The Cost-Benefit of Theoretical Adaptability
Continuing with the geocentric and heliocentric examples, we cannot rule out that the geocentric model still has adaptability in certain contexts. However, in many scenarios, replacing the geocentric model with the heliocentric model would yield greater adaptability, and even more advanced astronomical theories might perform better. This raises the question: why do some individuals in certain contexts prefer to stick with the geocentric model rather than adopt the heliocentric model or more advanced, precise astronomical theories?
Here, I introduce the concept of the cost-benefit of theoretical adaptability. In many scenarios, when applying a view or theory, individuals consider not only its adaptability but also its ease of understanding, its suitability for communication within local contexts, and the associated learning costs. When assuming a theory has adaptability value in a given context, decisions about adopting or replacing it involve weighing the costs of replacement against the potential benefits.
Consider a practical scenario: a computer runs software that adequately meets daily work needs. When the software company releases a more powerful new version or another company offers similar but superior software, most decision-makers evaluate whether to upgrade or switch based on effort and returns. They may choose to continue using the less powerful old software due to habits, the effort required to switch, or communication barriers with colleagues.
This software scenario mirrors a theoretical application. Decision-makers often consider cost-benefit when choosing or replacing theories. Sometimes, opting for a less adaptable theory allows individuals to allocate more time and energy to other pressing issues, leading to better overall outcomes.
In traditional societal or academic discourse, adopting more adaptable theories is seen as progressive, while clinging to suboptimal theories is considered conservative. In reality, individuals or work scenarios rely on a set of theories, and changing one part may improve outcomes, have negligible effects, or introduce barriers to collaboration or disproportionate costs. Thus, pragmatic cost-benefit evaluations remain necessary. We must also examine the reasons for conservative stances in theory selection. I advocate for cost-benefit-driven decisions rather than conservatism stemming from the assumption that one’s theories are absolutely true, which leads to intellectual rigidity. The former involves openly exploring new theories, weighing their costs and benefits, and making advantageous choices. The latter, assuming absolute truth, fosters extreme conservatism, intellectual confinement, and attempts to influence or restrict others from exploring new theories, leading to societal inefficiency and value conflicts. Thus, we should maintain theoretical openness and allow others to adopt different theories, whether we agree with them or not.