The Concept of Organizational Disengagement for Organizational Individuals
Before discussing organizational disengagement, it is necessary to clarify its definition. Here, I define organizational disengagement as the behavior of an organizational individual terminating future potential rights conversion relationships, which can also be understood as the individual detaching from a specific organization, ceasing to be regarded as an organizational individual of that organization. The Philosophical Foundations of Intelligenism argues that under the Intelligenism framework, individuals should be able to engage in theoretical disengagement (abandoning theoretical belief disengagement and turning to believe in or create a new theory), and the Intelligenism framework considers the freedom to disengage from theories as a key driver of theoretical openness and development in human society. In The Organizational Settings of Intelligenism, it is noted that in a slavery organization, slaves, as organizational individuals, cannot autonomously complete organizational disengagement, and this restriction on disengagement is one of the reasons for the low node individual mobilization degree of slave organizational individuals. Based on the views in the “Connate and Dis-Connate Organizations” section, individuals find it difficult to disengage from Conate organizations. In contrast, disengagement from Dis-Connate organizations is easier and less costly, which, in terms of organizational iterative evolution, manifests as Dis-Connate organizations evolving at a much faster rate than Connate organizations when measured by the lifespan of organizational individuals. This also reflects that the difficulty of organizational disengagement is negatively correlated with the efficiency of organizational iterative evolution.
Under the Intelligent Consortium organizational framework, organizational disengagement by organizational individuals is permitted and should be a frequent occurrence within the organization. During organizational construction, the Intelligent Consortium should refine disengagement rules for different types of organizational individuals to ensure that future disengagement behaviors by various kinds of organizational individuals can proceed in an orderly manner. Before an organizational individual joins the organization, the organization should provide clear disengagement rules for each type and for each individual. Organizational individuals should retain the right to disengage whenever the organizational template is fully adjusted. When specifying disengagement rules for different types of organizational individuals, reasonable disengagement mechanisms should be established for the following three typical scenarios:
1.Non-organizational template adjustment nodes; routine daily time nodes;
2.Organizational template adjustment nodes; when the organizational network adjusts its institutions and changes rules;
3. Unexpected or special nodes triggered by certain special clauses, such as buyers encountering product quality issues and returning goods, the organization facing unexpectedly high losses, or the organization being unable to fulfill salary commitments, etc.
For consumer organizational individuals, disengagement mechanisms may seem less necessary in some scenarios because, in the rights conversion relationship between the individual and the organization, consumers typically provide monetary ownership and control rights to obtain other goods or services. For one-time purchase consumers, the organization usually does not impose responsibility restrictions on the individual, so these consumers have no obligations or responsibilities toward the organization, making the necessity of disengagement less significant. However, for consumers who only need to make payments, if subsequent payment processes involve mandatory elements, establishing a disengagement mechanism to allow consumers (organizational individuals) to terminate such mandatory processes prematurely becomes necessary.
The nature of labor supply organizational individuals within organizations is similar to employees in traditional business organizations, and their organizational disengagement process resembles the resignation behavior of employees in traditional organizations. Therefore, the disengagement system for labor supply organizational individuals can largely adopt the settings of conventional resignation systems.
Disengagement Characteristics of Capital Supply Organizational Individuals
The disengagement characteristics of capital supply organizational individuals may be the most unique among all general types of organizational individuals. In traditional business organizations, capital suppliers are typically equity investors, creditors, or business partners. In conventional business organizations, equity investors can normally only exit through private equity transfers or stock market sales, rarely able to exit without a counterparty; however, they can generally obtain corresponding organizational voting rights based on their equity share. Creditors in traditional business organizations have higher priority repayment rights than equity investors, and debtors (the organization) typically have a full obligation to repay the principal of the debt. I will not delve too deeply into analyzing the partnership shares of partners here, as their settings are more flexible and variable, making it difficult to provide a specific definition.
Returning to the Intelligent Consortium organization, given the bottom-up organizational characteristics of a connectionism network, it is difficult to finance through mechanisms similar to equity or debt investments in traditional business organizations. In conventional business organizations, the amount of equity typically determines the proportion of control rights, which can also be reflected as the driving influence of equity holders on the organization. In the Intelligent Consortium, an individual’s driving influence is determined by their proportion of uncompleted rights conversion in the organization, meaning that other organizational individuals, such as consumers or labor suppliers who may not hold equity in the traditional companies under the Intelligent Consortium, can also gain significant driving influence. In conventional business organizations, company policies and decision-making schemes are typically decided directly or indirectly by equity holders, who bear the potential investment losses from company risks and cannot exit without a willing buyer (even if the company still has significant cash on its balance sheet). Instead, equity holders can ensure the security of their investments by participating in setting company policies and development plans. In the Intelligent Consortium, company policies and development directions are influenced not only by capital suppliers but also by consumers, labor suppliers, and suppliers of goods or services, meaning capital suppliers cannot solely rely on being the primary decision-making units for company policies and development plans to secure their interests. Additionally, in a bottom-up organization, it is difficult to pinpoint a single decision-making unit (final decision-maker), making it challenging for creditors to hold most individuals (group decision-making units) accountable for debt repayment when the organization fails to repay principal or interest as agreed. In summary, compared to traditional business organizations, capital suppliers in the Intelligent Consortium may face organizational template arrangements and development plans proposed by other types of organizational individuals that are not in their favor, and they cannot pursue debt recovery from a large number of organizational individuals as creditors. Therefore, capital suppliers in the Intelligent Consortium need to establish capital supply rules distinct from those of traditional equity investors and creditors, accompanied by a disengagement system tailored to the characteristics of the Intelligent Consortium.
