is a collection of individuals formed to achieve their individual goals. approval typically reflects an individual's subjective evaluation of an organization's ability to fulfill their goals. Higher approval generally indicates a stronger belief that the organization is likely to achieve the individual's predefined goals. This higher expectation of goal fulfillment translates into individuals being more willing to form a rights conversion relationship with the organization (i.e., being mobilized). This inference forms a logical closed loop among approval, mobilization, and individual goals, which is why I consider expansion of approval a core objective of consensus-building.

Definition and Potential Strategies for Expansion of approval

Before planning for the goal of expansion of approval, it is necessary to clearly define it. I break down this main goal into two sub-goals:

Sub-goal 1: *Increase the approval degree of each potential organizational individual (refer to the section "Organizational approval and approval Degree" in the chapter "Organizational Settings of Intelligenism" for the definition of approval degree).*

Sub-goal 2: *Expand the number of individuals covered by theoretical approval.*

Sub-goal 1: Increasing Individual approval Degree

Sub-goal 1 focuses on the approval degree of individual organizational members toward the theory, mechanisms, and consensus, with the approval degree defined within the range (0,1), where 0 indicates complete non-approval, 1 indicates complete approval, and values between 0 and 1 reflect partial approval. Based on the settings in this book, higher individual approval degrees imply a higher probability of mobilization or lower mobilization costs. However, this does not mean that individuals with near-zero approval can be mobilized by significantly increasing mobilization costs, as low approval is often accompanied by greater distrust in the theory or mechanisms. This distrust may lead potential organizational individuals to lack confidence in the initiator, the mobilizing organization, or the promised returns. It is more likely that mobilization can only be triggered after approval reaches a certain threshold. Furthermore, mobilization begins to exhibit positive economic value (sufficiently low mobilization costs) only when approval reaches an even higher

threshold.

Based on the section "Organizational approval and approval Degree," approval degrees cannot be precisely measured. However, initiators of consensus-building mechanisms and subsequent potential organizational participants should still monitor approval degrees and their thresholds. They should continuously assess changes in participants' approval through methods such as likes on mechanisms, critical comments, voting approval rates, and follow-up interactions during the process of refining consensus-building mechanisms and forming consensus. Considering the threshold factor, groups must ensure that at least some individuals reach or exceed the approval threshold required to trigger mobilization or achieve positive economic value from mobilization. If polarization is observed during consensus formation, it may be necessary to adopt group splitting or other innovative approaches to ensure a sufficient number of individuals maintain approval above the target threshold, rather than retaining all individuals at a low approval level below the target threshold.

For examples of group splitting, please refer to the 2016 Ethereum hard fork event, which was triggered by the vulnerability in the DAO contract. Sometimes, hard forks or group splitting should be considered within consensus-building mechanisms to ensure a sufficiently high proportion of organizational individuals maintain approval degrees at or above the threshold. Group splitting also aligns with the concept of organizational disengagement (see the section "Concept of Organizational Disengagement of Individuals" in "On the Intelligent Consortium" and the section "Competition and Theoretical Belief Disengagement" in the "Philosophy of Intelligenism"). Unlike individual organizational disengagement, group splitting is a large-scale, organized, and premeditated disengagement of multiple individuals under the framework of consensus-building mechanisms. It is also an inevitable form of organizational evolution under theoretical differentiation. In traditional commercial organizations, if members hold irreconcilable operational philosophies, rather than allowing internal conflicts to persist, it may be better to restructure the original company into a parent company with subsidiaries. This allows different ideological groups to operate independently under their preferred philosophies, reducing internal conflicts and improving operational efficiency. Given the non-binary nature of theories (where different theories can simultaneously hold positive value), splitting a group into subgroups may balance approval degrees while preserving the diverse positive effects of different applied theories.

Sub-goal 2: Expanding the Number of Individuals with Theoretical approval

Unlike Sub-goal 1, which focuses on increasing individual approval degrees, Sub-goal 2 aims to increase the number of individuals who recognize the theory. For consensus-building mechanisms, theories (including business plans or other consensus-driven content), and development plans, initiators and early participants need to assess the current number of recognized individuals and set an expected upper

limit based on the organization's developmental needs. They must also establish corresponding rules and plans for this limit, which should be included as inputs in the consensus-building mechanisms to achieve consensus within the group or organization.

To increase the number of recognized individuals within the expected upper limit, potential organizations or groups may need to maintain or gradually increase the approval degrees of existing individuals while attempting to expand the theory's exposure. This may involve promoting the theory across different media and channels, inviting more individuals to participate in constructing and applying consensus-building mechanisms (including discussions, voting, etc., as part of the mechanisms).

During the planning and management of these sub-goals, Sub-goal 1 and Sub-goal 2 cannot substitute for or complement each other. Even if a group performs exceptionally well in Sub-goal 2, if individual approval degrees are generally low and fail to reach the threshold for forming an organization or triggering mobilization at acceptable costs, the evolution from consensus to organizational construction will still fail. Conversely, suppose a group excels in Sub-goal 1 with high individual approval degrees but cannot expand the number of recognized individuals. In that case, it may still form an organization if the existing number meets the minimum requirement. However, such an organization may face challenges in future commercial development due to insufficient demand for its products or services.

Consensus Expansion and approval Expansion

Based on the settings for consensus expansion and approval expansion, it is clear that the two are not equivalent. Consensus expansion refers to the continuous increase in the scope of matters covered by consensus-building mechanisms and the matters requiring consensus within a group. Approval expansion, as mentioned, includes: 1) increasing approval degrees for specific individuals and 2) increasing the number of individuals covered by approval. However, as more matters achieve consensus, it does not necessarily mean individuals exhibit higher approval toward the organization, the overall consensus-building mechanisms, or all consensus-covered matters. For example, when consensus-building mechanisms cover only one scenario and achieve consensus, an individual may assign high approval (close to 1) to that scenario. However, if the mechanisms cover multiple scenarios requiring simultaneous consensus, and the individual assigns lower approval to other scenarios, their overall approval of the organization may decline. Similarly, when approval expansion results from an increase in the number of recognized individuals, it does not necessarily involve consensus expansion. Suppose the consensus scope remains unchanged and the number of recognized individuals stays constant. In that case, iterative optimization of consensus-building mechanisms can still lead to approval expansion

through increased individual approval degrees.

In the process from ideation and theory to organizational construction, consensus expansion is a necessary step. It is difficult to imagine that a consensus-building mechanism only covering a single viewpoint could directly form a complete organization without further consensus expansion, at least not in my vision for the Intelligent Consortium. However, in specific cases, some individuals may develop approval for a consensus-building mechanism, other individuals, or a potential group or organization based solely on consensus and approval in certain issues, leading to gradual consensus expansion and eventual organization formation. Regardless, achieving a sufficient number of potential organizational individuals with approval degrees reaching the threshold (critical point) by covering all necessary consensus scenarios for organizational construction is a prerequisite for forming the Intelligent Consortium.

