Denying Absolute Fallacy

I believe “truth” and “fallacy” are conceptually opposed. Since we have rejected the possibility of asserting absolute truth, the question of what makes us consider a theory true or fallacious reemerges. As Karl Popper stated, a theory can be deemed fallacious once it has been falsified. However, with my concept of adaptability, I argue that Popper’s falsification only disproves a theory in specific scenarios (e.g., laboratory conditions), where adaptability fails—meaning it doesn’t work or lacks probabilistic advantage. While adaptability failure in specific scenarios provides valuable judgment for other contexts, it does not necessarily mean the theory lacks adaptability in all scenarios. Thus, falsification only negates absolute truth, and under the adaptability framework, it negates the assumption that a theory is universally adaptable. However, a theory that cannot be deemed absolutely true cannot be deemed absolutely fallacious either, as it may still have adaptability in certain contexts.

If a theory’s absolute fallacy means it lacks adaptability in all scenarios, we similarly cannot assert absolute fallacy, as we cannot test and falsify a theory in every possible scenario. This leads to the conclusion that a theory always exists in an intermediate state—neither absolutely true nor absolutely fallacious.