Suggestions for the Disengagement System for Capital Suppliers
Definition of Residual Capital Supply Amount:
Before discussing the disengagement mechanism for capital suppliers, it is necessary to determine the amount of capital they can disengage, which I refer to as the “residual capital supply amount.” During capital disengagement, the residual capital supply amount represents the maximum disengagement limit. In my framework, the following items are included in the residual capital supply amount (though, considering the differences between projects, organizational individuals can add, remove, or innovate different items as per organizational requirements):
1.Original capital supply amount: The actual monetary amount invested by the capital supplier into the organization.
2.Unallocated portion of capital profit requirements: Based on the calculation method for G’ (individual’s uncompleted rights conversion value in the organization) in Example 3 (investors, capital suppliers) from On the Calculation of an Individual’s Total Uncompleted Rights Conversion Value in the Organization, when the annual profit compensation for capital is not distributed, it accumulates and converts into the residual capital supply amount.
3.In the initial stages of organizational construction and certain subsequent periods, some labor suppliers may convert all or part of their entitled labor remuneration into capital reinvested into the organization. For instance, in the early stages of organizational construction, if the organization faces capital shortages, some organizational individuals may provide labor services without receiving salaries, and their entitled salaries can be converted into the residual capital supply amount based on a calculation method recognized by other organizational individuals. This portion of the residual capital supply amount, under organizational rules, can receive future profit compensation like other capital supplies and may also be disengaged in the future under the name of the capital supplier.
4. In the initial stages of organizational construction and certain subsequent periods, some service or product suppliers can convert all or part of their services or products into capital reinvested into the organization. Referring to the third item above, they can similarly obtain a residual capital supply amount, receive future profit compensation, and disengage in the future under the name of the capital supplier.
The organization should establish an advanced announcement system for the disengagement of the residual capital supply amount. When a capital supplier needs to disengage capital, they must announce the disengagement action to all organizational individuals in advance and wait for a period before withdrawing funds from the organization’s liquid assets. During this waiting period, other capital suppliers may also request capital disengagement. In such cases, the organizational individual who first requested disengagement should disengage fairly and equitably with other affected capital suppliers during the waiting period. If capital is insufficient, multiple capital disengagers should proportionally divide all available organizational funds. During the waiting period, the organization can seek new capital supply sources to replace the capital being disengaged after the announcement.
When the organization’s liquid funds are less than the residual capital supply amount, after the capital supplier withdraws all funds from the organization’s account, they may achieve capital disengagement by liquidating company assets. Still, they cannot pursue recovery from other organizational individuals. Capital suppliers should consider the opportunity cost of capital disengagement and the potential for organizational paralysis resulting from ill-timed disengagement, which could lead to losses from failing to recover the full capital investment. Other types of organizational individuals need to fully assess the importance of capital suppliers and their interests when adjusting organizational templates, operational schemes, network structures, and consensus-building mechanisms, avoiding overly unfavorable adjustments that could lead to capital disengagement and ultimately cause organizational stagnation or collapse.
In summary, the capital in the Intelligent Consortium exhibits more flexible withdrawal characteristics than equity investors in traditional business organizations, as it can announce disengagement at any time and proceed with capital withdrawal. However, unlike traditional business creditors, Intelligent Consortium capital faces similar principal loss risks as traditional equity investments and cannot pursue joint recovery from other organizational individuals.
To ensure the disengagement rights of capital suppliers, the execution units (traditional corporate organizations or partnerships, etc.) under the Intelligent Consortium are typically controlled by the capital supplier group. However, the information platform, operational data, and communication channels of the Intelligent Consortium are owned by all organizational individuals and can be stored as independent third-party or decentralized distributed tools. This means that even if capital disengagement causes specific execution units of the Intelligent Consortium to cease operations, it does not mean the organization collapses. Other organizational individuals can still seek new capital suppliers based on the existing consensus-building mechanisms, information accumulation, and organizational template, reactivating existing execution units or establishing new ones for commercial operations.