Consensus Boundary and approval Boundary

As mentioned, consensus expansion does not necessarily lead to approval expansion. However, the process from theoretical proposal to organizational construction typically involves continuous expansion of consensus. As consensus-building mechanisms cover more content and a portion of the group (or organizational) individuals reach a mobilization threshold, the organization begins to form. However, consensus expansion is not boundless. When the total consensus content exceeds the capacity of the organizational network or individuals, a consensus boundary emerges. As the coverage of consensus-building mechanisms expands to a certain extent, there is a risk that the approval degrees of group or organizational individuals may peak and then decline. Excessive expansion of the approval boundary—whether through increasing the number of recognized individuals or pursuing higher approval degrees for a specific number of individuals—may suppress the process of consensus expansion once it reaches its limit. At this point, both the consensus boundary and the approval boundary emerge simultaneously. When these boundaries appear, the organization and its individuals must continuously optimize the internal structure and gradually address internal issues within the organizational network. At this stage, the Intelligent Consortium enters a slower process of gradually expanding consensus and approval compared to its initial construction phase.

Comparison of approval Formation Mechanisms: Intelligent Consortium vs. Traditional Organizations

Both the Intelligent Consortium and traditional commercial organizations involve individuals assigning varying forms of approval to the organization, allowing for evaluations of organizational approval degrees. However, the distinct organizational

forms of the Intelligent Consortium and traditional commercial organizations mean that the types of approval required during construction and operation differ. Below, I outline common approval types based on my understanding of both organizational forms and provide a brief analysis:

Traditional Commercial Organizations

1. **Founder or Founding Team approval:** This primarily refers to investors or other organizational individuals evaluating the founder or founding team's experience, education, achievements, professional capabilities, and character, and expressing approval of their overall profile. In traditional commercial organizations, approval of the founder or founding team plays a significant role in organizational formation.

2. **Business Plan approval:** Potential organizational individuals assess the organization's future business plans and strategies before joining and express approval. Although business plans may be adjusted or even significantly changed after a period of development, they remain a key consideration for some potential organizational individuals. They often believe that a rigorous and logical business plan is critical to judging the organization's future progress. Additionally, initiators often present detailed business plans when seeking capital providers.

3. **Approval of Business Opportunity Time Window (Timing):** The timing of a business opportunity, often referred to as an "**Opportunity Time Window**" by entrepreneurs, is another critical factor for potential organizational individuals before a traditional commercial organization is established. While the importance of timing may diminish over time, for products or services aimed at capturing market share or consumer attention, some business theories emphasize the critical role of timing.

The above three approval types typically apply to shareholders or capital providers, leading them to expect positive organizational development and believe their capital investment is likely to achieve their financial goals (investment returns).

1. **Approval of Organizational Compensation:** This refers to organizational individuals (typically employees) evaluating the compensation packages offered by the organization when joining. Compensation is often a primary consideration and plays a crucial role in the decision to join, even if it is not the most important factor.

2. **Approval of Organizational Sustainability:** The organization's ability to sustain operations is a key factor in ensuring compensation commitments are met. If sustainability is lacking, attractive compensation promises may fail to

materialize, resulting in losses for individuals. Thus, some individuals assess the organization's strength before joining, preferring stronger organizations. In the initial construction phase, due to limited historical data, approval of sustainability relies on approval of the business plan, business opportunity timing, and the founder or founding team. Thus, early employees must also evaluate these factors.

3. Approval of Management Mechanisms (Reasonable and Recognized Career Development Goals): Management mechanisms cover aspects like overtime policies, incentive structures, and promotion pathways. Beyond compensation and sustainability, employees consider the potential impact of management mechanisms. approval of these mechanisms is a key factor in their decision to join.

The above three approval types primarily apply to employee-type organizational individuals, who rely on the organization's operations for labor compensation, a core goal of theirs. Typically, labor-providing individuals have a higher dependency on the organization compared to other types.

1. approval of Products/Services: This stems from consumers' comprehensive evaluation of the organization's products or services based on quality, service level, after-sales terms, and pricing. This evaluation determines the final transaction decision, i.e., whether rights conversion occurs. In mobilizing consumer individuals, product/service approval plays a significant role.

2. approval of Organizational Sustainability (Including After-Sales): Beyond affecting labor-providing individuals, sustainability also influences consumer decisions. Since some products require ongoing service or after-sales support, and sustainability is a prerequisite for providing such support, consumers consider sustainability when evaluating products or services. Unlike capital or labor providers, consumers typically do not deeply analyze operational logic, financial data, or business models, but instead rely on superficial indicators such as office spaces, individual image, or promotional materials.

The above two approval types primarily apply to consumer-type organizational individuals, while the financial approval below applies to suppliers of raw materials or services. Although consumers and upstream suppliers are not considered members of traditional commercial organizations, they are included here under the Intelligenism framework's definition of organizational individuals.

1. Financial approval (Ability to Complete Payment Settlement): This applies to suppliers of goods and services, who assess the organization's financial capacity to ensure smooth payment settlement when providing goods or services.

Intelligent Consortium

The approval types discussed for traditional commercial organizations also apply to the Intelligent Consortium, though their weight may differ. Their underlying principles remain largely the same, so they are not repeated here. The key distinction lies in the Intelligent Consortium's unique organizational network, which, under the influence of consensus-building mechanisms, alters the presentation of these approval elements. Thus, potential organizational individuals must evaluate both the common approval elements of traditional organizations and the unique elements of the Intelligent Consortium.

1. Theoretical approval under Intelligenism: Unlike traditional commercial organizations (e.g., corporations or partnerships), which have established collaboration models and numerous success cases, the Intelligent Consortium is in its early stages of commercial application, lacking established collaboration norms or extensive success cases. Thus, under the Intelligenism framework, both individual participation and collaboration within the organization require strong theoretical approval as a behavioral foundation. In the absence of sufficient historical data, inductive reasoning cannot effectively drive individual behavior, making deductive reasoning based on theoretical logic essential for mobilization. Theoretical approval requires individuals to have a deep understanding of the theory and often involves engaging in discussions or debates with others. This helps individuals overcome the ingrained collaboration norms and cognitive inertia of traditional organizations, enabling a more cautious and objective evaluation of conclusions and the feasibility and value of mechanisms.

2. approval of Consensus-Building Mechanisms: Due to differences in individuals' environments, cognition, values, and goals, theoretical differentiation and the emergence of new theories are inevitable during theoretical development. Given these differences, individuals must recognize the necessity of theoretical openness and theoretical adaptability (see the sections "Theoretical Adaptability" and "Theoretical Openness" in the "Philosophy of Intelligenism"). Thus, individuals need to form approval of coordination mechanisms (consensus-building mechanisms) to address theoretical differences. When individuals with theoretical differences recognize the consensus-building mechanisms and accept their output (action guidelines), these guidelines can still drive behavior. Outputs include, but are not limited to, management systems, compensation plans, business models, and organizational network structures. As consensus expansion occurs, the number of decision nodes covered by consensus-building mechanisms increases, meaning more elements are included. As individuals recognize this expanding consensus network, they gradually transition from merely approving consensus-building mechanisms to endorsing

organizational approval.

3. approval of Organizational Network Structure: This must be built upon the approval of consensus-building mechanisms, as the organizational network structure encompasses both the organizational template network and the basic network structure of the action template, which is determined by the organizational template (see the section "Organizational Template and Action Template Concepts" in "On the Intelligent Consortium"). Both structures are outputs of consensus-building mechanisms. From a micro perspective, the organizational network structure reflects the roles of different organizational individuals and their corresponding collaboration methods (work styles). When an individual recognizes the organizational network structure, it indicates at least a basic acceptance of their role and the other individuals with whom they collaborate. Although the organizational network structure, like management systems or business models, is an output of consensus-building mechanisms, its unique role in the Intelligent Consortium warrants a separate introduction here.

