Competition and Theoretical Belief Disengagement

Referring to the previous section, I hope individual or organizational collectives can achieve a state of maximized theoretical adaptability benefits. In a static environment, individuals may forgo exploring new theories due to the short-term benefits of adaptability. Thus, balancing short- and long-term benefits when evaluating theories remains necessary.

I believe that introducing competition is a key mechanism for accelerating collectives toward the greatest common denominator of theoretical benefits. Competition makes individuals more cautious in evaluating benefits, as failure may harm their interests, increasing their motivation to explore and update their theory sets. In competitive settings, some theories may offer short-term benefits but lack long-term competitiveness. Sustained competition forces individuals to address declining long-term competitiveness, making it valuable to explore and experiment with new theories for future benefits. In fairer competition, this pressure affects more individuals, pushing the collective toward the greatest common denominator of theoretical adaptability benefits.

Preventing Theoretical Belief Disengagement is a significant issue in families and societies. Some individuals or organizations believe their theories are absolutely true, leading them to negate or alter the theoretical systems of others. This often occurs between parents and children, as parents, wanting the best for their children, impose their perceived absolute truths. Others, aware of the fallacies in their theories, restrict or eliminate competing theories to protect their interests, thereby maintaining their competitive edge under existing systems. Historically, when the heliocentric model challenged the geocentric model, some religious groups labeled heliocentrists as heretics, even going so far as to eliminate them to protect religious doctrines tied to the geocentric model. Such actions hinder the collective’s progress toward maximizing theoretical benefits.

Thus, whether driven by protective intentions or self-interest, asserting absolute truth or negating others’ theories obstructs theoretical benefit maximization. Introducing fair competition and allowing individuals to detach from certain theories at any time are essential for progress. I acknowledge the value of theories in specific contexts, but I argue that this should not come at the cost of preventing others from detaching or competing fairly, as such actions destroy greater value.