Summary of Differences in approval Forms

Traditional commercial organizations typically exhibit a top-down structure. As noted in the section "Information Transmission Characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium" in "On the Intelligent Consortium," information transmission in traditional organizations is confined to designated channels. In contrast, the Intelligent Consortium's bottom-up structure enables information to flow freely in a fractal, divergent manner, with nearly all information eventually becoming publicly available.

In traditional organizations, individuals not involved in information transmission often lack sufficient information for informed approval judgments, relying instead on deliberately released or partially leaked information that may be incomplete or biased. This information dilemma means approval is often based on curated information, such as advertisements, brochures, embellished financial reports, or office spaces. Modern individuals may seek additional information through social media, news, or past consumers to verify and mitigate risks, but their approval remains based on relatively incomplete information.

In contrast, the Intelligent Consortium's transparent information flow provides more open data for approval judgments. However, this requires individuals to conduct more extensive analysis and operational assessments. Due to its information transmission characteristics, approval in the Intelligent Consortium relies less on advertisements or office spaces and more on authentic operational data, consensus-building mechanism content, and network structures to evaluate the organization's true state.

Consensus Expansion, approval Expansion, and Value Enhancement

When a theory undergoes consensus expansion and gains broader approval, leading to the construction of the Intelligent Consortium, it represents a stage of theoretical value realization, embodied in the organization's formation. Both before and after formation, continuous consensus expansion reflects an increase in the group's capability scope (handling more diverse matters within the organizational framework). This is because it enables individuals to access broader input channels, process diverse information, and generate corresponding outputs under the consensus framework. Approval expansion can manifest in various ways: increased loyalty or number of potential/actual consumers, increased capital from providers, reduced return demands, and increased labor or reduced labor costs from providers. This approval under the consensus framework represents obvious value enhancement in both traditional and Intelligent Consortium evaluation systems. Thus, the processes of consensus expansion and approval expansion are inherently processes of enhancing organizational or group value.

Pre-Construction approval Requirements for the Intelligent

Consortium

Based on my vision for Intelligenism, the approval types required before constructing the Intelligent Consortium include: theoretical approval under Intelligenism, business plan approval, business timing approval, approval of consensus-building mechanisms, and approval of organizational network structure.

To achieve approval from potential groups or organizational individuals across these dimensions and ensure smooth organizational construction, initiators and early potential individuals must design consensus-building mechanisms to form consensus on these elements. The first approval type required is theoretical approval under Intelligenism, as only with some degree of approval of the Intelligenism framework can initial initiators and potential participants choose to become part of the Intelligent Consortium. Unlike future consumers or suppliers, these individuals face a "void" scenario with no products/services for sale or procurement needs. They cannot be mobilized through product/service or financial approval, so their primary motivation stems from theoretical approval under Intelligenism. This approval may arise from logical acceptance of the theory or from observing successful cases of other Intelligent Consortiums. In either case, this approval motivates individuals to push the theory toward organizational construction, involving critical thinking, theoretical refinement, and critique, ultimately forming a comprehensive understanding of the organization.

Once initiators and participants achieve some level of theoretical approval, they can envision business model possibilities under the Intelligenism framework for various

commercial purposes. They can propose directions they believe the Intelligent Consortium can achieve with added value and form consensus with other participants under the consensus-building mechanisms. During this process, business plan approval and business feasibility approval gradually emerge. To refine and optimize business plans within a feasible framework, initiators and participants must propose an initial version of the consensus-building mechanisms, covering: 1) guidelines for optimizing and expanding the mechanisms, 2) guidelines for refining and achieving consensus on business plans and timing (collectively, business mechanisms), and 3) guidelines for refining and adjusting the theoretical foundation. In the early stages of Intelligenism, with few mature templates to reference, initiators and participants must invest significant effort in constructing these mechanisms. (I plan to attempt constructing consensus-building mechanisms in the next phase after completing this book.) During this process, the mechanisms gradually gain approval from potential participants through consensus-building mechanisms.

Once initiators and participants have achieved preliminary approval of the theory, business mechanisms, and consensus-building mechanisms, they must also reach an initial consensus on the Intelligent Consortium's organizational network structure. As individuals preparing to join an organization or venture, they need to understand the organization's principles, assess the likelihood of success, and have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities within the organization. Only by confirming the organizational network structure can potential participants clearly understand how they will contribute to development, exert influence, assume roles (positions), and participate in operations.

When initiators and future participants achieve consensus and sufficient approval across these three modules, the prerequisites for organizational construction are largely met, and the process of forming the organization can proceed. Pre-organizational materials are public, meaning the "consensus and approval process" may lead to the formation of multiple organizations, either from identical consensus-building mechanism systems or from theoretical differentiation during discussions, resulting in group divergence. In the former case, as the theoretical foundation and business models unfold, some potential participants may seek greater benefits by reissuing similar or identical mechanisms to become initiators. Disagreements during the construction process may lead to theoretical differentiation, preventing consensus on a single development plan or achieving sufficient approval, prompting the splitting of mechanisms' provisions to foster group divergence for maximum approval across all participants.

Part 1: Ecological Vision of Intelligenism - Timing Identification for Organizational Construction

After achieving 1) a relatively complete consensus-building mechanism system, 2) a clear and theoretically feasible business direction, and 3) a clear and feasible Intelligent Consortium organizational structure, all potential participants must reach consensus on selecting an effective and fair consensus-building mechanism execution platform. This platform can be self-built or utilize third-party software. While similar platforms (e.g., third-party forums, social media discussion groups, or community software) are used during the development of consensus and business mechanisms, their fairness and enforcement requirements are less stringent due to the lack of significant organizational interests in the pre-organizational phase. However, once the organization is established and engages in commercial activities, involving increased interests and personnel, selecting a fair and effective execution platform becomes critical.

Throughout the process of developing and refining consensus and business mechanisms, initiators and potential participants must assess the number of participants in discussions, approval degrees, and other progress-related data, continuously updating this information through self-operated or third-party platforms. These data reflect the development of the pre-organizational phase and serve as key references for potential participants to decide whether to support or join the organization. During this phase, initiators and participants can include guidelines and rules in the consensus-building mechanisms for periodic approval evaluations (e.g., satisfaction votes or written feedback) to track changes in overall approval. Hard criteria, such as the ideal number and type of participants or the scale of capital funding, should also be agreed upon through consensus-building mechanisms as key indicators for determining when to initiate the organization.

Organizational Initiation Trigger

When initiators and some potential individuals believe the consensus-building mechanisms are sufficiently refined to meet organizational construction conditions or receive requests to form the organization, they must reach a preliminary consensus on whether the timing for construction is mature. Upon achieving consensus, they can introduce an “organizational initiation trigger” to finalize the timing for organizational formation. The trigger mechanisms below are merely examples conceived by the author and do not represent the only options. Various trigger mechanisms can be innovated and developed in future practice, and multiple triggers may be used in a single organizational initiation scenario.

Organizational Initiation and Trigger Types

1. **Donation Trigger:** After reaching consensus on organizational formation, a donation channel can be established to fund subsequent actions based on the existing consensus-building mechanisms and action consensus (e.g., \$1-\$10 donations). These actions may include hiring temporary staff, setting up a website, or forming a company. Donations reflect potential individuals' attitudes toward initiation. Thresholds and caps can be set for total donations and individual contributions. For example, a \$5,000 donation threshold could trigger hiring temporary staff for further actions. Before setting the trigger, initiators must reach consensus with donors (quasi-organizational individuals) on the use of donated funds through the consensus-building mechanisms.

2. **Other Triggers:** Triggers could include hosting offline events like meetups or conferences, allowing potential members to discuss organizational details. Such triggers may be limited by time and location, potentially excluding key individuals; however, for Intelligent Consortium organizations that require physical venues (e.g., restaurants or bars), offline events can be a viable trigger.

Additional Implications of Triggers

Potential individuals can become initial members of the Intelligent Consortium through trigger mechanisms, potentially participating in voting to differentiate themselves from others who did not participate. Notably, donations via a donation trigger are not investment and the donors won't get investment return. For example, a consumer may donate to support the organization's ideology and structure, hoping to purchase its products in the future; a potential employee may donate to secure future employment; or a capital provider may donate to gain future investment opportunities. Donation or other trigger actions represent minimal contributions to drive organizational construction, neither constituting consumption nor investment.

Triggers like donations can provide limited startup funds for paying temporary operational staff before capital introduction, though the scale is expected to be small (hundreds or thousands of dollars). Triggers also screen for high-approval potential participants, fostering emotional connections or identity approval. Events like meetups provide further interaction channels, accelerating organizational construction.

Post-Trigger Organizational Arrangements (Consensus Content)

Trigger activation signifies the completion of organizational construction, but transitioning to smooth operations requires a clear and comprehensive plan. Before applying triggers, initiators, and participants should reach consensus on the following, ensuring implementation post-trigger:

1. **Organizational Construction Timeline Post-Trigger:** After trigger activation, the organization may receive limited operational capital or other support. A clear timeline must be set to avoid indefinite delays. If construction stalls, clear rules should address organizational failure and handle remaining capital appropriately. Significant work remains between trigger activation and operations, requiring scheduling and use of trigger-raised capital to hire temporary staff.

2. **Definition of Organizational Individuals:** Post-trigger, individuals transition from potential to quasi-organizational individuals (donors) or remain potential (non-donors). Consensus should address the influence weight distinctions between these groups to optimize consensus-building mechanisms, assigning different weights based on donation amounts, while setting limits to prevent excessive influence by single donors.

3. **Financial Arrangements Pre-Capital Injection Period:** If triggers raise operational funds, preliminary financial arrangements should cover budgets, reimbursement processes, temporary staff payments, and disposal of remaining funds if construction stalls.

4. **Personnel Arrangements Pre-Capital Injection Period:** Temporary staff arrangements for construction tasks should include work assignments, basic information disclosure (anonymous or non-anonymous), and calculations of individual's uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization (G'), proportion of an individual's uncompleted rights conversion in the organization ($G'\%$), and driving influence (A) (see relevant sections in "On the Intelligent Consortium").

5. **Disclosure Rules for Construction Progress:** Beyond confirming the timeline, consensus should cover rules, channels, and methods for disclosing construction progress.

6. **Punitive and Protective Arrangements for Rule Violations:** Supervision and evaluation of actual progress are needed, with punitive or restrictive measures for violations. Contingency plans should address failure to meet progress expectations, including re-entering consensus-building mechanisms to adjust arrangements or terminating construction and reverting to pre-trigger status to seek other opportunities to form the intelligent consortium.

Part Two: Construction of the Intelligent Consortium

--- Introduction

This second part of the chapter primarily introduces the content related to the

establishment of the Intelligent Consortium organization after the confirmation of the trigger. When the first edition of this book was published, the ideas about organizational construction presented below represented only my thought experiments without evaluating their adaptability to various real-world scenarios. This means that subsequent practitioners, when engaging in organizational construction practices, must develop appropriate solutions tailored to the real-world scenarios they encounter. Suppose the content below cannot be practically implemented in real-world scenarios or conflicts with their own ideas. In that case, practitioners may consider the content as an initial guide for the original template and make modifications based on practical needs.

In the second part, Construction of the Intelligent Consortium, regarding organizational construction, I will further divide it into two modules. The first module focuses on discussing the organizational construction arrangements after the trigger but before the initial capital injection. The second module will discuss the organizational construction and operational arrangements following the completion of the capital injection.

Part Two: Construction of the Intelligent Consortium

--- Construction Arrangements Before Capital

Injection

After setting the trigger, organizational construction enters a substantive phase, which is further divided into two stages: 1) the pre-capital injection stage and 2) the post-capital injection stage. The substantive capital injection distinguishes these two stages, and each stage requires corresponding work arrangements. Considering that no substantial capital injection has occurred during the pre-capital injection stage, the organization needs to make personnel, financial, and timeline arrangements based on the consensus reached regarding work arrangements before and after the trigger takes effect. Once personnel are in place, the organization needs to form consensus-building mechanisms and reach consensus on the following content:

1. Arrangements for the continuous improvement process of organizational content and development plans:

Whether in the organizational construction phase or after the capital injection, the continuous improvement of organizational content and development plans, along with the corresponding consensus-building mechanisms, must be continually optimized and iterated to achieve a higher-quality new consensus. Therefore, after the trigger takes effect, organizational individuals need to clarify arrangements for continuous development based on the existing organizational content and

development plans. Additionally, for the content mentioned below that requires constructing new consensus-building mechanisms and reaching new consensus, specific work arrangements should be clarified. For this ongoing process of expanding consensus, organizational individuals need to publish a corresponding schedule.

2. Detailed plans for capital injection and disengagement: (Preliminary plans for capital injection and exit need to be proposed during the commercial plan stage.)

The content of capital injection and disengagement plans should include the equity structure of traditional commercial companies to be established during the organizational construction of the Intelligent Consortium, how to complete capital funding based on the equity structure, how to align organizational development progress with capital injection progress, adjustments to G', G'%, and A during phased investments, and coordination and response plans for scenarios such as subsequent capital refusing to invest as planned, capital exiting, or new capital entering.

3. Organizational template operation plan and network structure in Post-Capital Injection stage (consensus-building mechanisms and consensus):

The organizational network of the Intelligent Consortium is divided into the organizational template network and the action template network. After the trigger takes effect, organizational individuals must first propose a comprehensive plan for the network structure and operational mode of the organizational template. This plan is not the final operational plan after capital injection, as the capital injection has not yet been completed. Consequently, the consensus and consensus-building mechanisms corresponding to this plan lack the approval of potential capital providers. This plan, as a preliminary organizational individual plan (including operational and consensus-building mechanisms), is mainly used during this period to introduce and reference potential organizational individuals (including potential capital providers). As communication with capital providers and other potential organizational individuals progresses, the plan will be initially confirmed before capital injection, taking into evaluate the demands of more organizational individuals. The content of the organizational template's operational plan should include consensus-building mechanisms for the action template and commercial operation plans.


4. Action template vision (consensus-building mechanisms and consensus) in Post-capital injection stage:

As introduced earlier in the book, the network structure of the action template is derived from the organizational template during the corresponding consensus-building mechanism process. Therefore, before consensus is reached on the organizational template plan, the network structure and corresponding action plans of the action template cannot be finalized. Although the action

template's content cannot be ultimately confirmed, it is still necessary to propose different plan visions and continuously optimize and adjust them under a temporary consensus-building mechanism.

5. Post-capital injection commercial operation plan:

The operational plan primarily refers to the business model and the organization's commercial plan. Undeniably, the operation plan will be influenced by the organizational template, action template, network structure, and operational plans. However, to promote the organizational construction process, quasi-organizational individuals need to reach consensus on a temporary organizational commercial operation plan within the organizational template's consensus-building mechanism process based on the temporary organizational and action template framework.



As shown in the figure above, the organizational template of the organizational network exerts a critical influence on the Intelligent Consortium organization by establishing consensus-building mechanisms for commercial plans and action template content. The action template organizational network, during the subsequent organizational operation phase, functions through driving nodes and action nodes in sub-networks to implement the commercial plan that has reached consensus.

6. Post-capital injection personnel management plan (consensus and consensus-building mechanisms):

The personnel management plan mainly refers to the configuration, recruitment, and selection plans for organizational individuals providing labor within the organization. The selection plan's content primarily covers the selection plans for personnel corresponding to different network nodes in the organizational network. The information disclosure content of the selection process includes the decision-making process, personnel information, and information about staff involved in the selection process. Regarding the disclosure of the personnel

selection process, the organization can conduct personnel selection in a video-recorded environment and achieve transparency through live streaming or subsequent video uploads. The personnel management plan must be confirmed only after relatively complete plans for the organizational template, action template, and commercial plan have been established. Considering that the initial personnel management plan is proposed during the pre-capital injection stage by temporary staff, quasi-organizational individuals, and potential organizational individuals, it cannot be clearly determined which sub-organizational network(action template) it should belong to during actual operation. However, at the initial proposal stage, the issue of staff network affiliation and their preliminary confirmation in the corresponding plans of the action template and organizational template should be addressed.

7. Post-capital injection financial arrangements (budget, financial system, etc.):

Once the organization has formulated temporary plans and reached consensus on the organizational template, action template, commercial plan, and personnel management plan, it can propose temporary financial arrangements for post-capital injection based on these. Financial arrangements include, but are not limited to, financial budgets, expected capital injection scale, financial systems, and financial-related network operation methods. Since financial arrangements may play a relatively important role in the subsequent capital injection process, they should also include profit expectations, capital injection procedure, equity structures constructing suggestion for capital injection, and response plans for partial capital withdrawal.

8. Post-capital injection third-party platform or proprietary platform application plan:

Before completing the capital injection and finalizing the confirmation of various plans, it is necessary to publish plans that require consensus and provide a fair platform for organizational individuals to discuss and implement consensus-building mechanisms regarding plan content, operational status, and future improvement directions. Therefore, organizational individuals need to reach consensus on the selection of a platform for implementing consensus-building mechanisms, information dissemination, and opinion discussions.

9. Information storage and disclosure for organizational operations:

After completing platform selection, organizational individuals need to reach consensus on which information needs to be disclosed and how it should be stored. Information disclosure channels may require permanent retention and irrevocability features, and information storage should also incorporate a certain degree of decentralization. Considering that the Intelligent Consortium may lose

control over certain executing entities due to capital disengagement (read the content in Considerations and Visions for Capital Injection below), the platform and method for information disclosure and storage should not be affected by the loss of control over executing entities; otherwise, the Intelligent Consortium may collapse due to such loss.

10. Project promotion to various potential organizational individuals and other external groups:

The project promotion process is mainly aimed at expanding the number of potential and quasi-organizational individuals. Its content includes not only expanding information dissemination but also information collection, feedback, and optimization plans for the aforementioned plans. Potential organizational individuals may become labor providers, consumers, or suppliers of services and goods for the organization in the future.


Part Two: Construction of the Intelligent Consortium --- Considerations and Visions for Capital Injection

Definition of Capital Injection:

Capital injection for the Intelligent Consortium organization typically refers to the process by which capital providers invest funds to participate in organizational development and become organizational individuals. However, it does not rule out the possibility that some organizational individuals substitute funds with labor, raw materials, services, production materials, or the right to use real estate (properties) to achieve an alternative form of capital injection. In such cases, these organizational individuals are also considered capital providers, and their actions are defined as capital injection.

During the pre-capital injection stage, the Intelligent Consortium and its organizational individuals need to reach consensus on the forms of capital injection to be accepted, how to price the interest on the capital injection, and how to allocate shares in traditional commercial entities. They should also publish the consensus content to support the organization's commercial promotion.

Operational Structure of the Intelligent Consortium and Capital Injection:



The figure above is a simplified diagram of the Intelligent Consortium's actions, where capital injection is primarily reflected as investments in traditional commercial entities, and capital providers simultaneously become shareholders of the conventional commercial entities (executing entities) within (under) the Intelligent Consortium. The commercial actions of the Intelligent Consortium, such as sales agreements, personnel hiring, and financial transactions, are primarily carried out through the traditional commercial entities within the Intelligent Consortium. In this structure, organizational individuals other than capital providers are highly unlikely to be shareholders of the executing entities. Capital providers not only act as shareholders of the executing entities but also participate in the construction of the organizational and action templates of the Intelligent Consortium as organizational individuals and may participate in organizational operations in other types of organizational individual capacities.

In the framework shown in the figure above, the content related to the organizational and action templates, including but not limited to consensus-building mechanisms, consensus results, organizational data, organizational individual information, operational data, and customer information, does not belong to the executing entities but is owned by all organizational individuals in a distributed manner. In the case of capital disengagement, the Intelligent Consortium organization can establish new executing entities and implement new capital injection plans to address capital disengagement or replace certain shareholders of the original executing entities, thereby achieving partial capital disengagement. Specific response plans depend on the characteristics of the real-world scenario. When some organizational individuals substitute funds with labor, goods, or services to achieve capital injection, these organizational individuals become shareholders of the executing entities as capital providers, with no substantive difference from capital providers who invest cash.

In this framework, even if capital disengagement leads to the paralysis of executing entities and the organization must temporarily stop commercial activities using commercial entities that experienced capital disengagement, the organizational

structure, information system, and personnel system of the Intelligent Consortium remain intact. This means the Intelligent Consortium only needs to complete new capital injections and establish new executing entities to continue operations. However, organizational individuals must still consider the interests and demands of capital-providing organizational individuals when reaching consensus on the organizational and action templates. Although the Intelligent Consortium grants greater influence to non-capital-providing organizational individuals in terms of capital injection, the organization cannot conduct organizational actions without sufficient capital supply. Therefore, the Intelligent Consortium must achieve organizational construction and operation based on consensus among various types of organizational individuals and a high degree of organizational approval.

Part Two: Construction of the Intelligent Consortium

--- Construction Arrangements Vision for the

Post-Capital Injection Stage (Formation Stage)

1. Establishing the initial state of organizational individuals' uncompleted rights conversion value (G' and $G'\%$) and A:

After completing the capital injection and before confirming the overall plans for the organizational and action templates, it is necessary to confirm the actual influence of organizational individuals. Therefore, after the capital injection, the actual calculated values of G' , $G'\%$, and A for organizational individuals need to be confirmed and publicized. After no disputes arise from the public disclosure, organizational individuals can enter the consensus-building mechanism process for the organizational and action templates based on the size of their A values to confirm the initial consensus. In the future, when organizational individuals exit, capital disengagement occurs, or G' values are adjusted, the organization needs to arrange personnel to periodically recalculate and publicize the actual calculated values of G' , $G'\%$, and A.

2. Completing the first round of confirmation for the organizational and action template plans (organizational template):


After the capital injection, the Intelligent Consortium can proceed with organizational template consensus confirmation based on the established consensus-building mechanisms. At this stage, although capital has been secured, considering that the consensus for the organizational template and the network structure of the action template have not been finalized, the organization has not yet begun operational expenditures. At this point, the injected capital remains in the executing entity's account, awaiting final confirmation of various elements. If the final consensus of the organizational template does not meet the expectations of all or some capital providers, they may choose to partially or fully disengage their capital. If capital disengagement at this stage leads to insufficient operational capital, the organizational

construction process will revert to the organizational improvement stage of the pre-capital injection phase. The process will resume only after organizational individuals secure sufficient new capital injections for another round of consensus confirmation. At this time, unwithdrawn capital should not be used for expenditures but should remain in the executing entity's account to observe process developments. Given that the organization may face the dilemma of capital withdrawal during the organizational consensus confirmation stage, the scale of injected capital should significantly exceed the organization's capital needs to avoid operational capital shortages or process stagnation due to partial capital disengagement after organizational confirmation. After reaching consensus on the organizational template, the organization needs to disclose and store relevant information in accordance with the consensus reached in the pre-capital injection stage regarding information storage and disclosure for organizational operations.

The consensus output from the organizational template should include an action template networks construction committee. This committee's responsibility is to evaluate the network structure plans, consensus-building mechanisms, and other organizational matters related to the construction of sub-networks in the action template. The members of the action template networks construction committee are determined through the consensus-building mechanism of the organizational template's organizational network, and the consensus must be reconfirmed by the organizational template network at regular intervals.

3. Personnel allocation, organizational construction for driving nodes and action nodes in each network of the action template:

Once the organizational template plan has reached consensus within the organization, the action template organizational network plan, as an extension of the organizational template consensus, will also be confirmed. After completing the overall framework of the action template network, organizational individuals need to construct the sub-network structure, personnel allocation for driving and action nodes, and corresponding consensus-building mechanisms for the action template network. Different sub-networks consist of specific organizational individuals forming their driving and action nodes. The network structure, driving forms, action forms, and consensus-building mechanisms of sub-networks, proposed by organizational individuals within the sub-network, must be approved by the action template networks construction committee before implementation. These elements also need periodic reevaluation, adjustment, and reconfirmation. Plans submitted to the action template networks construction committee for evaluation should also be disclosed to all organizational individuals through the organization's information disclosure system, allowing them to discuss, evaluate, review, and supervise the actions.



4. Preparation and personnel deployment for sub-networks:

During the process of confirming the action template structure consensus through the organizational template, a temporary preparation leader needs to be designated for the sub-networks to be constructed in the action template. This organizational individual is responsible for convening network individuals within their sub-network, providing an initial version of the consensus-building mechanism, and reaching consensus with organizational individuals within the sub-network on the final consensus-building mechanism, internal network structure, driving forms, action forms, network operation budget, and subsequent network optimization management matters. The final plan is submitted to the action template networks construction committee for evaluation and confirmation. Once the final plan is evaluated and confirmed, the preparation leader's duties are completed, and the sub-network will operate according to the final plan.

As sub-networks begin operating according to the plan, it signifies that the Intelligent Consortium has transitioned from the construction phase to the operational phase. At this point, the journey from theoretical proposal to organizational construction concludes, but the story is just beginning. After elaborating on the ideas related to organizational construction, this book cannot provide further visions or introductions regarding network operations. The complexity from theoretical proposal to organizational network operations inevitably increases exponentially, as readers can sense from the length and information density of the book's chapters. During the network operation phase, different organizational business forms may lead to significant differences in network structures and corresponding sub-networks. Therefore, this phase requires organizational individuals to explore, experiment, and summarize experiences in practice. As mentioned earlier in the plan, after completing the writing of this book, I will also begin practical attempts at constructing the Intelligent Consortium. Perhaps after some time of practice, I can explore various

visions, practical operational experiences, and reflective conclusions about the network operation phase in future writings.

Limitations and Prospects of Intelligenism

Introduction

Finally, we have reached the last chapter of the main text of this book. After the discussions in the previous two chapters ("On the Intelligent Consortium" and "Construction of the Intelligent Consortium"), I believe readers should have a preliminary understanding of the organizational framework and construction process under the Intelligenism framework. However, there is still a long way to go from conceptualization to the actual completion of building an Intelligent Consortium. This requires practitioners to have sufficient patience and courage to take the first practical step in an environment with few, if any, successful precedents.

In this chapter, I will first explore the practical constraints and limitations that may arise during the construction of the Intelligent Consortium, based on the framework outlined earlier. As the proponent of the Intelligent Consortium, it is my responsibility not only to articulate its mechanisms fully but also to present the advantages and disadvantages I can foresee objectively. Some of these disadvantages may not necessarily be insurmountable in future practice. Still, for any issues that lack a clear solution at the time of completing this book, I will highlight them. The limitations

discussed below do not encompass all possible shortcomings of the Intelligent Consortium; additional flaws or constraints may be discovered by readers and future practitioners. I hope that practitioners, while identifying these issues, will also work to refine the entire Intelligent Consortium system, addressing problems while making the system more robust.

Next, I will introduce the potential social value of the foundational framework of the Intelligent Consortium. Some of these social value speculations reflect my expectations when proposing the concept of the Intelligent Consortium, with the hope that it can address some persistent, unresolved issues in the world. However, whether these values can be realized will depend on the actual operation of the Intelligent Consortium in reality.

Finally, I will provide an outlook on the possible future development of the Intelligent Consortium. This represents the envisioned form, derived from numerous simulations conducted during the construction and writing process. As for its longer-term characteristics, I will explore and speculate further in future books. Like a painter imagining the final effect of a painting or an entrepreneur envisioning the ultimate realization of a business model, this outlook is not guaranteed to be achieved. Still, it represents the creator's vision, driving them forward like a shark drawn to the scent of blood.

Limitations and Challenges

Considering that the Intelligent Consortium differs from traditional Cybernetics-based commercial organizations, its unique organizational design may not achieve hard constraints under the current traditional legal framework. When the organization grows significantly and involves substantial interests, it remains uncertain whether situations may arise where specific organizational individuals violate established rules without facing sufficient penalties. For instance, if the Intelligent Consortium reaches a consensus on the expenditure plan of a sub-network structure at a certain point, and an individual within that sub-network violates the plan, the Intelligent Consortium may have no recourse other than expelling specific organizational individuals. For organizational individuals other than capital, labor, or product suppliers, such a measure may be inconsequential. Alternatively, if a shareholder of an Execution Unit, disregarding the interests of other organizational individuals and violating prior consensus, forcibly exercises shareholder rights to interfere with the unit's operations or transfer capital, the operations of the Intelligent Consortium could be significantly impacted. However, under the current legal framework, the Intelligent Consortium may not be able to impose sufficient penalties on such shareholders in accordance with existing commercial laws. Consequently, practitioners of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium must continuously innovate and explore organizational mechanisms and rules to provide substantial safeguards for the organization as a

whole. When certain organizational rules lack sufficient organizational guarantees, the Intelligent Consortium may be inapplicable in certain commercial contexts or scenarios. Until clear safeguard mechanisms emerge, I still consider this a limitation and challenge of the Intelligent Consortium.

As outlined in the previous framework of the Intelligent Consortium, information within the network spreads diffusely, meaning all organizational individuals can access all operational information if they wish. In scenarios where business expansion involves confidential information, such as a restaurant's seasoning recipe or a specific production process, the need to protect such confidentiality within the organization must be addressed. When the organization seeks to obtain intellectual property rights, current legal rules require such rights to be attributed to a traditional commercial entity or individual. My temporary solution is to encapsulate confidential research or recipes within a conventional commercial entity, functioning as a black-box input-output system that interacts with the Intelligent Consortium as an organizational individual. However, this raises another question: who should be the shareholder of the entity holding the intellectual property? Overall, I believe this could be a limitation in the future development of the Intelligent Consortium, requiring practitioners to explore innovative, scenario-specific solutions in practice.

Compared to traditional Cybernetics-based commercial organizations, the organizational power in the Intelligent Consortium is more decentralized. For all organizational individuals, greater decentralization indeed provides a stronger sense of participation and engagement, thereby increasing overall mobilization and reducing mobilization costs. However, the organizational characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium may result in lower mobilization for specific individuals compared to Cybernetics organizations. When exceptional individuals with capabilities and organizational value far exceeding the average—such as Elon Musk or Steve Jobs—emerge, the decentralized power structure may lead to reduced mobilization for such super individuals, potentially lowering the likelihood of disruptive innovation compared to Cybernetics organizations. While it is not yet confirmed whether this risk of insufficient mobilization due to power decentralization truly exists, logical reasoning suggests it is possible. This potential risk implies that the Intelligent Consortium may need to complement traditional business models in its network structure. For instance, super individuals could establish a Cybernetics commercial entity and participate in the Intelligent Consortium network as an organizational individual, ensuring sufficient mobilization at certain rights conversion points.

Readers of this book may also notice that the structural complexity of the Intelligent Consortium is likely significantly higher than that of Cybernetics organizations. While a bottom-up managed organization delegates its complex tasks to all organizational individuals, the intricate network structure may increase the overall maintenance costs of the organization in the long term. Although these costs may be distributed among all organizational individuals rather than reflected in the organization's financial

statements as operational costs, it remains uncertain whether the incremental value brought by the Intelligent Consortium's characteristics can offset this cost increase.

Due to the bottom-up collective decision-making nature of the Intelligent Consortium, the decisions it produces may not be suitable for matters requiring a few individuals to bear full responsibility. Additionally, in the foreseeable future, the Intelligent Consortium will need to operate under traditional commercial entities, which tend to favor individual accountability. This means that the organizational design of the Intelligent Consortium must still align with certain limitations of traditional commercial entities.

The collective decision-making and responsibility framework of the Intelligent Consortium may make debt financing under traditional commercial frameworks unfeasible, as the Intelligent Consortium cannot provide a few or a single guarantor. This implies that the Intelligent Consortium may only attract capital providers willing to accept its organizational rules when seeking financing.

Social Value of Intelligenism

1. The rules of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium reshape the relationships among consumers, labor suppliers, capital suppliers, goods and service providers, and other stakeholders in traditional commercial organizations. Under the Intelligent Consortium framework, all aforementioned stakeholders are represented as different types of organizational individuals, with their contributions to the organization uniformly quantified by Driving Influence (A). While organizational individuals must still consider the interests of capital suppliers to secure funding, the organization's operations are otherwise driven solely through consensus-building mechanisms between Driving Nodes and Action Nodes. This results in less hierarchical and more egalitarian relationships compared to cybernetic organizations. In my vision, relationships among organizational individuals in such an organization will be more equal.

2. The Connectionism-like information diffusion characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium allow for faster and more comprehensive information dissemination compared to traditional Cybernetics organizations, enabling organizational individuals to access more internal information quickly. This scenario, where individuals have easier access to extensive information, results in higher transparency and coverage of information within the organization. Information generated by the behavior of action nodes in the network can quickly reach more organizational individuals. Under these characteristics, corrupt or unfair behaviors by network nodes are more likely to be detected, making it easier for the organization to reduce or even eliminate internal corruption risks. The decentralized power and decision-making allocation in the Intelligent Consortium can enhance the overall participation of organizational individuals. Higher decision-making participation can increase organizational

identification, influence the form of Rights Conversion, and improve mobilization efficiency. Different types of organizational individuals have their own interests, and these interests drive the network to consider the needs and information provided by various individuals. This may enhance the sense of belonging among organizational individuals and reduce the concentration of interest distribution. Therefore, the development and popularization of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium may serve as a potential method to reduce wealth disparities.

3. In the Intelligent Consortium, all organizational individuals function to some extent as sensors and decision-making units of the organizational network. The diffuse information transmission form enables faster and more comprehensive information flow, allowing more individuals to make decisions based on extensive information during localized actions. This results in more flexible and externally adaptable action outputs under well-developed consensus-building mechanisms. The Intelligent Consortium's actions can respond flexibly and perform effectively in a wide range of real-world scenarios, even beyond the cognitive or comprehension capabilities of a single individual or a few individuals. In contrast, in top-down Cybernetics organizations, a few high-level decision-makers operate in a filtered information environment, making such flexibility unachievable. The higher external environment adaptability of the Intelligent Consortium's outputs is reflected in its ability to match the specific needs of different scenarios when interacting with the external environment through sub-networks. Its behaviors, products, and services demonstrate greater flexibility and precision in handling details. Conversely, top-down Cybernetics organizations rely on hierarchical instruction transmission, where top decision-makers often lack sufficient understanding or information-processing capacity for end-level execution scenarios, resulting in a lack of detailed control or flexibility. In reality, the value of outputs usually does not increase linearly. For example, in critical exams, scores of 25, 50, and 100 do not yield benefits in a 1:2:4 ratio; rather, 25 or 50 may yield no benefits, while 100 yields significant rewards. Similarly, in the context of battery efficiency and electric vehicle adoption, only when battery efficiency surpasses a specific threshold can the industry take off. Likewise, only when display chip computing power reaches a certain threshold does the AI industry begin to proliferate. In the case of humans as a species, while human intelligence surpasses that of other species, the genetic similarity to some species is over 90%, and some animals' intelligence may reach the level of a human toddler. Yet, this seemingly small gap results in humans dominating most of Earth's resources. The nonlinear, highly flexible, precise, and adaptive outputs of the Intelligent Consortium may enable it to surpass value thresholds in certain scenarios, creating new industrial possibilities and capturing significant shares of benefits in these new contexts.

Outlook of Intelligenism and The Intelligent Consortium

1. With the development and popularization of Intelligenism, the number of Intelligent Consortiums will increase. This will lead to intricate networks of relationships among individuals, Intelligent Consortiums, traditional commercial entities, and even AI programs, forming a complex, nested structure of mutual interdependence. As the number of Intelligent Consortiums grows, network complexity will rise exponentially, with mutual influence and driving forces among Intelligent Consortiums, individuals, and traditional organizations. As Intelligent Consortiums continue to develop, their intricate networks may stack to form higher-order Intelligent Consortiums, composed almost entirely of other Intelligent Consortiums and traditional Cybernetics organizations. With stronger resource integration capabilities, these higher-level entities may venture into commercial fields that require significant human and material resources, thereby forming a multidimensional network structure.


2. As Intelligent Consortiums emerge, individuals will have more diverse options when choosing organizations they want to work for. Greater choices will lead to competition among organizations in terms of structure, form, and development philosophy. The unique characteristics and operational effectiveness of Intelligent Consortiums may enable more individuals to choose employment opportunities that benefit them most. The inherent traits of Intelligent Consortiums and their commercial competition with Cybernetics organizations may help reshape labor-capital relationships in society and serve as a potential tool for reducing wealth disparities.

3. As AI advances, simple, online execution tasks performed by organizational individuals may gradually be replaced by intelligent programs, potentially lowering the organizational and social status of individuals engaged in such tasks. This will also rapidly reduce the cost of implementing such tasks, increasing the overall societal value of creative and collaborative work. In this trend, individuals will need to redefine their value within society and organizations. Under the Intelligent Consortium framework, individuals will take on more decision-making and collaborative tasks, participating as intelligent agents in the network's operations. Such decision-making and collaborative work forms generate new organizational value outputs that seem more difficult to replace by AI.

4. Considering the bottom-up, neural network-like structure of the Intelligent Consortium, its organizational individuals (akin to neurons) participate as intelligent agents in decision-making and driving processes. In this framework, AI, as an intelligent agent, can also function as an organizational individual within the Intelligent Consortium network, collaborating with human individuals in a bottom-up intelligent network for decision-making and driving. Organizational individuals may delegate part or all of their Driving Influence Weight Ratio to designated AI programs or grant AI partial influence weights in specific sub-networks with organizational consensus. In this hybrid human-AI neuron system, the resulting larger network may integrate the intelligence value of both humans and AI, creating a more intelligent

organizational network that surpasses individual humans or AI.

AI and Human Collaborative Driving Diagram 1:




5. As described in the construction of the Intelligent Consortium, setting initial development goals, consensus-building mechanisms, and development plans is essential, as are subsequent discussions and voting processes. In the process of continuously expanding and optimizing consensus, large-scale AI models can analyze information generated from organizational individuals' comments, votes, and other consensus-building activities, outputting improved business models, consensus schemes, and operational plans. This means that forum discussions, opinion expressions, likes the work got in the forum, and votes—common in Connectionism-based bottom-up governance—can serve as data sources for AI models, which, together with AI, can continuously drive organizational development and optimize various schemes.

6. Under the collaborative framework of Intelligenism, AI can not only serve as Driving Nodes, as mentioned in the 4th section, but also be regarded as a sub-network within the Intelligent Consortium. By managing the information input and feedback of AI intelligent agents (sub-networks), their behavior can be influenced. In this process, human organizational individuals can input organization-generated information, as described in Section 5, and feed the entire content of this book to AI intelligent agents, enabling them to understand the theoretical logic of Intelligenism fully. By providing the book's content, individual methods, and goals, organizational individuals can enable AI to generate solutions based on the overall theoretical framework of Intelligenism. Individuals can even feed multiple books from different theoretical systems to AI to explore further theoretical innovations. In this approach, this book

and others serve not only as sources for human knowledge and new concepts but also as data sources for AI participation in decision-making analysis.

AI and Human Collaborative Driving Diagram 2:



7. With the development of blockchain technology and the Intelligent Consortium, the distributed storage and immutability of blockchain can combine with intelligent contracts and digital currency-related technologies to create a more advanced form of the Intelligent Consortium. This new form may address the current legal inability to enforce novel organizational rules, providing stronger enforceability, safeguards, and fairness for the Intelligent Consortium's organizational design and the interests of its organizational individuals. The Intelligent Consortium also offers blockchain-based commercial models, more practical tools, and approaches for real-world implementation.

Epilogue

Thank you for persevering and reading this far. This must have been a challenging reading journey. Thinking, Conception, and Construction of Intelligenism, as my first book, is a non-narrative, “professional” work filled with new concepts and coined terms. During the writing process, I was deeply concerned about the readability, engagement, and expressiveness of the text after publication. When friends and family, who had a rough understanding of my writing plans, asked about the target audience and content positioning, I struggled to provide a concise summary. On the one hand, the development plans in this book differ significantly from the business models I have observed around me, which may reflect a sense of being ahead of its time, peculiar, or innovative. Regardless of how this difference is defined, for those expecting a simple explanation, the book may seem difficult to comprehend or even esoteric. On the other hand, the book’s direction and content exceed the understanding of everyone around me (at least based on my impression of them). I believe they never imagined I would write a book of this nature, as its content likely surpasses their expectations. They probably expected me to write a book on investment strategies, macroeconomics, or political economy. Under this inertia of thought, I could hardly discuss the book’s content or perspectives with anyone. Thus, this writing journey was a significant test for me, marked by profound loneliness. I also recognize that this book poses a considerable challenge to readers.

As I write this, it is already the first half of 2025. Reflecting on when I first began conceptualizing this book, over three years have passed. During this time, my surroundings have undergone significant changes, and I have made numerous additions and revisions to ensure the book’s ideas align with my current thinking. After three years of writing and refinement, if someone were to ask me the core of this book, I would say it revolves around “value” and “mobilization.” Perhaps in the future, I might give a different answer, or if I write another book, it may center on different themes. But for now, these two words encapsulate my thoughts. What is “value”? I believe that achieving one’s aspirations is a “value,” and pursuing those aspirations is a “mobilization.” The expansion of Intelligenism theory and the construction of the Intelligent Consortium are processes of individuals pursuing their aspirations—a process of mobilization, the emergence of intelligence from all things. When aspirations are realized, value is achieved. This, I believe, is the significance of Intelligenism and the Intelligent Consortium. Mobilization enables intelligent individuals within the Intelligent Consortium to make decisions, drive actions, and

execute—a mobilization from behavior to spirit. It is not the superficial toil of slavery but a deeply considered and creative endeavor born from within.

During the years of writing, I have continuously refined my aspirations, reordering my list of desires. In this process of self-discovery and contemplating my mission, I have simplified my life, fine-tuned my goals, and narrowed my scope of action to focus.

After completing and publishing this book, I will begin refining the website content and make the entire book freely available online, setting up comment sections under each chapter to address questions and critiques about the content and theory. These comments, critiques, and discussions will serve as valuable sources for future content adjustments and optimizations. Additionally, I will consider presenting some or all of the book's more challenging content in video format to lower the comprehension barrier, enabling those without a reading habit to understand the book through videos.

Furthermore, potential operational actions, such as forums based on the Intelligenism concept or other video content, will be gradually implemented in accordance with the process outlined in the book for building the Intelligent Consortium. I will maintain a blog-style record of my thoughts and operational progress during this process, both as a case study for building the Intelligent Consortium and as a continuous reflection on operational advancements. At this stage, I hope to ultimately create a third-party service platform (organized as an Intelligent Consortium) to assist other practitioners in building their own Intelligent Consortiums and to provide readers with a potentially effective organizational construction path.

In my expectations, realizing the Intelligenism concept and the Intelligent Consortium in real-world scenarios will be a tough battle. What I am doing is like planting the first banyan seed for a future banyan forest, testing and confirming the key elements that will enable that seed to take root and sprout. I cannot predict whether Intelligenism will merely be a joke, but having taken the first step, I will continue forward. Let us see what the scenery along this path will be.